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Introduction 
'Since human beings are not merely political animals but also language-using animals, their behaviour is 
shaped by their ideas. What they do and how they do it depends upon how they see themselves and their 
world, and this in tum depends upon the concepts through which they see.' 
Hanna Fenichel Pitkin I 
This investigation is concerned with the possibility of establishing a concept of political 
responsibility. For, if Pitkin is correct and our behaviour is shaped by our ideas and 
concepts, then if we understand what it means to be responsible, and in this case in 
particular politically responsible, that understanding should direct or delineate our 
behaviour. Even the most superficial examination of the behaviour of those who operate and 
act within the political milieu would confirm that there appears to be a failure to accept 
responsibility for these actions. This, in Pitkin's terms, would suggest that there is no 
understanding of the meaning of a concept of responsibility, and in particular political 
responsibility. That this is the case seems to be borne out by the findings of the Butler 
Enquiry, into the events leading to the war waged against Iraq where it appeared that almost 
everybody had done something wrong but that nobody was responsible. 
The fact that it is possible to find many examples in which there are calls for the ascription 
of political responsibility suggests that indeed political responsibility is a concept through 
which we see 'ourselves and our world'. However, it would appear that the political realm 
consists of political actors who seek to avoid the ascription of and/or the acceptance of 
political responsibility. Is this because they do not understand what it means to be politically 
responsible or is it that they are all too well aware of the ramifications and consequences of 
I Pitkin, Hanna Fenichel, The Concept of Representation, (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1967), 
p. 1. 
such a concept and, therefore, seek to avoid it, or is it a combination of both? This 
investigation will explore the apparent gap between the theoretical concept and practice. It 
will clarify the possibility of, and also make explicit the parameters of the concept of 
political responsibility. In addition it will suggest strategies that may make the ascription 
and/or acceptance of political responsibility less objectionable to political actors. 
To begin this process of clarification it is essential to understand the prevailing environment 
in which claims for the ascription and/or acceptance of political responsibility are made. 
There is no doubt that "responsible" and political responsibility are terms that are in 
frequent use and appear to be afforded elevated importance in the political realm. In fact at 
any point in time, within the public sphere, there will be demands made to identify those to 
whom responsibility can be ascribed, and if experience has demonstrated anything it is that 
it will be equally certain that these demands will almost certainly remain unfulfilled. The 
diversity of the calls for political responsibility is illustrated by the following examples. 
From across Europe, come belated demands from Spain for an investigation of atrocities 
committed by both sides engaged in the Civil war and also to establish who it is that is 
politically responsible for the death squads, the GAL, in the 'dirty war' against ETA.2 From 
the United Kingdom there are calls to attribute political responsibility for the events that 
contributed to the death of the scientist David Kelly and the false "intelligence" information 
that appeared in the Iraq dossiers. From Germany come demands for the identification and 
prosecution of those who were politically responsible for the repression in the former 
German Democratic Republic in the Cold War era and in The Hague the international 
criminal court has begun to try those who are alleged to be politically responsible for war 
crimes. From Africa, the discovery by the Truth and Reconciliation Committee in South 
2 Woodworth, Paddy, 'The stain of Spain's dirty war', Irish Democrat, August/September 2001. 
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Africa, of those politically responsible for atrocities committed in the apartheid era, and the 
trials of those who are similarly accused in Rwanda and in Sierra Leone. From the 
Americas, lawyers still seek in South America those politically responsible and, therefore, 
justice for victims of the Pinochet regime; and in North America human rights activists seek 
to attribute political responsibility for international war crimes to Henry Kissinger and for 
the torture of Iraqi civilians to Donald Rumsfeld. 
As interesting as these diverse calls for political responsibility are, our real concern here is 
the confusion and complexity to which these calls for political responsibility give rise. The 
following examples underline this concern. At the time of the trial of the now late Slobodan 
Milosovic it was confidently asserted that Milosovic 'clearly shares political responsibility 
for the country's immolation, with his opportunist pandering to rapacious nationalism.,3 Or 
that 'with every passing day, Iraq becomes a bigger challenge than many Americans 
imagined ... Rather than deny that a problem exists, Mr Bush should invite the UN to 
assume political responsibility for restoring Iraqi sovereignty'. 4 A succinct example of our 
concerns is shown by the problems associated with the Victoria Climbie case. Climbie, a 
Nigerian child, was brought into Britain illegally, and was subsequently beaten and starved 
to death by her "carers". The problems associated with this very distressing case regularly 
resurface and remain unresolved. At a subsequent enquiry into her death, the lines of 
responsibility were found to be confused and in fact unfortunately still remain so. This 
confusion is illustrated by a conference declaration where it was suggested that 'it could be 
the [elected] leader [of the local authority] who would take political responsibility and the 
3 Milne, Seumas, 'Hague is not the place to try Milosevic', The Guardian, 2nd August 2001. 
4 Toronto Star, Editorial 28th October 2003. http://www.guardian.co.uk/editor/story/O, 12900, 1 072824,OOhtml 
16111103. 
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chief executive who would be ultimately responsible for the operational management'. 5 The 
Climbie case still leaves many questions unanswered, and the only person to have been 
disciplined and punished (apart from the direct perpetrators) is the newly qualified junior 
social worker involved. The problem with each of these cases is that there is no explanation 
of what is understood by political responsibility or how it could be achieved. 
These few of many available examples illustrate how diverse and elusive the concept of 
political responsibility can be. The need to ascribe political responsibility is very often in 
order to attribute blame or invoke sanctions, because 'people spontaneously attribute 
responsibility for the behaviours they observe. Attributions of responsibility are known to 
exert powerful influence over a broad spectrum of ... social attitudes.,6 This study is not 
however, an empirical investigation of political responsibility, although numerous examples 
are cited, but is instead a conceptual analysis. As a conceptual analysis of political 
responsibility this work will explore its meaning, to discover if indeed such a concept as 
political responsibility can be a real phenomenon in the political realm. It will also examine 
how political responsibility is used in everyday and academic contexts and the validity of 
such usage in the political lexicon. 
The problem with political responsibility as a concept is that it concerns the juxtaposition of 
two highly contested terms and is therefore about two words, nevertheless, 'it is not about 
mere words, not merely about words.' For, as Pitkin reminds us, for social scientists words 
cannot be "mere", they are not only the 'tools of his trade' but also 'a vital part of his 
5 Carvel, John, 'Where the buck stops', The Guardian, Society, 4th June 2003. Those attending the conference 
were from Local Government Associations, the NHS Confederation and associations representing social 
services and educators. 
6 Iyengar, Shanto, 'Framing Responsibility for Political Issues', Annals of the American Academy of Political 
and Social Science, Vol. 546, The Media and Politics, 1996, p. 60. 
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subject matter.' 7 Pitkin whilst discussing "representation" could well be writing about 
political responsibility when she states that considering 'the frequency with which it is used 
by writers [and commentators] on politics, there has been surprisingly little discussion or 
analysis of its meaning.' 8 Her observation about "representation", that there exists a kind of 
'reductionist realism' that asserts that 'representation exists if and only people believe in 
it,,9 could equally be an observation made about political responsibility. Theorists such as 
Niklas Luhmann, for example, claim that political responsibility is merely a necessary 
fiction on which the political system resides. Indeed, even one of the few academics who 
claim to interpret political responsibility, John Dunn, appears to be convinced that political 
concepts such as political responsibility 'are hopelessly abstract, general and hence 
inadequate in relation to the heterogeneity, intricacy and vastness of the facts of actual 
political life.' 10 This does not appear to be very encouraging preface to this investigation. 
Notwithstanding these negative claims the imperative of this investigation is in fact based 
on the damage that the lack of political responsibility inflicts on the polity. The first 
casualties of the lack of political responsibility are the profound problems that are created 
for truth and justice which impact on the health of the polity with devastating consequences. 
It is no less than an understanding that any failure to identify those who are politically 
responsible 'enfeeebles representative government and encourages political cynicism and 
passivity.' II Despite the difficulties, therefore, the confusions invite clarification and 
political responsibility deserves close scrutiny because of the potential its absence has to 
damage the polity. 
7 Pitkin, The Concept 0/ Representation, p. 1. 
S Ibid., P 3. 
9 Ibid. P 9. 
10 Dunn, John, Interpreting Political responsibility, (Cambridge and Oxford, Polity Press and Basil Blackwell, 
1990). Quoted in a book review by D. A. Lloyd Thomas, Mind, New Series, Vol. 100, No.3, 199 I, p. 38 I. 
11 Shklar, Judith, The Faces o/Injustice, (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1990), p. 83. 
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The first task undertaken was to review the available scholarly literature. This review 
illustrated the confusion and conflation of different types of responsibility. These 
illustrations underlined the lack of a clear understanding of the meaning of political 
responsibility, the scope of its application and to whom it can be applicable. The literature 
review did, however, confirm a limited but persistent consensus that the concept of political 
responsibility has in some way a direct bearing on the democratic political system and 
therefore required careful investigation. 
What was also revealed by this review was the lack of discussion of the concept of political 
responsibility as a discrete meaningful concept separate from other descriptions of 
responsibility. This was not because commentators failed to appreciate that political 
responsibility is a matter of intense concern and public interest, but was instead that 
commentators did not ascribe any significance to the "political" in political responsibility. 
Moreover, the literature review as well as revealing the lack of clarity and understanding 
also revealed that there are significant problems and influences that require further 
investigation. The conflation of political responsibility with moral and legal responsibility 
although problematic, was not the most intractable problem. The problems explored 
concerning agency and the disagreements over cause and capacity, demonstrated not only 
the contested nature of these areas but identified the vital importance of contingency to any 
discussions of political responsibility. 
The evidence from the literature review concerning the possibilities of ascribing political 
responsibility, not just to the individual, but to the collective, illustrated the essential 
importance of justice. The role of justice is essential because political responsibility, 
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although concerned with issues of the past, has a profound bearing on the future of the 
community. Arising from attempts to begin to address the problems that can occur when 
injustices from the past are not acknowledged and societies have to rebuild themselves using 
narratives that are at best incomplete or at worst a fabrication, illustrate that issues of truth 
also have a central role in any discussion of political responsibility. 
The literature reVIew also revealed the lack of any systematic discussion of political 
responsibility and how it relates to the "political" amongst even the most eminent political 
theorists. This omission is addressed in the second chapter, as the nature of the political 
plays a vital role in the understanding of political responsibility. In order to clarify this 
significance there is an examination of the thought of three political theorists, who do 
discuss political responsibility, Max Weber, Hannah Arendt and Jlirgen Habermas. This 
examination leads to three different but enlightening conceptions of the nature of the 
political that give us definitive contexts for our understanding of political responsibility. 
Political responsibility emerges as a completely separate discrete concept not to be confused 
with legal, moral, criminal or any other type of responsibility. For each thinker their view of 
political responsibility is circumscribed by their notion of the political. All three 
differentiate between the public and the private, but disagree about who can be politically 
responsible and how political responsibility is possible. All three thinkers also emphasise 
the difficulties caused by the contingency and complexity of the world. Arendt and 
Habermas also discuss the necessity to ameliorate the problems concerning choice and risk 
and the importance of truth and justice in this process. These considerations delineate the 
elements that influence the possibility of political responsibility and are discussed in 
subsequent chapters. 
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The first of these influential elements is contingency. The third chapter, therefore, examines 
the arguments between those who claim that the contingency of the world mitigates against 
any possibility of political responsibility and those who aver that this very contingency 
renders political responsibility essential. Notwithstanding these difficulties, political 
responsibility emerges as being essential to the political process, and more specifically to 
representational democracy. What is discovered is that it is essential to "give an account". 
This arises from the understanding that the notion of "responsibility" is integral to 
representational democracy. This understanding limits political responsibility to political 
representatives acting in a representational democracy. Although our efforts fail to discover 
a strategy that will offset the inherent unpredictability and irreversibility of the contingent 
world there is still scope to speculate on strategies that may mitigate against this 
unavoidable contingency. These discussions, therefore, lead to an examination of Arendt's 
strategy of forgiving and promising as they relate to the political realm. 
The initial literature review identified that the first casualties of the failure to ascribe and/or 
accept political responsibility were justice and truth. Arising from the previous work on 
contingency it is seen that the most devastating consequences for the polity arise from the 
sense of injustice and alienation. Further, the integral element of "giving an account" as a 
cornerstone of representational democracy indicates that the nature of that account must be 
truthful in order to allow for new beginnings which are not based on a false narrative of the 
past. Both these essential elements to political responsibility are examined almost in parallel 
in the final two chapters of this investigation. 
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What emerges is a limited and somewhat narrow concept of political responsibility. It has 
been possible to identify specific normative values inherent within this concept, which 
designate it as a discrete and potentially crucial ingredient to the maintenance and re-
legitimisation of the polity. This is a comprehensive and conceptual analysis of the 
possibility and the potential role of political responsibility. This understanding limits 
political responsibility to political representatives acting in a representational democracy 
and as such is in sharp contrast to claims such as those by David Blunkett the ex-Home 
Secretary. Blunkett remonstrated with citizens concerning their alleged failure to take their 
responsibilities as citizens seriously enough whilst simultaneously denying that politicians 
could be politically responsible. ' .. .in the eyes of [the] Government "responsibility is for 
job-seekers and single parents and not for the ruling classes.,,')2 Despite the efforts of this 
investigation, such a mindset as demonstrated by Blunkett would appear to make the 
ascription and/or acceptance of political responsibility a very remote and unlikely 
possibility. It was to circumvent such cynical claims that this investigation was initiated, as 
failure by politicians to acknowledge the concept and consequences of political 
responsibility is ultimately self-defeating in that it undermines their own legitimacy and 
more importantly the very legitimacy of democratic representational government. 
12 Cathcart, Brian, ''''Sorry'' has come to mean "Don't blame me"', Independent on Sunday, 18th July 2004, 
p.25. 
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Chapter One 
The Problem of Political Responsibility 
It is clear that political responsibility, whether expressly identified by the adjective or not, is 
a central part of our political vocabulary. Attempts to understand the concept are, however, 
problematic. An example of how problematic was evident in the reporting of the death of 
Lena Riefenstahl on 9th September 2003 at the age of 101 years. Riefenstahl was a 
controversial figure best known for her film of the Berlin Olympics in 1936 and 'Triumph 
of the Will' a stunning documentary of a Nazi Party rally at Nuremberg in 1934. Although 
fated by some for her innovation and as 'a visionary and pioneer,l she was, nevertheless, 
hated and despised by many who claimed that her work was merely propaganda that 
glorified a regime which had been responsible for the deaths of millions. Riefenstahl's past 
connections with Hitler and the Nazi Party had resulted in her being arrested and questioned 
by the Allies at the end of the war. Although she was never prosecuted for war crimes, 
nevertheless, she was never able to work as a major filmmaker again. Riefenstahl herself 
always denied that her work was propaganda, claiming instead that it was art. This denial of 
the political nature of her work was not accepted by the majority of her critics; thus, when 
asked to comment on Riefenstahl's death, the German Culture Minister Christina Weiss 
stated that Riefenstahl's life had demonstrated that 'art is never unpolitical and that form 
and content cannot be separated from one another. ,2 Also, whilst discussing her life and 
work on BBC radio news the Director of the Berlin Film Institute offered an insight into 
1 Berliner Morgenpost, 10 September 2003. BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-
Illhi/entertainment/film/30970 IS.stm Accessed 11/09/2003 
2 Washington Times, Obituaries, 10 September 2003. 
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why she aroused such hostility, claiming that 'Riefenstahl could never be rehabilitated 
because she never accepted political responsibility for her actions. ,} (my italics) 
This is a typical example of the way in which the term political responsibility is pressed into 
service. In this particular instance, the Director of the Film Institute gave no indication of 
how or why he had come to such a conclusion that Riefenstahl' s crime was her non-
acceptance of her political responsibility. Nor did the interviewer question him to elicit any 
further explanation, implying that further clarification was unnecessary and that both parties 
had a clear understanding of what was being said. There are, however, a number of radical 
and far reaching assumptions inherent within the statement made both by the Culture 
Minister and Director. The Director accepts the view expressed by the Culture Minister that 
art can be political (a view denied vehemently by Riefenstahl), and that individuals and not 
just politicians can and should be held to be politically responsible. For an individual such 
as Riefenstahl to be rehabilitated it is essential that they accept political responsibility for 
their actions and therefore seek forgiveness; it appears to be implicit that forgiveness is 
possible, although, in this instance, there is no indication from whom such forgiveness could 
be sought. We must assume that the Director believed that he knew exactly what political 
responsibility entailed when he used the term, but is this really a shared understanding? Was 
the notion of political responsibility so clearly understood by both interlocuters that no 
further clarification was necessary? These are just some of the problems that need to be 
addressed, if political responsibility is to be taken seriously as a concept. 
Despite its frequent use, however, the following review of the scholarly literature will show 
that political responsibility is an under-explored and often elusive concept. This is 
3 BBC Radio News, P.M Programme, Tuesday 10 September 2003. 
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significant because the lack of a clear understanding of its meamng, the scope of its 
application and to whom it is applicable results in political responsibility as a concept 
appearing to be everywhere and nowhere. This lack of clarity has serious consequences for 
the political process. This manifests itself in two different ways. Concepts and usages of 
political responsibility that impose very high burdens upon those held to be responsible, 
whether few or many, risk inciting strategies of evasion by the putatively responsible. In 
turn, such evasion induces cynicism amongst citizens as they discover that no one appears to 
be responsible. This was graphically illustrated in the worst tragedy that had ever occurred 
in a public facility in New Zealand. In the disaster that took place at Cave Creek, in which 
14 young people died,4 the fact that no high level minister accepted responsibility or 
resigned 'probably enhanced public cynicism. There remains a strong public perception that 
justice has not been done, let alone seen to have been done.' 5 Even the subsequent public 
enquiry 'seemingly failed to reassure a small population of 3.6 million citizens ... Herein 
may lie the real failing of political responsibility.,6 Conversely, accepting political 
responsibility can appear to bring with it such minimal sanctions that it has little or no 
credibility. Thus Tony Blair whilst appearing to accept political responsibility when 
commenting on the Butler report into the Iraq war stated ' ... for any mistakes made, as the 
report finds, in good faith, I of course take full responsibility,' but then failed to accept that 
there had been anything wrong with his actions and no sanctions of any kind were taken 
4 'On 28 April 1995, in a wilderness area of New Zealand's South Island, 18 people were standing on a 
viewing platform when it collapsed, plummeting them 30 metres below on to rocks. 'Fourteen of them died, 10 
almost immediately. All but one were members of a polytechnic outdoor recreation course on a geology field 
trip. Their ages ranged from 17-3l. Gregory, Robert, 'Political Responsibility For Bureaucratic incompetence: 
Tragedy at Cave Creek', Public Administration, Yo1.76, Autumn, 1998, p. 519. 
5 Gregory, Robert, 'A New Zealand Tragedy: Problems of Political responsibility', Governance, Yol.2 No.2, 
1998, p. 239. 
6 Ibid. 
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against him. Instead he reiterated his claims about the rightness of his actions stating that 'I 
cannot honestly say I believe getting rid of Saddam was a mistake at all. ' 7 
It will be argued below that this vicious circle is encouraged by a failure to confront the 
"political" in political responsibility. This omission leads to attempts to establish the 
meaning of political responsibility through general discussions of the concept of 
"responsibility" and discussions of generic types of responsibility. It will be demonstrated 
that this failure to clearly specify the meaning of the "political" in political responsibility 
and thereby establish its scope, inevitably leads to the unexamined conflation of political 
responsibility with moral, legal and criminal responsibility. This inability to establish either 
meaning and/or scope engenders yet further inconclusive discussions concerning to whom 
political responsibility can be assigned. Despite these reservations, the review of the 
literature does reveal some positive results. It shows that recurrent problems in the 
discussion of responsibility, whether purportedly political or not, arise from the difficulty of 
reconciling political responsibility with the contingency of the world and considerations of 
justice and truth. Subsequent chapters will, therefore, seek to provide a definition of the 
"political" in political responsibility and to show how this might be reconciled with the 
contingency of the world and those considerations of justice and truth. 
Since there are few, if any, attempts to deal directly with political responsibility as a concept 
this review will address the three identified major areas of contention, i.e. meaning, scope 
and agency. Each of these issues has a prima facie bearing upon the concept of political 
responsibility. The review will deal firstly with attempts to extract a meaning for political 
7 Cathcart, Brian, 'After Butler: "Sorry has come to mean 'Don't blame me"', The Independent Sunday, 
(London, 18 July 2004), p. 25. 
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responsibility through general discussions of the concept of "responsibility" and 
"responsibility" in its generic sense. Secondly, the problems uncovered by this approach 
generate a review of attempts by commentators to displace discussions of political 
responsibility in favour of discussions of political accountability. The third part of the 
review addresses the scope of political responsibility and deals with the tendency to conflate 
political with moral, legal and criminal responsibility. Finally, discussions concerning those 
who can be held to be politically responsible fall into three distinct groups. The fourth part, 
therefore considers philosophically informed attempts to approach responsibility from the 
viewpoint of the responsibility of the individual. The fifth considers debates about collective 
responsibility that have arisen as a reaction against this individualistic focus. The sixth, 
demonstrates how dissatisfaction with the perceived inadequacies of the displacement of the 
individual with the collective has resulted in a resort to identifying those who can be 
politically responsible in terms of their "role". What has been revealed by this review is that 
the lack of discussion of the concept of political responsibility as a discrete meaningful 
concept separate from other descriptions of responsibility is not because commentators fail 
to appreciate that political responsibility is a matter of intense concern and public interest. It 
is instead that commentators do not ascribe any special significance to "the political" as a 
concept. This omission will be addressed after the review of the literature as the nature of 
the political plays a vital role in understanding political responsibility. 
The lack of explicit literature which deals directly with political responsibility might 
indicate that it is perceived to have little value as a concept. This is, however, not the case. 
It now seems, that for modem men and women, 'responsibility is so integral a part of human 
relationships that in its various meanings and shadings it serves as a synonym for almost 
14 
every important political word'. 8 One would expect, therefore, that at least as a concept the 
term "responsibility" would be uncontested. The philosopher Gallie, however, has called it 
'an essentially contested concept,.9 The first part of this review, therefore, concerns the 
attempts to attribute meaning to the term political responsibility and begins with discussions 
that locate political responsibility as part of a wider discussion of "responsibility" in its 
general sense. The first surprising discovery is that considering how frequently demands are 
made concerning "responsibility" and "being responsible", detailed explorations of these 
concepts have a very short history. Chester Barnard, for example, noted with astonishment 
in 1950, that 'unlike "authority", "responsibility" has not been the subject of extensive 
literature, ... [C]onsidering the common use of "responsibility" and "responsible" in 
connection with politics, government, and organisation, this is a matter of astonishment'. 10 
The lack of earlier scrutiny can perhaps be attributed to the fact that "responsibility" was not 
a term used by the ancients, 'Homeric heroes had little use for [it], centring their moral 
vocabulary on merit and kudos instead.' II Although we now take the notion of 
responsibility for granted, and use it in many different contexts, in fact the term was not 
used at all in English until 1643. According to the Oxford English Dictionary the first 
citation of the adjective "responsible" occurred 'in a passage referring to the king as 
"responsible to Parliament". 12 "Responsibility" appeared in 1776 in Bentham's A Fragment 
of Government and was used also by Alexander Hamilton in No.63 of the Federalist 
published in 1787. Richard McKeon states that 'responsibility was first used in English and 
French in 1787, and was applied to the operation of political institutions.' 13 Although it 
8 Bovens, Mark, The Quest for Responsibility, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 22. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid. p. 23. 
II Lucas, 1.R. Responsibility, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1995), p. 5. 
12 Ibid., p. 5. 
13 Pennock, 1. Roland, 'The Problem of Responsibility', in Carl 1., Friedrich, (ed.) Responsibility, (New York, 
The Liberal Arts Press, 1960), p. 5. 
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seems clear from this discussion that the term responsibility when it was originally used was 
overtly political, this fact is now almost universally, studiously ignored. 
Although since the 1950s there has been a good deal more literature dealing with the 
concept of "responsibility", including discussions by commentators such as Hart, Spiro, 
Glover, Feinberg, Thompson, Jonas, Pennock and Lucas,14 these are philosophical 
discussions and follow a similar pattern. Glover and Lucas, for example, both offer a 
comprehensive history of the concept of "responsibility" beginning with Aristotle, but 
neither of them discusses political responsibility directly. Lucas does refer conclusions that 
emerge as a result of his general discussions of responsibility back to the political arena but 
by way of discussions concerning the responsibility of office and responsible government. 
Jonas and Thompson provide typical examples of yet another strategy. The account offered 
by Jonas has the advantage of being one of the few texts that directly addresses political 
responsibility. He does this, however, by relying on generic types of responsibility, for 
example, parental responsibility or ministerial responsibility. Jonas contrasts political 
responsibility with parental responsibility which he claims is the 'archetypal paradigm' .15 
Although he claims that political responsibility and parental responsibility are in some ways 
at the opposite ends of the spectrum, nevertheless, it is by examining parental responsibility 
that we can understand political responsibility. Jonas is not alone in adopting this strategy. 
Commentators who adopt this approach hope that an understanding of the implications of 
one type of responsibility may be transferable, and thus give insight, to the notion of 
political responsibility. The problem with this strategy is that it does not facilitate any overt 
discussion of what is political in political responsibility. Thus, Thompson also claims that 
14 Bovens, The Questfor Responsibility, p. 23. 
15 Jonas, Hans, The Imperative of Responsibility, (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1984), p.l 0 1. 
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we can aid our understanding of political responsibility by attempting to discover the 
characteristics of other types of responsibility. Although his discussions are centred squarely 
in the political realm, nevertheless, he does not even consider, except in passing, the 
possibility of political responsibility being a separate and discrete concept. 
Both Pennock and Hart, however, similarly argue that attempting to extract meaning by the 
process of identifying generic types is a flawed strategy and that in fact, "responsibility" has 
varied meanings in different contexts. Pennock claims that responsibility has two primary 
meanings, or more correctly a single core value with two distinct facets; '(a) accountability 
and (b) the rational and moral exercise of discretionary power (or the capacity or disposition 
for such exercise), and that each of these notions tends to flavour the other. In any particular 
application, either one may be dominant, but the other remains in the background.' 16 
Assigning different shades of meaning to the term "responsibility" is expanded and refined 
in the work of Hart, who has been extremely influential in this area. Using Hart's work, 
Bovens claims that as far as meaning is concerned, the term "responsibility" has been 
identified as having at least five distinct shades of meaning. 17 Responsibility can be used in 
a descriptive non-moral sense as part of a process (e.g. the stock market collapse was 
responsible for the company's financial difficulties) but conversely it can also be used as a 
moral imperative. Hart, for example, lists four distinct uses; responsibility as cause; 
responsibility as liability; responsibility as capacity; responsibility as role fulfilment; a fifth 
16 Pennock, 'The Problem of Responsibility', pp. 13-14. 
17 Bovens, The Questfor Responsibility, pp. 24-26. 
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is added by Bovens responsibility as virtue. (Hart includes virtue as a part of role/task 
responsibility and not as a separate category).18 It is not clear, however, how we are to 
utilise these definitions of meaning to facilitate an understanding of political responsibility. 
Although providing a general definition of "responsibility", which can then be applied to 
different contexts, including the political, might appear an interesting development, it leaves 
too much power to the interpreter. Rather than creating clarity it merely adds to the 
confusion because it requires an assessment in each individual case of which meaning is to 
be adopted. Rather than providing a definition of political responsibility, instead a choice 
has to be made of which meaning of responsibility will be utilised in any particular political 
circumstance. It fails to overcome the problem of who will, and how we are to decide, in 
any individual context, which of these meanings is dominant. Is it to be left to the 
protagonist to decide on which meaning he/she will give prominence? For example, if the 
term "responsibility" has so many meanings, then what role does it play in the ascription of 
political responsibility in the Climbie case previously cited in the introduction? Are all of 
these meanings inferred, or just some of them? Is the elected leader to be politically 
responsible in terms of liability, task or virtue, or as many suspect, because of its lack of 
18 Hart, Herbert L.A., Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law, (Oxford, Clarenden 
Press, 1968), pp. 211-230. Quoted in Bovens, The Quest for Responsibility, pp. 24-26. 'Responsibility as 
cause. The term "responsible for" can in some contexts be replaced by the word "caused" or "to have as a 
consequence" or some other form of words that indicate that there is a causal connection.' In this sense not 
only people or their behaviour can be said to have caused situations but also things, situations and 
circumstances. For example, his poor driving was responsible for the accident, or the falling tree was 
responsible for the broken greenhouse, or the SARS virus was responsible for many deaths worldwide. 
Responsibility as liability. "Being responsible" is often used in the sense of political, moral or legal liability 
(either separately or in conjunction). Who is to be held responsible for the decision to allow Dr. David Kelly's 
name to be made public? 
Responsibility as capacity. To be responsible in the sense of being able to be held responsible, one has to be 
capable of understanding what this means, therefore, young children, people who are mentally ill, including 
the demented, are often said to be incapable of being held responsible. 
Responsibility as role/task fulfilment. When we have a perceived role in society or in an organisation that it is 
our duty to fulfil this is called a role or task responsibility. For example, parents have responsibilities towards 
their children, auditors have responsibilities to shareholders, or David Blunkett in his role as Home Secretary 
has responsibilities towards Parliament. 
Responsibility as virtue. As a positive value jUdgement, for example, my son's teacher is a very responsible 
person. 'In this sense, the concept refers to a virtue, it suggests that someone takes his tasks and duties 
seriously, acts only after due deliberation and considers himself answerable to others for the consequences of 
his actions.' 
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clear definition, is political responsibility really being utilised as a "Sunday" concept in an 
attempt to add gravity without any real substance? 19 
Pennock reports that because the concept has so many diverse implications any idea that 
"responsibility" can be used in a generic sense is mistaken. It is suggested that the term 
"responsibility" should always have attached to it an 'explicit or implicit modifer'. This 
would assist investigations because they could then be 'confined to a single topic, such as 
''political responsibility" or criminal responsibility'. This would overcome concerns that, to 
take one example, '''political responsibility" has in common with moral and legal 
responsibility nothing more than the use of the same combination of letters. ,20 This strategy 
appears to have some merit. Cooper similarly identifies the usage of an "explicit modifier" 
advising us that this method has proved to be successful in discussions of another contested 
term, "self-deception".21 He claims that the adoption of such a procedure overcomes the 
problems created by analytic philosophers when they subject self-deception to an analysis of 
its component parts?2 Cooper makes a persuasive case for the practical application of the 
concept serving as a way to clarify the term without subjecting it to theoretical examination. 
Although initially this might appear to be a promising avenue of investigation, in the 
instance of political responsibility it is an erroneous development. In the case of self-
deception, "self' merely modifies "deception". The "political", in political responsibility, 
19 Bovens, The Quest for Responsibility, p. 22. 
20 Pennock, 'The Problem of Responsibility' , p. 4. 
21 Cooper, David, Existentialism, (Oxford, Blackwel1, 1990), pp. 117-118. 
22 This analysis results in an initial discussion of deception that is I who believe x set out to deceive you by 
persuading you that not-x. If self-deception were then construed as deception of oneself using the definition of 
other deception, then 'since a second person is required whom one intends to deceive, deceiving oneself 
deliberately seems to contain a contradiction.' We would then have to agree with philosophers such as Kant 
that such a claim 'smacks of paradox', all subsequent discussions are then focused on finding solutions to this 
alleged paradox. Cooper points out, however, that when the term is used in a practical sense by Sartre to give 
examples, what is revealed is 'a phenomenon that is not in the least paradoxical.' Kant, Immanuel, 
Metaphysical Principles of Virtue, (trans.) James Ellington, (Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merril1, 1964,) p. 91. 
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however, signifies the intrinsic qualities of a discrete concept hitherto unacknowledged, 
rather than merely modifying through description the theatre of influence or operation. 
Although the strategy of attempting to extract the meaning of political responsibility from 
discussions of "responsibility" in its general or generic sense is commonplace, it is always 
unsuccessful. This inability to establish any clear definition of political responsibility has 
resulted in the abandonment by some political scientists of the concept of political 
responsibility altogether. Whilst they acknowledge the importance of the concept of 
"responsibility" to the political realm they also understand its contested nature, and believe 
that the only way that clarity can be achieved is to abandon the notion of political 
responsibility in favour of political accountability. Indeed some commentators, such as 
Barker, claim that 'accountability and responsibility are different concepts, despite their 
increasing use as identical ones.,23 It will be demonstrated, however, that this strategy 
involving the abandonment of political responsibility in favour of political accountability is 
also invalid. Firstly, notwithstanding commentator's claims to be discussing "political 
accountability", they nevertheless succumb to the same temptations as those analysing 
political responsibility - they fail to give any real consideration to "political" and instead 
concentrate on "accountability". Secondly, despite the claims of commentators that the 
notion of political accountability is superior to that of political responsibility because it is 
able to deliver precise and definitive definitions, after examining these claims it is clear that 
they remain unsubstantiated. 
23 Barker, Anthony, 'Accountability and Responsibility of Government andPublic Bodies', Political 
Quarterly, Yol.2, 2001, p. 138. 
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This strategy is clearly demonstrated in the thinking of two influential political scientists, 
Keohane and Schedler. Keohane in 'Political Accountability' claims that his purpose is to 
'fashion a concept of political accountability that could be applied coherently'. He provides 
an example of the first problem when he advises us that when he refers to "accountability in 
this paper, I refer to political accountability.' One would expect, therefore, that he would 
proffer a comprehensive definition of the term "political". His acknowledgment that 
"political" needs any further clarification is, however, minimal, merely stating that 'political 
accountability relationships exclude purely personal and familial relationships ... such as 
those between parents and teen-age children'. 24 This is the only definition that he offers of 
the "political". Instead he embarks on the now familiar route of those who discuss 
responsibility, except that he refers to it as accountability. Similarly, in 'Conceptualising 
Accountability', although Schedler asks the questions 'who is politically accountable for 
what?' and 'who are the agents of political accountability?', nevertheless he also fails to 
discuss the nature of "the political". Instead it is only accountability that he addresses, 
dwelling on its alleged basic connotations of answerability and enforcement. Although he 
begins by asking 'What is the essence of politics?' his answer is power, 'in politics, first 
comes power, then the need to control it.' 25 Schedler does not enter into any discussion 
about the source of this power, and therefore his entire argument is based on the notion that 
power cannot be 'subjected to full control' and equally neither can it be 'opened up to full 
transparency'. This, by his own admission, reduces the notion of political accountability to a 
modest concept. 26 
24 Keohane, Robert O. 'Political Accountability', Paper prepared for Conference on Delegation to 
International Organisations, May 2002, p. 1. 
25 Schedler, Andreas, 'Conceptualising Accountability' in Andreas Schedler, Larry Diamond, Marc F. Plattner, 
The Self-Restraining State, (Boulder, Colarado, Lynne Reinner, 1999), p. 13. 
26 Ibid. p. 27. 
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Keohane claims that political accountability, unlike political responsibility, can be precisely 
located and is, therefore, a superior concept and that 'fortunately ... there is wide agreement 
on how to define [political] accountability ... '. He gives us examples from several 
commentators including one from Oakerson that 'to be accountable means to have to answer 
for one's action or inaction, and depending on the answer, to be exposed to potential 
sanctions, both positive and negative'.z7 He concludes that 'all satisfactory definitions of 
political accountability include, explicitly or implicitly, two essential features: information 
and sanctions. ,28 Schedler, similarly, asserts that the 'the notion of political accountability 
carries two basic connotations: answerability .... and enforcement ... This two-dimensional 
structure of meaning makes the concept a broad and inclusive one. ,29 
Keohane and Schedler are obviously convinced that the use of the term political 
accountability will deliver the precision and clarity of meaning that is absent from the 
notion of political responsibility. Nevertheless, even the most cursory examination of the 
etymology of responsibility and accountability illustrates that they are mistaken in that 
belief. For example, Lucas, Bovens and Pennock, each undertake a brief examination of the 
etymology of the word "responsible", and conclude that 'the term "to be responsible" 
suggests, both in its Germanic as in its Romance origin, the notion of giving an answer, 
respondere', 30 'I must give an account', 31 and in German and Dutch is 'formed on the 
basis of the noun Antwort, meaning "answer"'. 32 The definition of responsibility in the 
Oxford English Dictionary is "the state or fact of being responsible"; and responsible means 
27 Oakerson, Ronald J., 'Governance structures for enhancing accountability and responsiveness', in Perry, 
James L., (ed.), Handbook of Public Administration, (San Francisco, Jossey-Bass, 1989), p.114 in Keohane, 
'Political Accountability', p. 3. 
28 Ibid, pp. 2-4 
29 Schedler, 'Conceptual ising Accountability', p.14. 
30 Pennock, 'The Problem of Responsibility', p. 6. 
31 Lucas" Responsibility, p.5. 
32 Bovens, The Questfor Responsibility, p. 23. 
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"liable to be called to account; answerable (to person for thing).'33 'Webster lists as 
synonyms, 'responsible, accountable, amenable and liable' saying that they all mean 
'subject to an authority which may exact redress' .34 Further, Crabb (English Synonyms) says 
that "responsible" and "answerable" convey 'the idea of a pledge given in performance of 
some act, or the fulfilment of some engagement. ,35 When responsibility and accountability 
are viewed in these terms (with almost identical meanings and inference) it is difficult to 
understand why Keohane and Schedler believe that utilising political accountability rather 
than political responsibility resolves any of the problems. 
This strategy is partly explained by Schedler's acknowledgement that agents are reluctant to 
accept political responsibility and are aided in this task by a lack of an explicit definition. 
This lack of a clear definition can result in the terms political responsibility and "political 
accountability" being used synonymously. This practice is clearly illustrated in British 
government circles. The difficulties surrounding such discussions and the obfuscation that 
they produce become apparent in the comments from The Cabinet Office in Britain, when 
submitting evidence to the Scott Enquiry in 1994. It was stated that 'The Government has 
not distinguished consistently between the use of the terms "[politically] accountable" and 
"[politically] responsible", nor can it determine the use of the words by others. They can and 
have been used interchangeably even in the most authoritative texts. ,36 It is the desire to 
overcome such obfuscation (deliberate or otherwise) that causes both Schedler and Keohane 
to promote the concept of political accountability. Schedler claims that whilst you are 
always politically accountable to someone for something, 'responsibility for something may 
33http://dictionary. oed. com/ cgi/ entry / 502043 OO?single= 1 &query _ type=word&q ueryword=respons ib i I ity & first 
= 1 &max to show= 1 0 
34 http://;w-;;'.merriam-webster.comldictionary/responsibility 
35 Pennock, 'The Problem of Responsibility' , p. 6. 
36 Mather, Graham, 'Clarifying Responsibility and Accountability'" Government Accountability: Beyond the 
Scott Report, in CIPF A Report, 1996, p. 22. 
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go entirely without responsibility to somebody. ,37 He claims that 'the presumptive burden 
of [political] responsibility has become an easy formula to legitimate political power. .. And 
it has also become the formula to shed off prospective [political] accountability... In 
essence, while [political] accountability forces power to enter into a dialogue, the notion of 
[political] responsibility permits it to remain silent. ,38 Similarly Keohane also claims that 
political accountability is easier to promote, institutionally, than political responsibility. 
However, his observation that 'political responsibility without political accountability may 
often be important, but it is more a matter of moral character and psychology than strictly of 
political institutions' merely leads to further obfuscation by introducing an entirely different 
concept.39 
One reason given for the use of political accountability rather than political responsibility by 
Keohane is that there is wide agreement about how to define political accountability. This 
agreement, however, may not be as inclusive as he would wish. Schedler, for example, 
despite his promotion of the concept of political accountability, appears to disagree about its 
ease of definition. He could just as well be discussing political responsibility and identifying 
the main problems caused by the lack of an explicit definition, when he claims that 'due to 
its novelty, accountability represents an under-explored concept whose meaning remains 
evasive, whose boundaries are fuzzy, and whose internal structure is confusing. ,40 In 
British government circles discussions are often limited to an 'attempt to identify in the 
normal usage of the words "accountability" and "responsibility" ... tidy and precise 
37 Schedler, 'Conceptualising Accountability', p. 19. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Keohane, 'Political Accountability', p. 7. 
40 Schedler, 'Conceptual ising Accountability', p. 13. 
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meanings, distinct as between one word and another'. 41 Woodhouse notes that 'confusion 
arises from the failure to separate theoretical requirements and political practice. ,42 
More critically for Keohane and Schedler, Kutz claims that although sometimes used 
synonymously with responsibility, accountability is merely a subset of responsibility.43 
Gregory concurs with Kutz, agreeing that accountability is part of responsibility, thus, 
'whilst [political] responsibility is a duty of obligation; accountability is the need to account 
for - to explain, justify or tell a story about - one's actions to one's superiors in the 
hierarchical chain of command' .44 Lucas, similarly, claims that the central core of the 
concept of responsibility is that I am obliged to give an answer.45 Accountability viewed in 
these terms is answerability. Although he fails to articulate what the burden of political 
responsibility actually entails, Graham Mather claims that 'to be responsible is a heavier 
burden than simply to give an account.' He claims that to be politically responsible goes 
beyond merely having to give an account, that when 'properly analysed, accountability is 
merely a part of responsibility, a subset, something which makes it possible in practice to 
hold someone [politically] responsible. The giving of an account makes it possible to assess 
the factors which led a responsible individual to a particular set of acts and omissions, to 
place their behaviour in context and make a judgement of it fair. ,46 
When all these reservations are taken into account, abandoning political responsibility in 
favour of political accountability is not a means to overcome the contested nature of the 
41 Woodhouse Diana, 'Ministerial Responsibility: Something Old, Something New', British Journal of 
Administrative Law, Summer 1997, p. 271. 
42 Ibid., p. 267. 
43 Kutz, Christopher, Complicity, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 18. 
44 Gregory, 'Political responsibility for Bureaucratic Incompetence: Tragedy at Cave Creek', Public 
Administration, Vo1.76, Autumn, 1998, p. 529. 
45 Lucas, Responsibility, p. 5. 
46 Mather, 'Clarifying Responsibility and Accountability', p. 22. 
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concept of political responsibility, but instead to discuss a more 'modest concept', one that 
according to some commentators is merely a subset of the original concept under 
discussion. This reliance on political accountability leaves the way open for the rejection of 
political responsibility. Thus, the British government has argued that political accountability 
'relates to the constitutional obligation for ministers to account to Parliament', whereas to 
be politically responsible 'implies direct personal involvement. ,47 Thus, 'a Minister is 
[politically] accountable for all the actions and activities in his department, but is not 
[politically] responsible for all the actions in the sense of being blameworthy.'48 The 
inherent dangers of this route are again starkly illustrated with reference to the British 
government. Whilst giving evidence to the Scott Enquiry, Sir Robin Butler, the Cabinet 
Secretary, sought to limit the scope of both political responsibility and political 
accountability on several occasions. The result is that 'ministerial [political] responsibility 
for departmental acts has been defined away almost to nothing ... while officials have no 
[political] responsibility other than to Ministers.' The ellusive relationship between political 
responsibility and politicians and officials is further confused by Barker's assertion that 
[political] 'responsibility should be reserved for the politician's or official's formally 
determined relationships with their political superiors. ,49 The reliance on political 
accountability, however, to deliver clarity fares no better. The so-called "Butler doctrine" 
maintains that' [political] accountability is discharged by giving information to Parliament. 
Even if this information is misleading, and the Minister knows that it is misleading, the view 
is that no liability attaches unless the information is not given in good faith.'5o A very 
modest proposal indeed. 
47 Woodhouse, 'Ministerial Responsibility: Something Old, Something New', p. 270. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Barker, 'Accountability and Responsibility of Govemment and Public Bodies', p. 138. 
50 Mather, 'Clarifying Responsibility and Accountability', p. 21. 
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We can wholeheartedly agree with Keohane concerning the necessity of accountability, and 
also agree that it would be unwise to rely on any sense of responsibility and virtue that 
politicians may have. He cites US President Madison to support his claim: 'It is vain to say 
that enlightened statesmen will be able to adjust these clashing interests, [parochial and 
personal] and render them all subservient to the public good. Enlightened statesmen will not 
always be at the helm.,5l We can, therefore, endorse Keohane's exhortation that, in light of 
this observation 'to rely on responsibility without [political] accountability is too risky. ,52 
The resort to political accountability alone is, however, an equally risky strategy because as 
an incomplete concept it is too narrow and therefore far too easily satisfied. 
All of the strategies examined so far - discussions of responsibility in its general and generic 
sense and the abandonment of political responsibility in favour of political accountability -
whilst acknowledging the importance of responsibility in the political realm, have done little 
to advance the quest for a definition. Having identified this lack of an explicit definition and 
therefore the inability to establish the scope of political responsibility, the next step is to 
illustrate how this lack of definition generates alternative strategies which in tum create 
further difficulties. The first of these strategies to be considered is the conflation by 
commentators of political, moral and legal responsibility. Pennock reminds us that 'when 
one starts thinking about the general notion of responsibility, certain aspects or categories 
immediately come to mind' ,53 for example, moral, criminal and legal responsibility. He 
claims that there are well-established and comprehensive properties ascribed to the notions 
of criminal and moral responsibility, and if pressed, the man on the Clapham omnibus might 
well be able to provide a relatively comprehensive definition of what moral or criminal 
51 The Federalist # 10 (1787-88), Edited with introduction and notes, by Cooke, Jacob E., (Wesleyan, 
Wesleyan University Press, 1961), in Keohane, 'Political Accountability' , p. 7. 
52 Keohane, 'Political Accountability', p. 7. 
53 Pennock, 'The Problem of Responsibility', p. 5. 
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responsibility entail. This is not, however, the case for political responsibility. Thompson, 
for example, recommends that we examine the notions of moral responsibility and then 
devise ways in which our conclusions can be referred to public officials. He hopes that by 
concentrating on different types of responsibility, qualities and values can be discovered that 
can, by inference, be used to 'enrich our understanding of political responsibility. ,54 He 
fails, however, to consider what it is about the political sphere that makes it so problematic, 
failing to appreciate that political responsibility is of a different order to other types of 
responsibility (e.g. legal, or moral) because of the nature of "the political". This can result in 
immoral and criminal acts often being presumed to be political acts merely because they 
take place in what is thought of as the political arena. It also can make the burden of 
responsibility for politicians so onerous that it will inevitably lead to strategies of avoidance. 
There follows an illustration of this conflation in two different spheres, the first domestic 
and the second international. 
Woodhouse demonstrates the conflation of moral, legal and criminal responsibility with 
political responsibility, referring to various examples of Ministerial resignations, including 
Edwina Currie, Cecil Parkinson, Ron Davies and Peter Mandelson.55 Currie was forced to 
resign after she made statements about eggs and salmonella, which precipitated a drop in 
egg sales, the slaughter of millions of chickens and a loss of confidence and therefore 
livelihoods, in the poultry markets. Parkinson resigned when his private life became a 
matter of public debate and an embarrassment to his party. Davies, Secretary of State for 
54 Thompson, Dennis F. 'Moral Responsibility of Public Officials: The Problem of Many Hand', The 
American Political Science Review, Vo1.74, p. 107. Although Thompson correctly identifies the deficiencies of 
utilising generic types, and rejects both the collective and hierarchical models as inadequate when utilised in 
the political sphere, rather than discussing political responsibility he instead attempts to impose the much more 
demanding criteria of moral responsibility. 
55 Woodhouse, Diana, 'The Reconstruction of Constitutional Accountability', Newcastle Law School Working 
Papers, 2000110, pp. 2-4. 
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Wales, resigned after being attacked and robbed whilst on Clapham Common late at night in 
an area known to be frequented by homosexuals. Mandelson, Secretary of State for Trade 
and Industry, resigned when concerns were raised over the matter of an undisclosed loan to 
Mandelson from the then Post Master General, Geoffrey Robinson. It appears from the 
examples that Woodhouse provides that if a minister behaved badly in any area then that 
necessitated their resignation. Although Woodhouse offers no comments on the failure to 
discriminate between the private and public realm, as we can observe in fact only Currie 
resigned over an overtly political matter. The other resignations appear rather to be based on 
moral, criminal or legal responsibility and although becoming a matter of public scrutiny 
were certainly matters within the private realm. There appears to be no distinction made 
between the public and private life of the individual. That the conflation of different types of 
responsibility is also widespread is demonstrated by examples from both France and 
Germany. In France, there were demands for those who were thought politically 
responsible for the HIV "blood scandal" to be put on trial,56 and from Germany where 
Avishai Margalit delivering lectures on 'Ethics and Remembrance' for the Holocaust 
memorial ceremony 'conflates political with moral responsibility and confuses guilt with 
shame' .57 This tendency to conflate different types of responsibility leads to the burden of 
political responsibility being impossibly and unreasonably wide, and becomes too onerous 
to be accepted by politicians and therefore almost inevitably leads to attempts at avoidance. 
The same lack of any clear understanding of the scope of political responsibility also 
engenders a similar conflation between "war crimes" and political responsibility. This 
desire to ascribe responsibility to political leaders through the legal system is a relatively 
56 Roussel, Violaine, 'Changing Definitions of Risk and Responsibility in French Political Scandals', Journal 
of law and Society, Vol.29, No.3, September 2002, pp. 461-462. 
57 Alweiss, Lilian, 'Collective Guilt and Responsibility', European Journal of Political Theory, Vol.2, No.3, 
2003, p. 307. 
29 
recent phenomenon. Garcia-Mora, claims that it was first attempted after the First World 
War by the imposition of criminal responsibility upon individuals in 'Articles 227 and 228 
of the Treaty of Versailles which provided for the prosecution of Kaiser Wilhelm II and 
other German leaders' 58. Although this attempt at prosecution was a failure, it set a 
precedent and was next attempted at the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials after the Second 
World War. The Nuremberg Tribunal, and the verdicts reached, were landmark rulings 
because they changed the emphasis, re-imposing duties and obligations on individuals as 
well as on states. There are two sets of problems here. First, the acts of sovereigns, and by 
extension political leaders acting in the name of the sovereign, were traditionally held to be 
beyond the law. Secondly, political leaders are typically too remote from the physical 
perpetrators of acts held to be reprehensible. The case of Slobodan Milosovic was a good 
illustration of the difficulties that arise when the international community attempts to 
ascribe political responsibility to those accused of war crimes. Although our commentator 
Milne59, cited in the introduction, is convinced that Milosovic shares political responsibility, 
it is not clear what exactly this political responsibility is. It is in these very difficult and 
emotive cases that there is little clarity about the type of responsibility that can be attributed 
to those accused of such war crimes. In an attempt to bring sovereign acts and political 
leaders within the scope of the law, and especially international law, political responsibility 
has been invoked to close the gap between the political leader and the physical perpetrators. 
It is, however, not clear that the responsibility in these cases is properly political. 
This attempt to close the gap between political leaders and the physical perpetrators 
undertaken at the Nuremberg Tribunal led to the identification by The Tribunal of three new 
58 Garcia-Mora Manuel R., international Responsibility for Hostile Acts of Private Persons Against Foreign 
States, (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1962), p.36. 
59 Milne, Seamus, 'Hague is not the place to try Milosevic', The Guardian, 2nd August 2001. 
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kinds of crimes, 'crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity,.6o The 
outcome of the changes that were instigated after the Nuremberg Tribunal is illustrated by 
Babic who claims that now the international community presumes that immoral and 
criminal acts are political acts. He argues persuasively that despite the categorisation of 
crimes at the Nuremberg Tribunal into three new types, it is only 'crimes against peace' that 
are actually war crimes.61 The other two categories of crimes, dreadful though they are, 
need to be prosecuted in the normal course of criminal prosecutions and are not, therefore, 
the province of international courts. He argues that' a "crime of war" is really a crime if the 
act in question is criminal, and [that] the characterisation "of war" is, morally 
superfluous ... ,62 It is morally irrelevant that acts took place in times of war; war is merely 
the context in which the acts were undertaken. Although Milne confidently asserts that 
Milosovic 'clearly shares political responsibility for the country's immolation', if we agree 
with Babic, then crimes such as rape, torture and mass killings, although carried out in the 
arena of war, are nevertheless, nothing more nor less than criminal acts. To this extent 
Milosovic was, therefore, not being tried in The Hague for his political responsibility but 
rather his criminal responsibility. If, as our commentator claims, politicians like Milosovic 
pandered opportunistically to rapacious nationalism that in tum led to conflict, then his 
incitement to racial or religious hatred is a criminal category. As Babic demonstrates, 
however, it is only the aggressive losers in a conflict who are subject to indictment for 
'crimes against peace'. This has serious implications for claims concerning political 
responsibility. For, although Babic claims that these crimes are 'simply political', he is not 
indicating that the nature of the crime is political but the nature of the decisions taken by the 
60 Gewith, Alan 'War Crimes and Human Rights', Jokie Aleksandar (ed.), War Crimes and Collective 
Wrongdoing, (Oxford, Blackwell, 2001), p. 49. 
61 Babic Jovan, 'War Crimes: Moral, Legal or Simply Political?' Jokic Aleksandar (ed.), War Crimes and 
Collective Wrongdoing, p. 63 
62 Ibid., p. 59. 
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prosecuting authorities is political; ' ... prosecuting war crimes is a political practice, even 
when it is described in legal and moral terms. ,63 These decisions are based on the wish to 
punish the aggressive loser because they are perceived to have flouted the moral values 
espoused by the prosecuting authority. This prosecution may be by the international 
community or, as Babic notes, it may simply be a court of the victorious side, or a court 
espousing the moral values of a superpower.64 In any event, what is on trial are the moral 
values of the aggressive loser rather than any attempt to assign political responsibility. 
An alternative strategy for dealing with those who are perceived to have broken 
international conventions is suggested by Thorneycroft. She argues for Courts of 
International Delinquency in order to arbitrate in contested cases. These courts would have 
the 'power to recommend that a politician, diplomat or other representative of one country 
who has officially given orders in breach of international obligations, should be treated as 
persona non grata by all states. ,65 She does not make it clear, however, if this refers to 
criminal, moral or political decisions. By conflating what are criminal and moral 
responsibilities into political responsibility, rather than clarifying the situation it merely 
brings the concept of political responsibility into further disrepute. These illustrations of the 
tendency to conflate political responsibility with moral, legal and criminal responsibility 
demonstrate that without a proper definition and understanding, the scope of political 
responsibility can be expanded to such an extent that it merely invites evasion. 
The final part of this review will concentrate on agency. Whilst still acknowledging the 
centrality of the concept of responsibility in the moral and political realm, an alternative 
63 Babic, 'War Crimes: Moral, Legal or Simply Political?' p. 68. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Thomeycroft, Elizabeth, Personal Responsibility and the Law o/Nations, (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff" 
1961), p. 22. 
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strategy adopted by some philosophers is to focus instead on who can be held responsible. 
This is an attempt to overcome the lack of definition and therefore the scope of political 
responsibility. The literature that exists in this area comprises two broad schools of thought, 
one is that responsibility in whichever realm it is to be ascribed, belongs rightly to the 
individual, the alternative view is that it is possible to ascribe responsibility to collectives. 
The discussions that ascribe responsibility to the individual have centred on capacity and 
cause. As far as the capacity of an individual to be held responsible, the literature review of 
such discussions reveals that rather than reaching any agreed conclusions, philosophers 
disagree profoundly over this question and, therefore, capacity remains resolutely contested. 
For an example, we will return to the attempt by Jonas, cited earlier, to define political 
responsibility by contrasting parental responsibility with political responsibility. Jonas 
claims that a property of parental responsibility is to 'encompass the total being of their 
object' and similarly, 'for the duration of his office or his power, [the statesman has 
political] responsibility for the total life of the community ... ,66 The discussion in a later 
chapter of the problem of contingency although firmly attributing political responsibility to 
the "statesman", nevertheless concludes that the scope of political responsibility is restricted 
to decision making concerning "high policy". We find here a conceptual problem. Jonas 
correctly attributes political responsibility to the political representative. However, his 
description of that responsibility as being analogous to parental responsibility and therefore 
all encompassing (the total life of the community), without taking into consideration the 
problem of contingency, sets an impossibly high standard that statesmen are, quite rightly, 
likely to reject. The political representative's rejection of his political responsibility for the 
'total life of the community' will mean that he can deny that he has political responsibility 
for it. As has been already illustrated by the Cave Creek disaster the significance of the 
66 Jonas, The Imperative of Responsibility, pp. 10 1-102. 
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consequences of attempts to evade political responsibility are clear. The public enquiry 
found the fact that no high level minister accepted responsibility 'probably enhanced public 
cynicism. There remains a strong public perception that justice has not been done, let alone 
seen to have been done. ,67 Thus, the consequences of the evasion or denial of political 
responsibility, its lasting damage to the polity, are explored in the chapter on injustice. That 
the political representative has some political responsibility is however, clear and the 
subsequent chapter which deals with forgiveness and promising will discuss means by 
which sanctions can be effective without being excessive. 
This recognition of the contested nature of capacity (of a political representative to be 
ascribed political responsibility), has led other philosophers to rely on causation, but as will 
be demonstrated this also remains a contested issue. Discussions of the 'capacity of an agent 
to be ascribed responsibility, therefore, add little to the clarification of political 
responsibility but they do help to emphasise some troubling aspects of responsibility in 
general that will be taken into account in presenting a viable account of political 
responsibility. 
While strict determinism will be rejected, individuals do, however, act in the light of social 
and cultural constraints that, in significantly divergent ways, have been so interpreted as to 
amount to the exoneration of the individual. Firstly, it has been held that cultural 
interpretations of acts make it impossible for the individual to understand his or her acts as 
reprehensible. Secondly, an extension of this argument actually upholds the general 
principle of responsibility, and purportedly condemns not only the physical perpetrators, but 
also the entire population that is in thrall to the reprehensible cultural interpretation. The 
67 Gregory, 'A New Zealand Tragedy: Problems of political responsibility', p. 239. 
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first case directly diminishes responsibility. The second case apparently inflates it but in 
doing so makes it difficult to hold anyone in particular responsible. Yet in both cases, 
indeed especially in the latter, justice seems to demand that someone be held responsible. 
The first review will be of discussions that are based on the notion of the individual. It soon 
becomes clear, however, that there are going to be problems with this strategy from the 
outset. As Lucas reminds us, 'responsibility, though central in our moral and political 
thinking, can nonetheless be impugned. ,68 Any claims made for the capacity of an agent to 
have responsibility ascribed to them are resolutely challenged by the philosophical claims 
made by determinists and post-modernists. It is these groups of thinkers who are most 
convinced that individuals cannot be held responsible. The arguments postulated for 
determinism, such as those found in Determinism, Free Will and Moral Responsibility 
edited by Dworkin, assert that responsibility is an incoherent concept because the universe 
is a deterministic system.69 The very notion of responsibility, therefore, is inconsistent with 
the determinist's claims that we only react to stimuli that are entirely determined by our 
genetic make-up and coloured by our past experiences.7o In contrast, the concept of 
"responsibility" 'presupposes that there are agents, that agents act for reasons, and that it is 
up to an agent whether he/she acts or not.' 71 The argument proceeds thus: for an agent to be 
said to have free will she must be able to make choices; these choices must not just be 
theoretical but genuinely possible. This freedom to act is defined, roughly, for thinkers such 
as Locke, Hume and Mill, as being able to do what one wishes to do.72 For these thinkers, 
68 Lucas, Responsibility, p. 12. 
69 Dworkin Gerald, Determinism. Free Will and Moral Responsibility, (New Jersey, Prentice Hall,1970), 
~p.I-5. 
o Lucas, Responsibility, p. 2. 
71 Ibid., p. 12. 
72 Dworkin, Gerald, (ed.), Determinism, Free Will and Moral Responsibility, (New Jersey, Prentice-Hall, 
1970), 'Introduction', p. 9. 
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further enquiries into whether an· individual was indoctrinated, manipulated etc., are 
illegitimate, unnecessary further steps. The determinists claim that their theory relieves the 
individual of the burden of vengeance and vindictiveness. Those, however, who dismiss the 
arguments of the determinists such as Spinoza, Marx and Freud, claim that rather than 
simply relieving the burden of vengeance and vindictiveness, the determinists have instead 
destroyed the entire notion of a human agent and thereby the capability to hold anyone 
responsible. 73 
Similarly, Habermas criticises post-modernists such as Foucault, for the way in which 
Foucault conceptualises power; that is, modem strategies of power seem to operate 
independently of responsible human agents. 'While the Foucaultian conception of power 
helps overcome a crude distinction between a perpetrator-class and victim-class in society, 
... this appears to be achieved at the cost of understanding individuals as creative social 
agents. ,74 Isaiah Berlin eloquently outlines the problems that would occur if we were to 
accept the arguments for determinism. He believed that the results would be untenable and 
also counter-intuitive. It would require 
... changes in the whole of our language, our moral terminology, our attitudes towards 
one another, our views of history, of society, and of everything else will be too 
profound to be even adumbrated. The concepts of praise and blame, innocence and guilt 
and individual responsibility from which we started are but a small element in the 
structure, which would collapse or disappear. Our words - our modes of speech and 
thought - would be transformed in literally unimaginable ways; the notions of choice, 
of responsibility, of freedom, are so deeply embedded in our outlook, that our new life, 
73 Dworkin, (ed.), Determinism, Free Will and Moral Responsibility, p. 10. 
74 Schaap Andrew, 'Power and Responsibility: Should we spare the King's Head?', Politics, VoL 20, No.3, 
2000, pp. 132-133. 
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as creatures in a world genuinely lacking in these concepts, can, I should maintain, be 
conceived by us only with the greatest difficulty.75 
In order to proceed, therefore, we will have to accept the notion of agency and dismiss the 
claims of the determinists and post-modernists . 
. Discussions concerning the ability of an agent to be held responsible almost immediately 
develop into discussions of the capacity of the agent. Glover and Lucas offer typical 
examples of arguments that centre on the individual as the bearer of responsibility. They 
both begin their discussions with Aristotle, although Aristotle in fact never actually used the 
term "responsible". He did, however, make references to something that greatly resembles 
the concept of responsibility, in the Nicomachean and Eudemian Ethics. 76 This is why it is 
Aristotle who is credited with the first systematic discussion of personal responsibility in 
response to the contentious claim, attributed by Plato to Socrates, that nobody errs 
voluntarily. Aristotle sets about 'reinstating the common-sense view that people do in fact 
do wrong deliberately. Hence he is primarily concerned with the cases where something has 
gone wrong, and considering then to what extent the action was voluntary.' 77 Thus, 
Aristotle asks, why did you do it/ not do it? In answering this question you give an account 
(logon) of your action or inaction. When accused of such action or inaction, you might be 
able to state that there has been a mistake, in fact you did not do it, or if accused of inaction, 
that you did indeed do it. Alternatively, it might be that even though you did do it, you did 
not act freely, you were compelled to do it, or that you did it/did not do it through ignorance. 
75 Berlin, Isaiah, Four Concepts o/Liberty, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 113, quoted in Lucas, 
Responsibility, p.12. 
76 Aristotle,Nichomachean Ethics, III. 1.3, IIIoal-3, and III. 1.6,IIIOa 15-18; cf Eudemian Ethics, II. 6, 1223"9-
18. 
77 Lucas, Responsibility, pp. 275-279. 
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These very early discussions by Aristotle of personal responsibility are utilised by 
philosophers as the basis for many of the subsequent discussions of responsibility in 
general. The basic Aristotelian premise, which according to many commentators is still 
relevant, is that when something goes wrong the questions that should be asked are, was the 
action voluntary, and was the agent culpable? 78 
It is assumed that Aristotle's basic premise that centres on the ability to make choices, is a 
suitable means by which we are able to assess how reasonable it is in any given 
circumstance to hold an agent responsible. Thus, in order to be able to produce a yardstick 
against which it is possible to measure our responsibility for our actions, analytical thinkers 
have subjected this basic Aristotelian premise to further scrutiny. As soon as attempts are 
made to systematise Aristotle's premise however, instead of adding clarity they simple 
generate further controversy and disagreement. For although we have already discounted the 
determinist's claim that choices are not possible, there are other commentators, who whilst 
also dismissing determinism, nevertheless similarly argue that there are some circumstances 
in which it is impossible for agents to make choices. In the discussion by Kutz we find an 
example of such claims. According to him two distinct elements must be in place in order 
for the agent to be thought responsible . 
.. . responsibility bears two distinct senses, an internal and an external sense. Given a 
certain relation of an agent to a harm, the first sense of responsibility refers to a set of 
internal psychological competencies a person must have in order to be answerable for 
the harm. The second sense of responsibility refers instead to a set of normative, 
external affiliations, the duties of the agent to other surrounding agents. 79 
78 Lucas, Responsibility, pp. 5-12. 
79 Kutz, Christopher, Complicity, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000) pp. 17-18. 
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These definitions might initially appear to clarify the situation, by setting clear guidelines 
for the conditions that must be met for an agent to be held responsible. A more thorough 
examination of the implications of these two distinct elements, however, merely 
demonstrates the obfuscation that surrounds them. In fact, this concentration on the 
conditions that must be met in order to verify the capacity of an agent to be responsible, 
although superficially appearing promising, merely creates a further mire of contested 
claims. The first of these contested areas relates to the ability of an agent to have the 
requisite internal psychological competencies to be thought responsible and reveals that 
commentators are deeply divided over this issue. For example, some claim that agents can 
be so influenced by ideology, nationalism, racism or religious bigotry etc. that they cannot 
be held responsible. To support such claims, Scarre, for example, discusses the idea that 
individuals in the Third Reich were 'dupes of an "hallucinatory ideology". 80 Similarly, 
Jokic, discussing atrocities committed in Bosnia, claims that the perpetrators were in fact 
people 'who are themselves products of cultures which are imbued with hatred for persons 
of other ethnic groups, simply because they are members of those groups. ,81 Goldhagen in 
his controversial book, Hitler's Willing Executioners, claims that Germany was 'permeated 
by a particularly radical and vicious brand of anti-Semitism ... that this "viral" strain of anti-
Semitism "resided .. .in the heart of German political culture and was based on the teachings 
of the Christian religion ... the Nazi machine only turned this ideology into a reality,82 
The claims of Scarre, Jokic, Goldhagen et al who question the ability of individuals to act 
voluntarily, that is to be able to choose freely because of the influence of ideology, 
nationalism, racism or religious bigotry etc, are strongly repudiated by other commentators. 
80 Scarre, Geoffrey, 'Understanding the Moral Phemenology of the Third Reich', Ethical Theory and Moral 
Practice, I, 1998, p. 445. 
81 Jokic, (ed), War Crimes and Collective Wrongdoing, p. 72. 
82 Hay, Colin, 'Willing Executors of Hitler's Will ? The Goldhagen Controversy, Political Analysis and the 
Holocaust', Politics, 20,(3), 2000, p. 120. 
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Both Arendt and Hay make similar points. Hay not only vehemently contests such claims 
but also demonstrates that they can lead to bizarre outcomes. In his very critical article on 
Goldhagen he claims that on the one hand Goldhagen seems to be indicting most of German 
society for their culpability in crimes against humanity, but on the other hand providing 
them with the perfect opportunity to deny responsibility. Goldhagen does this by appearing 
to absolve them of blame because of their historic total immersion in anti-Semitism. Hay 
reports that Finkelstein perceptively notes that 'Goldhagen's thesis is, in fact, their 
["ordinary Germans"] perfect alibi. Who can condemn a "crazy" people?,83 Arendt, 
similarly denounced Adolf Eichmann who, whilst never denying that he had been 
responsible for transporting millions of victims to their deaths, claimed that he lacked the 
ability to make a different choice. Eichmann claimed that he lacked the internal 
psychological competencies to be able to make such choices, and, therefore, no other course 
of action had been open to him. He completely dismissed 'those who today told [him] that 
he could have acted differently, [claiming that they] simply did not know, or had forgotten, 
how things had been. ,84 Arendt of course did not accept such self-justification. Similarly, 
French, who focuses on two types of evil, perverse and preferential, also challenges 
Aristotle's initial premise, that in order to be held responsible it is necessary to be able to 
make choices. He concludes, as does Arendt, that all evil is preferential. He acknowledges 
that, for example, in the Balkans people did not choose to become racially or ethnically 
bigoted. Instead they grew up and imbibed these centuries old prejudices from their families 
and culture. French quarrels, however, with claims such as those held by Scarre, that whilst 
it is of course possible to condemn their actions it is not possible to hold the perpetrators 
morally responsible. French argues that even if evil is 'unchosen' it is still possible to hold 
83 Hay, 'Willing Executors of Hitler's Will? The Goldhagen Controversy, Political Analysis and the 
Holocaust', p.127. 
84 Arendt, Hannah, Eichmann in Jerusalem: a Report on the Banality of Evil, (London, Faber & Faber, 1963), 
p.21. 
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individuals responsible. He argues that to refer only to "choice-based" responsibility is a 
mistake. Instead he claims that we should base it on character. He argues persuasively that it 
is inconceivable that the average Balkan war criminal did not understand that he was 
performing an evil act when he was raping and/or torturing and/or murdering women in a 
Muslim village. French rejects 'choice-basing as the sole justification of ascriptions of 
moral responsibility'. 85 It is worth noting here that when considering the capacity of an 
agent there appears to be an inevitable propensity to conflate legal, criminal, moral and 
political responsibility. 
An extension of the capacity argument is provided by Wolf and Donagan who attack the 
Aristotelian thesis that 'an adult agent's ignorance of what she ought to do is, in general, no 
excuse for wrongdoing. ,86 They also claim that it is cultural impediments that render one 
unable to know that certain actions are wrong. They call this the "Inability Thesis" and 
claim that it is unfair, for example, to be critical of ancient Greek society based on slavery. 
The Inability Thesis is itself attacked by Moody-Adams, who claims that if it is possible for 
an individual to have a sense of negation then it is impossible for them to claim that they 
could not envisage a world that is organised other than it is now. In discussing the case of 
Greek slave culture she claims that 'the belief that slavery was justified was insufficiently 
examined by those who held it. But there is no convincing evidence that the blame for this 
should be traced to anything other than affected ignorance. ,87 Affected ignorance is 
Aquinas's phrase; that is choosing not to know what one can and should know. 'First, 
because the act of the will is brought to bear on the ignorance: as when a man wishes not to 
know, that he may have an excuse for sin, or that he may not be withheld from sin; 
85 French, Peter A., 'Unchosen Evil and Moral Responsibility', in Jokic Aleksandar (ed.), War Crimes and 
Collective Wrongdoing, p. 43. 
86 Moody-Adams, Michele M. 'Culture, Responsibility and Affected Ignorance', Ethics, 104, p. 293. 
87 Ibid., p. 296. 
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according to Job 21:14: "We desire not the knowledge of Thy ways." And this is called 
"affected ignorance".' 88 This line of investigation that centres on capacity is unable to add 
any clarity to the notion of political responsibility by being unable to reach any definitive 
conclusion about who is able to be responsible. The claims and counter-claims concerning 
the psychological competencies of individuals to make choices or even that the ability to 
make choices is a necessary criteria, demonstrates how contested this issue is. 
The alternative route is to consider cause. Although there are many different accounts of the 
way in which an individual may be held responsible because of cause, the discussion of 
individual responsibility and causation throws up another problem, namely the contingency 
of the world. Kutz attempts to clarify the problems of causation by differentiating them into 
the following principles; the Individual Difference Principle, the Control Principle and the 
Autonomy Principle. The Individual Difference Principle holds that I am only accountable 
for "a harm" if something I did made a difference to its occurrence. If substantially the same 
harm would have occurred regardless of what I have done, I cannot be held responsible for 
it. The Control Principle holds that I am only responsible for events over which I have 
control, and whose occurrence I could have prevented. The Autonomy Principle holds that I 
am not responsible for the harm another agent causes, unless I have induced or coerced that 
. £. 89 agent mto per ormmg an act. It becomes immediately obvious from the Individual 
Difference Principle that there is going to be a difficulty between the "I" and the "We". 
Kutz uses the bombing of Dresden as an example. There were 1,000 bomber aircraft 
involved in the raid on Dresden, each had approximately 8 crew members, added to these 
numbers there were also planners, ground crew, technicians etc. From this it is clear that a 
88 Aquinas, Thomas, Political Writings, edited and translated by Dyson, Robert W., (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2002), Summa Theologica, Articulus 8 'Utrum ignorantia causet involuntarium'. 
89 Kutz, Complicity, pp. 3-4. 
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great many people were involved. The Individual Difference Principle, says that I am only 
responsible for a "harm" if something I did made a difference to its occurrence, if 
substantially the same harm would have occurred regardless of what I have done, I cannot 
be held responsible for it, that "I in fact did not cause it to happen". Using this principle 
seems to imply that none of the people taking part in the Dresden bombing could be held 
responsible. It is, however, clear that many of them, especially some crewmembers, felt 
extremely responsible. That there is no one person to whom responsibility can be ascribed 
also seems to be true of both the Control and the Autonomy Principles. The individual 
crewmembers, for example, could certainly argue that they had no control over the events, 
and also that they could not be held responsible for the harms caused by the other agents 
involved. 
Fischer and Ravizza attempt to overcome problems created by contingency that question the 
amount of control that it is possible for an agent to exert. They attempt to address the 
problems created by the Control Principle by arguing that in order to be held responsible, it 
requires an agent to have much less ability to be in control than is usually claimed by other 
commentators. Although they agree that to be morally responsible, control over ones actions 
is essential, they claim that control can be divided into two types, regulative and guidance. 
'Regulative control involves alternative possibilities: it is a kind of dual power of free 
action. In contrast, guidance control does not, by its nature, involve alternative 
possibilities. ,90 Whilst it is assumed in other accounts that the sort of control required to 
render one morally responsible is regulative, Fischer and Ravizza argue that it simply 
requires guidance control. This is a very complex technical argument, which addresses only 
90 Fischer, John Martin, & Ravizza, Mark, Responsibility and Control, (Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1998), p. 240. 
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this one very narrow area of criticism. Fischer and Ravizza are using their arguments to 
challenge claims, such as those of Thomas Nagel, about the "paradox of moral luck", that 
although we want to hold an agent to be responsible for his actions, nevertheless, there is a 
large role played by 'external determinants'. Nagel claims, therefore, that 'a person can be 
morally responsible only for what he does; but what he does results from a great deal that he 
does not do; therefore he is not morally responsible for what he is and is not responsible 
for.' 91 Nagel suggests that there is no real solution to this paradox and despite Fischer and 
Ravizza's work, one is inclined to have sympathy with this point. What has become clear is 
that both the arguments for capacity and causation remain contested and are therefore 
unhelpful in establishing who could be held to be politically responsible. Both these 
approaches have been criticised as being too "individualistic", suggesting an awareness that 
something is missing in the discussions. This has led philosophers to move from an 
individualistic model to a collective model. This will become the next area for examination. 
Although, as we have established, for some commentators responsibility is a matter for 
individuals, for other commentators it is a matter for collectives that 'it is only within the 
context ofrelationships between persons that the responses of [responsibility] have meaning 
and value.,92 Kutz includes Kant in his criticism, claiming that Kant reduces cases of shared 
responsibility to individual choice and action. Kutz's critique of solipsism is his answer to 
the seemingly insoluble problems posed by the "individualistic" approach that has 
surrounded notions of responsibility from Aristotle onwards. The bombing of Dresden 
illustrates clearly the I/We problem, '1 participate in a harm caused by something we do, but 
am not personally [responsible] for that harm, because of the insignificance of my 
91 Scarre, 'Understanding the Moral Phemenology of the Third Reich', p. 438. 
92 Kutz, Complicity, p. 64. 
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contribution. ,93 Kutz postulates a technical and detailed theory of individual responsibility, 
and how that can become applicable to collective responsibility. He seeks, however, to 
avoid any charges of communitarianism. His strategy is 'not [about] modifying the 
fundamental bearer of [responsibility], but in expanding the scope of individual 
[responsibility] by including an assessment of what an individual does with others. ,94 
Although Kutz in his theory of responsibility divides discussions into three areas, social, 
moral and legal, he offers no indication in which of these areas political responsibility is 
located, even though he analyses in depth the problems created by the Dresden bombing.95 
Kutz is not alone in criticising the individualistic nature of most theories of responsibility, 
Baier also claims that such theories have a fatal flaw. 'It [supplies] no account of really 
shared responsibility but only pooled or passed-along individual autonomy and 
responsibility. ,96 Unlike Kutz, her arguments are unashamedly communitarian. She asserts 
that we should all be willing to take our share of responsibility, since we have all caused the 
problems, sometimes by our actions but mostly by our inaction. These arguments form one 
view of collective responsibility, that is, they enable us to assign responsibility to collectives 
as long as we are able to evaluate individual differences in the scale and scope of their 
complicity. 
Since the contingency of the world seems necessarily to exempt the individual from 
responsibility yet justice demands that someone be responsible, an alternative approach is to 
ascribe responsibility irrespective of individual action. Another alternative, therefore, is to 
93 Kutz, Complicit, p. 5. 
94 Ibid., p. 7. 
95 Ibid., pp. 1-3. 
96 Baier Annette C., 'How Can Individualists Share Responsibility?', Political Theory, Vol.21, No.2, 1993, 
p.245. 
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claim that political responsibility can be ascribed to the collective itself, irrespective of the 
blame, if any, attaching to individual members. Carl Jaspers is perhaps the philosopher who 
most powerfully argued for the acceptance of collective political responsibility by members 
of a polity. He argued that rather than political responsibility being the remit of the 
individual it could be ascribed to the collective as a whole. It was irrelevant to Jaspers 
whether or not a citizen had been able to exert any direct influence over the actions of his or 
her government, they were all still collectively politically responsible. Jaspers is 
uncompromising III his ascription of political responsibility, as 'each human being is 
responsible, for how he is ruled, political responsibility is a direct consequence of political 
decisions undertaken in the name of the members of a polity whether or not they consent 
. 1 1· . 1 ,97 taCIt y or exp IClt y. 
Again, however, this inflation of responsibility also leads to the evaporation of 
responsibility. Arendt, for example, who is usually supportive of Jaspers' views, dismissed 
this collective model when discussing the alleged culpability of the German population. 
Arendt consistently refuted such arguments. She asserted that if one is to make the claim 
that 'everyone is guilty, then [in essence] no one is guilty', and she completely dismissed 
such a claim saying that 'this is simply not true. ,98 Moreover, Jaspers' strategy seems to 
violate the moral principle that people should not be held responsible for actions they have 
not taken. Since Jaspers made these claims others have followed with similar claims. The 
most recent highly contested claims are Goldhagen's claims that the German population as a 
whole was collectively guilty, and therefore responsible. Strategies similar to those 
formulated by Jaspers and Goldhagen are strongly rebutted in Collective Responsibility, a 
97 Karl Jaspers, Die geistige Situation der Zeit, (Berlin, W.de Gruyter, 1931), pp. 142[, quoted in Rabinbach, 
Anson, 'The German as pariah', Radical Philosophy, No.75, 1996, p. 2l. 
98 Cited in Dan Diner, 'Hannah Arendt Reconsidered: On the Banal and Evil in her Holocaust Narrative', New 
German Critique, No.72, Part 2,1997, p. 190. 
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collection of essays from five decades, edited by May and Hoffman. Lewis who opposes 
claims of collective responsibility, states that claims of collective or group responsibility are 
non-moral and are used for purely pragmatic purposes. He claims that 'value belongs to the 
individual and that it is the individual who is the sole bearer of moral responsibility. ,99 
Downie supports Lewis by asserting that collectives cannot be morally responsible since 
they do not make moral choices. He asserts that there is no way that it could conceivably be 
argued that the German population as a whole made a collective decision, in contrast to the 
way in which it could be argued that it is possible that the Cabinet could make a collective 
decision.lOo As it is not possible, therefore, to show that a morally faulty decision was made 
then it is not possible to hold all the German population responsible. 
Other attempts to resolve this problem with collectives refer less to actions than to character 
traits or interests. At the opposite end of the spectrum, Cooper claims that it is perfectly 
possible to assign responsibility to groups without thinking that each member of the 
collective bears responsibility. To achieve this, however, it is necessary to adopt Brandt's 
definition of responsibility. 'To say 'X' is morally accountable on account of 'z' means: 
"Some trait (or set of traits) of X's character was responsible for Z in the sense that some 
trait (or set of traits) was below standard, and all other traits of his personality having been 
the same, Z would not have occurred but for this fact;,.IOI Cooper claims that it is easy to 
amend this to fit collective groups of people. However, we seem to be back to the claims 
made by Goldhagen, who criticised the German population for having sub-standard personal 
traits, in lacking tolerance and being anti-Semitic. Feinberg in contrast argues that it is 
99 Lewis, H. D., 'Collective Responsibility' in May, Larry & Hoffman, Stacey, Collective Responsibility, 
(Maryland, Rowman & Littlefield, Savage, 1991), p. 31. 
100 Lewis, 'Collective Responsibility', pp. 22-30. Although Lewis and Downie clearly discuss the political 
arena because they do not afford sufficient attention to the "political" they are also forced to revert to moral 
responsibility in order to support the practical ascription of responsibility. 
101 Cooper, David E., 'Collective Responsibility', in May & Hoffman, Collective Responsibility, p. 45. 
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possible to hold groups responsible by focusing on the common interests that a group may 
have rather than on their decision-making strategy. Although the cases will be rare, he 
thinks that it is possible that in some cases, where groups show a high level of solidarity, 
criminal liability might be assigned to a whole group for actions of only some of its 
members. 102 McGary agrees with Feinberg's basic tenets, but he does not agree that the 
group needs to show a high level of solidarity. McGary identifies racial or groups where 
members identify with each other without necessarily seeing themselves as being interested 
in one another's interests. The fact that they derive benefits from being a member of the 
group also gives them responsibilities, which include preventing other members of that 
group from doing harm. The only way that this responsibility can be avoided is to totally 
break with and disassociate oneself from the group. 103 Arendt made a similar claim 
concerning members of the German population who post-war wished to claim non-
involvement. She insisted, however, that this was possible only for the non-participators. 
'The non-participators in the public life under a dictatorship are those who have refused to 
support it by shunning those places of "responsibility" where such support, under the name 
of obedience, is required.' 104 
These arguments may be open to the objection raised above about the inflationary use of the 
concept of responsibility, but they do point to an important dimension of political 
responsibility - namely that it has some relationship to the continuing identity of groups, 
including political communities. In other words, a viable concept of political responsibility 
has to deal not only with the issues of past actions but also the future of the community. 
Groups, including political communities, may pose structural problems even to those 
102 Feinberg Joel, 'Collective Responsibility', (1970) in May & Hoffman, Collective Responsibility, pp. 61-67. 
103 McGary, Howard, 'Morality and Collective Liability', in May & Hoffman, Collective Responsibility, 
pp. 84-85. 
104 Arendt, Hannah, 'Personal Responsibility under Dictatorship', The Listener, 6 August 1964, p. 205. 
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concerned to fulfil their responsibilities. For instance, Held discusses the possibility of 
holding random groups of people responsible, for example bathers on a beach who do not 
rescue someone who is drowning. She admits however, that this is fraught with difficulties 
that mostly consist of those outlined by Kutz of Control and Individual Difference 
Principles. 105 Thompson argues that because no one person's contribution can be 
distinguished from the contribution of any other individual, the ascription of responsibility 
is just not possible. He uses an example from Feinberg's Doing and Deserving, in which 
Feinberg gives an example of a train robber, who holds up the train and escapes with all the 
valuables. If the passengers had banded together, all, or even a few of them could have 
prevented the robber escaping with his loot. Thompson claims that: 
in this way the passengers are collectively responsible for their own losses, but since no 
passenger was obligated to resist the bandit, none was individually responsible. The 
fault lay not in individual actions or omissions, but in the continuing identity and 
structure of the group. Similarly, a political system may suffer from structural faults that 
block the efforts of all but the heroic bureaucrat and politician to accomplish morally 
respectable ends. 106 
These examples again illustrate that without a clear understanding of the nature of the 
"political", commentators, even whilst discussing the possibility of collective responsibility, 
are still forced to rely on criminal and moral responsibility. The outcome of these 
discussions is that it is fruitless to rely on establishing who it is that can be responsible and 
expect that this will illuminate the notion of political responsibility. Instead a more effective 
procedure would be to reach a definition of political responsibility which relies on the 
105 Held, Virginia, 'Can a Random Collection of Individuals Be Morally Responsible', in May & Hoffman, 
Collective Responsibility, pp. 93-98. 
106 Thompson, Dennis F., 'Moral Responsibility of Public Officials', The American Political Science Review, 
Vo1.74, 1980, p. 908. 
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"political". This will establish a definition that will circumscribe both the meaning and 
scope of political responsibility and thereby establish who can have political responsibility 
ascribed to them. 
As if the difficulties illustrated and the resultant contested nature of both individual 
responsibility, whether based on cause or capacity, and collective responsibility were not 
enough, claims concerning the complexity and contingent nature of the world have 
permitted artificially created divisions to be manufactured in the political realm. These 
divisions are between policy making and operational matters, which has resulted in a 
blurring of the lines of procedural responsibility. In an attempt to resist further the 
diminution of governmental responsibility and accountability, commentators, such as 
Woodhouse have resorted to re-introducing the idea of "role" responsibility. In addressing 
these issues, however, rather than undertaking a discussion of political responsibility as a 
concept in its own right, Woodhouse chooses instead to ore-orientate' the concept of 
ministerial responsibility, that, it is often claimed, has a long history in British politics. Her 
discussions, therefore, are based on "role" responsibility rather than "causal" responsibility. 
The concept of role or task responsibility is not of course new (see footnote 19.) Role 
responsibility as a concept has been utilised on other occasions in an attempt to assign 
responsibility. This has especially been the case on those occasions that have aroused great 
controversy and concern. Kurt Baier, for example, made similar claims for "role" 
responsibility concerning the massacre at My Lai in the Vietnam War. He took the view that 
it was ridiculous to blame only the troops on the ground, those who were the actual 
perpetrators of the crimes. He, like Woodhouse, wished to distinguish causal-responsibility, 
that is, the soldiers who actually did the killing, from the "role-responsibility" of senior 
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officers. He argues that by measuring and evaluating if the agents who had a particular 
role/task to fulfil, fulfilled their roles/tasks properly, it is possible to determine which, if 
any, of the soldiers or commanding officers may be held responsible for the massacre. Not 
by their causal-responsibility, which was alas all too clear, but by their role/task 
responsibility. 107 For example, did officers who were responsible for training young 
inexperienced conscript soldiers carry out their role/task properly or did lack of training 
contribute to the tragedy? Fati6, following the same route almost 30 years later, whilst 
examining the International War Crimes Tribunal formed under UN Security Council 
Resolution No.808 to examine war crimes in the former Yugoslavia, is intensely critical of 
the 'international community' who cherry-pick who they want to prosecute. Fati6 claims 
that the West has concentrated too much on cause, that is, on the actual perpetrators of 
crimes at the ground level and, therefore, not enough attention has been paid to the "role 
responsibility" of the old ruling elite, who systematically and deliberately incited 
nationalistic and racist violence. IDS Although Woodhouse is appealing to "role 
responsibility" in exactly the same way as Baier and Fati6, in this instance it is only in one 
particular circumstance, that of ministerial responsibility. 
Ministerial responsibility had once, it is claimed, been an important doctrine, for example, 
'in Dicey's day, liability to loss of office was seen as "the kernel of the doctrine"; [and] the 
individual responsibility of ministers was extended to all official acts ... ' 109 Although this 
would appear to be an unambiguous expression of ministerial responsibility we can still 
legitimately ask the following questions; was this individual responsibility, political 
107 Baier, Kurt ,'Guilt and Responsibility', in May and Hoffman, Collective Responsibility, pp. 205-210. 
108 Fatic, Aleksander, Reconciliation via the War Crimes Tribunal?, (Ashgate, Aldershot, 2000), p. I & pp. 71-
80. 
109 Lewis, Norman & Longley, Diane, 'Ministerial Responsibility: The Next Steps', Public Law, 1996, p. 490. 
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responsibility or some other type of responsibility, for example, moral or legal, and exactly 
how far do official acts extend? 
It may well have been the case that in Dicey's day the responsibility of ministers extended 
to all official acts, but if this was ever the case, it is now highly contested. A minister can in 
fact choose from a range of different strategies in order to avoid/evade responsibility for her 
political actions. These are some of the possibilities. She may announce an inquiry, making 
the matter sub judice and/or delay the matter. She may claim that the legal advice that she 
received made no alternative action possible. Or she may claim that she was herself misled 
or not given enough information, or that such information that she did possess had "security 
implications" and therefore could not be revealed. Any inquiry subsequently instigated may 
concentrate only on the detail, that is, what exactly in this circumstance went wrong, and not 
concentrate at all on the policy that brought it about. Alternatively, she may claim that she is 
only politically responsible for "high" policy and therefore any blame for the delivery of 
such policies should be directed at the civil servants who carried them OUt. IIO This division 
between high policy (the responsibility of the Minister) and the administration of that policy 
(civil servants), was first applied by James Prior in 1983 after the Maze prison breakout. 
However, it reached its nadir when the then-Home Secretary, Michael Howard, refused to 
accept any political responsibility for the prison breakouts at Whitemoor and Parkhurst in 
1995. 111 Howard claimed that there was a separation between the policy that he made and 
110 Woodhouse, Diana" 'Ministerial responsibility: The abdication of responsibility through the 
receipt of legal advice', British Journal of Administrative Law, p.412. 
III This was an unedifying affair in which the Director General of Prisons Derek Lewis was blamed and then 
sacked by Michael Howard, the then-Home Secretary. Howard claimed that there was a separation between 
policy and operations and consequently because he was only responsible for policy could not in any way be to 
blame for the prison breakouts that had occurred. This was repeatedly challenged most spectacularly by 
Jeremy Paxman in an interview on BBC2 "Newsnight", 13/0511997. This incident led, however, to Howard 
losing the Conservative Party Leadership Election in I 997 when he was again challenged over this matter, this 
time by Conservative MP Ann Widdecombe who had been Prisons Minister at the time that the incident had 
occurred. 
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the operations that were the concern of the Director General of Prisons, Mr. Derek Lewis. 
Howard blamed the Director General of the Prison Service for the breakouts even though 
Lewis maintained that 'the Home Secretary had intervened directly and regularly in the 
running of the agency and thus could not abdicate [political] responsibility for it.' 112 
Nevertheless, this was exactly what Howard did, and Lewis was subsequently sacked. 
By invoking Hart's distinctions between "role" and "causal" responsibility, Woodhouse 
hopes to undermine this problem, claiming that 'role responsibility arises from the 
minister's distinctive place or office .... and implies that ministers are constitutionally 
responsible for their departments, not because of their detailed involvement in departmental 
affairs, but because of the positions of public trust they hold as politicians.,I 13 The 
examples that Woodhouse provides, however, do little to clarify how this "role 
responsibility" actually functions. She cites Edwina Currie, Tim Smith, Neil Hamilton, 
Jonathan Aitken, Cecil Parkinson, David Mellor, Ron Davis and Peter Mandelson as 
examples of politicians who were all required to resign for various misdemeanours. 114 In 
fact only Currie had resigned over a political matter, the other resignations appear rather, to 
be based on moral, legal or criminal responsibility within the private realm. The adoption by 
Woodhouse of the Hart "role" distinction might work if it were to be systematically and 
consistently applied, albeit that it is onerous, appearing to require a resignation for almost 
any type of misdemeanour. This is not, however, the case. Woodhouse herself draws our 
attention to the case of Robin Cook, who although criticised for his private life, 
nevertheless, unlike Cecil Parkinson, did not have to resign. The intense debate over the 
well-publicised love affair between David Blunkett, the then-Home Secretary and a married 
112 Woodhouse, 'Ministerial Responsibility', p. 270. 
113 Woodhouse, Diana, 'The Reconstruction of Constitutional Accountability', Newcastle Law School Working 
Papers, p. 5. 
114 Ibid., pp. 3-4. 
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woman, in which questions had arisen not only over his conduct but also concerning the 
fast-tracking of a visa for his lover's nanny again illustrates the conflation of the public and 
private. 
Thompson cautions us that conversely, appearing to accept responsibility because of their 
position of trust, can, instead of leading to a full disclosure, degenerate into 'a kind of 
political ritual' designed to hide the truth. He cites two examples from the American 
government of the inadequacies of this role responsibility, naming Presidents John F. 
Kennedy and Richard Nixon. Kennedy, he claims, publicly accepted 'sole responsibility' for 
the Bay of Pigs invasion and thus forestalled all debate or disclosure about it, whilst 
privately blaming 'just about everyone who knew about the invasion in advance.' Nixon 
also went to great lengths to 'invoke the ritualistic formula of responsibility,' stating in a 
broadcast on CBS that 'in any organisation, the man at the top must bear the responsibility. 
That responsibility, therefore, belongs here in this office. I accept it.' 115 Woodhouse also 
gives an example of what could be construed as this type of behaviour in the British 
political arena, citing the behaviour of Lord Carrington. Carrington resigned over the 
invasion of the Falkland Islands in 1982, his resignation could be 'seen as a device to 
remove pressure from the government, ... his assumption of responsibility was intended to 
distract attention from the full extent of government's failures.' 116 
It is also far from clear how "role" responsibility circumvents any attempt to artificially 
divide policy from operation. Woodhouse refers to the example of Cave Creek in New 
Zealand, a tragedy that caused fourteen deaths. Although the Minister for Conservation 
115 Thompson, 'Moral Responsibility of Public Officials: The Problem of Many Hands', p. 907. 
116 Woodhouse, Diana, Ministers and Parliament; Accountability in Theory and Practice, (Oxford, Clarendon 
Press, 1994), pp. 96-97. 
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accepted that his "role" was head of the organisation he certainly did not accept any 
political responsibility. Indeed Woodhouse is clear that she is not suggesting that a minister 
should accept 'vicarious or consequential responsibility for errors made at a distance, both 
geographically and hierarchically.,J 17 That the politician concerned resigned from his role 
as minister many months later, was, he claimed, not because he accepted political 
responsibility, which he always firmly attributed to the operational side, but rather as an 
indication of his 'sorrow'. Nevertheless, Woodhouse claims that this illustrates the 
'fundamental difference' between role and causal responsibility. 'Causal responsibility 
requires a direct link between a minister and what happened. Role responsibility requires a 
recognition that the nature of a minister's responsibilities, the power he exercises and his 
position of public trust, lay certain duties upon him ... ,' 118 although it appears that in this 
case the minister felt these duties were fulfilled by an expression of his 'profound 
sorrow' .119 Woodhouse obviously appreciates that there is something different about the 
role of a minister and the responsibilities that are commensurate with such a position. She 
fails however to understand that what is unique in ministerial responsibility is not the 
generic characteristics of "role" as it refers to the minister but the nature of the political and 
the public world within which the minister operates. 
From the discussions so far undertaken it is possible to identify the problems concerning 
political responsibility as a concept, namely the lack of a clear understanding of the 
meaning, the scope of its application and to whom it is applicable. This review has 
repeatedly revealed the failure by commentators to appreciate and examine the significance 
of "political" in political responsibility. Even where there has been an understanding that 
117 Woodhouse, 'The Reconstruction of Constitutional Accountability' p. 9. 
lIS Ibid. 
119 Gregory, 'Political responsibility for Bureaucratic Incompetence: Tragedy at Cave Creek', p. 523. 
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this is a problem instead of confronting the significance of "political" commentators have 
adopted various strategies to circumvent the problem. This review has emphasised the need 
to address this failure. Rather than seeking to move forward by escaping from discussion of 
principles, by revisiting the different generic types, or by seeking to compensate 
individualistic approaches by consideration of collective and role responsibility, it is time to 
confront the political directly. 
Even though the existing literature does not help specifically with the concept of political 
responsibility, nevertheless, consideration of this literature has been illuminating because it 
has indicated some of the other themes that may be central to the task of understanding the 
concept. The lack of an explicit definition and the inability to define the scope of political 
responsibility that has often resulted in the conflation of the political, with moral and legal 
responsibility, although problematic are not the most intractable problems. The problems 
revealed concerning agency and the disagreements over cause and capacity has 
demonstrated not only that these areas are contested, but has also revealed the importance of 
contingency to the discussions of political responsibility. Moreover, not only capacity and 
cause but also role responsibility is revealed to be reliant on external factors, many of which 
are, in any real sense, beyond our control. One area for discussion, therefore, will be 
political responsibility in the contingent world. 
The evidence in the literature detailing the search for a means of ascribing political 
responsibility not just to the individual, but also to the collective, reveals the vital 
importance of justice in any exploration of political responsibility. This is essential because 
political responsibility, although usually concerned with issues from the past, also has a 
profound bearing on the future of the community. Judt reminds us just how important it is 
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for justice not only to be done but also to be "seen to be done", and the lasting consequences 
if this does not occur. The Politics of Retribution in Europe charts the experiences in 
countries across Europe in the aftermath of the Second World War. It attempts to begin to 
address the problems that can occur when injustices from the past are not acknowledged and 
societies have to rebuild themselves using narratives which are at best incomplete or at 
worst a fabrication. Judt claims that 'the ways in which the memory of the experience was 
distorted, sublimated, and appropriated, bequeathed to the post-war era an identity that was 
fundamentally false.' 120 Finally, there is also no doubt that commentators have recognised 
that to be politically responsible requires "giving an account". The Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission is just one example where perpetrators involved in atrocities in South Africa 
have been encouraged to give an account and thereby facilitate the discovery of "the truth". 
Issues of truth, therefore, also have a central role in any discussions of political 
responsibility. 
The first task, therefore, is to confront "the political" directly. This will be undertaken by 
examining the work of three thinkers who have attempted to evaluate political responsibility 
as a concept either directly, for example Max Weber in 'Politics as aVocation', or 
indirectly, for example in the work of Hannah Arendt and Jiirgen Habermas. By examining 
the work of all three thinkers it will be demonstrated that there is a direct correlation 
between their individual perception of the nature of the political and their subsequent claims 
concerning political responsibility. This examination will reveal that political responsibility 
is a discrete concept with inherent normative values that should not be confused or conflated 
with other types of responsibility. This important initial exploration of the nature of the 
120 Deak Istvan, Gross Jan T. & Judt Tony, The Politics of Retribution in Europe, (Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, 2000), p. 293. 
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political as it relates to political responsibility will confirm that the contingent world has a 
profound bearing on the possibility of political responsibility. Subsequent chapters will 
therefore also examine issues of contingency, justice and truth. 
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Chapter Two 
The Nature of the Political and Political Responsibility 
What has already become clear is that despite its frequent usage in almost every type of 
discourse, political responsibility remains little discussed in any meaningful or organised 
way, even by some of the greatest political theorists. Three notable exceptions to this lack of 
systematic discussion are Max Weber, Hannah Arendt and ltirgen Habermas. It has also 
been identified that the failure to confront the "political" in political responsibility leads to 
discussions based on general or generic types of responsibility. By examining each of these 
three thinkers in turn, it will be demonstrated that not only does their understanding of the 
nature of the political have a profound bearing on their understanding of political 
responsibility, but rather that their understanding of the nature of the political ultimately 
circumscribes their notion of political responsibility. This conclusion illustrates not only the 
futility of discussing political responsibility without first establishing the nature of the 
political upon which it is dependent, but also for that very reason, that political 
responsibility is different in kind from other types of responsibility. 
This course of action is not, however, without its problems. What this examination also 
demonstrates is the diversity of view concerning the nature of the political. This diversity is 
on many levels, caused by the theorists' differing responses to the contingency and 
complexity of the world, and thus the meaning of political responsibility and who can be a 
politically responsible agent. It would seem that the nature of the political will remain a 
contested concept. To think that this is an unproductive exercise, because it does not produce 
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a precise meaning of political responsibility would, however, be a mistake. What it does 
illuminate are some vital areas of concern. As well as contingency and complexity, there are 
the matters of choice and risk, accountability, truthful communication, promising, forgiving, 
and justice that will all be subjected to further considerations in the following chapters. 
What also became clear from the literature reVIew was that discussions of political 
responsibility were rare and that any discussion that did take place failed to address the areas 
of meaning, scope and applicability. To begin this examination of the nature of the political 
and how this relates to subsequent notions of political responsibility we first examine the 
work of Max Weber, a theorist who does discuss political responsibility in detail and 
addresses all three areas. Although Weber's ideas change and develop over time, the links 
between the political and political responsibility are evident. These links are most clearly 
articulated in his later political writings including 'The Profession and Vocation of 
Politics'. I In this text Weber indelibly links the political and political responsibility but 
concludes that political responsibility only resides with the political leadership. This would 
not in itself be strikingly significant if it were not for the fact that he makes the even stronger 
claim that political responsibility cannot be applied to the province of citizens or 
bureaucrats, but the sole politically responsible agent is the charismatic leader. Weber is 
important because political responsibility is built into his concept of political action. 
Political action is about making choices in a morally indeterminate world. These choices are 
those to which one is committed and for which one accepts public responsibility. The 
outcome of this acceptance of political responsibility typically (but not necessarily purely) 
means the loss of the power which one sought in the name of one's cause. The choices that 
I This was originally a lecture delivered to the Freistudentische Bund in Munich in January 1919. 
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the charismatic leader makes also have implications for the political community, affecting 
its fate in some vital areas, but with severe implications for the leader. 
To be able to understand Weber's notion of the political and therefore his notion of political 
responsibility it is essential to track the development of his thought. Although Weber is 
celebrated for his sociological writings and there can also be no doubt that he was 
profoundly affected by the political landscape in which he found himself, nevertheless, his 
concept of political responsibility is still relevant and emphasises recurring problems. 
Although it can be argued that his 'political thought constitutes a set of responses to the 
antiquated nature of the German political system of the Wilhelmine period', nevertheless, it 
is also the case that his complex theory of modernisation has a wider resonance than just the 
emergent German state.2 His theory of modernisation reflected his concern with the 
growing complexity of government divided into administration and economy. This 
awareness of the growing complexity was also compounded by his acute aWareness of the 
contingency of the world. 'Weber ceaselessly pointed to what he referred to as the 
"irrationality of the world" and was preoccupied with understanding how human beings 
construct patterns of meaning within this condition of senselessness.,3 
Understanding Weber's political thought is not straightforward but for this exercise its utility 
is that it illustrates an idea of the political which not only explores the meaning of, but also 
the scope and the applicability of political responsibility. It is inevitable that in a writing 
career that spanned twenty-five years there would undoubtedly be changes and 
2 Thornhill, Chris, Political Theory in Modern Germany, (Cambridge, Polity Press, 2000), p.18. 
3 Titinuk, Regina F., 'Max Weber on the Advent ofthe New Aristocracy', The Journal of Politics, Vo1.59, 
No.3, 1997, p.688. 
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developments in his ideas, nevertheless, it is possible to identify key areas of thinking which 
elucidate his notion of the political. Even from his earliest writings there are some consistent 
threads, the 'inescapability of conflict (Kampf), for example, remained a constant theme in 
his work.,4 This insistence on the inescapability of conflict when combined with his theory 
of modernity and theory of legitimation, moved inexorably to his ultimate reliance on the 
"charismatic leader" as the source of both legitimacy and power and, therefore, political 
responsibility. 
The problem as perceived by Weber was with the corporate model of political and economic 
government in which parliamentary representation was often outweighed by 'the importance 
of personal connections between interest-groups and politicians.,5 This transfer of power to 
corporate associations and interest groups was at odds with Weber's notions of politics as 
the 'striving for a share of power or for influence on the distribution of power, whether it be 
between states or between the groups of people contained within a single state.,6 Not only is 
conflict inescapable,7 but it also has the ability to produce positive benefits. It is the lack of 
conflict in the modem bureaucratic state that was one of Weber's major criticisms. Weber 
blamed this corporate model with its lack of conflict for the failure to create a responsible 
political leadership and the subsequent inability to identify responsible political agents. His 
concern is about the type of leader that emerges from such an unsatisfactory parliamentary 
system created under the corporate model. He is less than complimentary about the type of 
4 Weber, Max, Political Writings, (ed.) Peter Lassman & Ronald Speirs, (Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1994), p. xi. 
S Thornhill, Political Theory in Modern Germany, p.19. In an attempt to weaken the fledgling parliamentary 
system Bismarck had 'cemented the development of a corporate model of political and economic government.' 
6 Weber, Political Writings, 'The Profession and Vocation of Politics', p. 311. 
7 Weber, Political Writings, p. xi. When discussing conflict Weber utilised terms that are Darwinian in origin, 
for example the idea of the' inescapability and necessity of conflict and selection between states, peoples and 
classes, (unlike Marx) he does not believe in the possibility of a future utopia free from conflict, but imbues it 
with positive benefits'. 
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leader and the inherent personal ethical qualities associated with such a type. 'The only 
choice lies between a leadership democracy with a "machine" and democracy without a 
leader, which means rule by the "professional politician" who has no vocation, the type of 
man who lacks precisely those inner, charismatic qualities which make a leader. 8 The 
corollary of Weber's claims is that politics should be directed by a political leader who has a 
"calling" and is not just a "professional" politician. 
That Weber accepted the contingencies inherent within modem industrial capitalist societies 
is not in question, there is no yearning for a lost past, 'in which political order is seen to be 
legitimate because of its time-honoured nature'. 9 It is instead that he insists that the sphere 
of politics is autonomous and must not simply be reduced to economics. 10 Weber's notion 
of the political at this point may be summarised as follows. Politics for Weber was separate 
and different to economic imperatives. He fervently believed that there must be a sphere of 
political activity that was not circumscribed by technical, bureaucratic practice. It is his 
concern with what he called "negative politics", that leads Thornhill to claim that 'Weber's 
personal objective is therefore to explain how "'parliament, damned by its present internal 
structure to purely negative politics", can be "transformed into a bearer of political 
responsibility".' II (my italics) 
Weber asks, 'How is parliament to be made capable oj assuming power?' 12 He considered 
the German parliament as then constituted was traditionally a 'place full of bustling 
8 Weber, Political Writings, 'The Profession and Vocation of Politics', p. 351. 
9 Thornhill, Political Theory in Modern Germany, p. 32. 
\0 Weber, Political Writings, p. xiv. 
II Weber, 'Die Lehren der deutschen Kanzlerkrisis'in Gesammelte politische Schrijten,p. 221. Quoted in 
Thornhill, Political Theory in Modern Germany, p.29. 
12 Weber, Political Writings, 'Parliament and Government in Germany under a New Political Order', p.190. 
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parvenus and job-seekers', without real political influence.'\3 Thus, parliament 'cannot 
accommodate "those with qualities of leadership - who do not seek sinecures, status and 
salary, but something completely different: power and political responsibility'. 14 (my italics) 
Weber was also pessimistic about the credentials of the representatives, believing that they 
would be those 'whose actions are in fact subject to the "imperative" mandate of vested 
economic interests, a parliament of closed, philistine minds, in no sense capable of serving 
as a place where political leaders are selected' .15 He claimed that because the corporate 
model ' ... inevitably puts a limit on the purely political importance of parliament as such, 
... [it is therefore] absolutely essential to have a counterweight resting on the democratic will 
of the people.' 16 This was Weber's attempt to integrate the citizen into the political life. 17 
Weber had now corne to believe that there were only two benefits accrumg from 
parliamentary democracy, namely, the rise of political elites and the production of 
charismatic leaders. Within his theory of legitimation, the validity of any claims to 
legitimacy might be based on rational-legal grounds, traditional grounds or charismatic 
grounds. I8 Weber, however, invoked the charismatic claim to legitimacy,I9 believing that it 
cut across the more traditional types of legitimacy and thereby overcame the sterility of 
modern economic existence. The role of parliamentary democracy was, therefore, no longer 
a "good" in its own right but instead valued by Weber only as an instrument which would 
13 Weber, 'Bismarcks Erbe in der Reichsverfassung' in Gesammelte politische Schrifien, p. 242. Quoted in 
Thornhill, Political Theory in Modern Germany, p. 36. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Weber, Political Writings, 'The Profession and Vocation of Politics', p. 381. 
16 Weber Political Writings, 'The President of the Reich', p. 306. 
17 Since the citizen is responsible for the election of the charismatic leader, through whom legitimacy is 
conferred, ultimately the citizen is integrated into the political. 
18 Wolin, Sheldon S., 'Max Weber, Legitimation, Method and the Politics of Theory', Political Theory, Vo1.9, 
No.3. 1981, p. 406. 
19 This third, and most controversial, ground is anti-economic and engenders legitimacy through the charisma 
of the 'chosen warlord, the plebiscitary ruler and the political party-leader'. Weber, 'Politik als Beruf, in 
Gesammelte politische Schrifien p. 507. Quoted in Thornhill, Political Theory in Modern Germany, p. 32. 
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produce political elites. Thus, he had become less concerned that the parliamentary system 
would function as the institute to mediate the will of the people than its ability to produce a 
charismatic leader. 
By 1919, however, when Weber wrote 'The President of the Reich', he had developed grave 
doubts concerning the ability of parliament, thus arranged, to produce the kind of leader he 
felt was imperative.2o He had also lost his earlier enthusiastic belief that any such 
parliamentary leader produced in this milieu would not merely seek 'an official post with its 
salary and rank but [would also seek] power and the political responsibility it entails'. 21 (my 
italics) Weber now also does not have any confidence that either the electorate in general or 
their representatives would be motivated by anything other than selfish, class, factional or 
party interests. Weber did not, however, share the principled contempt for professional 
politicians expressed by Oswald Spengler's 'Preussentum und Sozialismus' also of 1919, 
whose recommendations for reform included: 'no organised parties, no professional 
politicians, no periodic elections. ,22 
In these wartime writings, he again defines the struggle for power as the crucial trait of both 
international and domestic politics. Nor is this conflict a matter for lamentation, but instead 
is the external process through which national cultures are also refined and strengthened. 
'There was an air of exaltation at the prospect of participating in "the eternal struggle for the 
preservation and improvement of our national type".' 23 Weber's charismatic leader is to 
20 The complicated proportional representation system that came into force on 14 August 1919 had caused him 
great anxiety that resulted in his change of emphasis. 
21 Weber, Political Writings, 'Parliament and Government in Germany under a New Political Order', p. 169. 
22 Spengler, Oswald,'Preussentum und Sozialismus' (1919), in Oswald Spengler, Politische Schriflen, 
(Munich, Beck, 1933), p. 64. 
23 Wolin 'Max Weber, Legitimation, Method and the Politics of Theory', p. 411. 
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emerge from this struggle. From his earlier criticism of the structure of parliament that 
condemned it to purely "negative politics," Weber has little interest in parliament 
functioning to mediate the will of the people, but instead its role is as a training ground for 
political elites. He journeyed inexorably to a narrow notion of the political that merely 
facilitates the inescapable struggle for power, and from this struggle the emergence of the 
charismatic leader. This is essential, even though the character and status of the charismatic 
leader at the head of the party machine 'means a "loss of soul" (Entseelung) for the 
followers, what one might call their spiritual proletarionisation. ,24 Thus, for the charismatic 
leader power and political responsibility are axiomatic. The nature and, therefore, the 
limitation of the political is that political elites, but the plebiscitary leader in particular, 
should be allowed to take political action and practice political decision-making free from 
bureaucratic and financial constraints. It is in this context that they can then become the 
bearers of political responsibility. 
Weber, unlike most commentators is explicit about the scope, applicability and meaning of 
political responsibility. He clearly articulates the limits of political responsibility, separating 
it from "legal responsibility". He rejected any claim that those who were involved in the 
administration as bureaucrats could be bearers of political responsibility. Weber argued that 
'the political manifestation of the radicalisation of modem society is the production of 
bureaucracy, in which each political task is accomplished by a system of appointed 
executives. ,25 The rise of the bureaucracy, although ensuring effective rule was also limiting 
24 Weber, Political Writings, 'The Profession and Vocation of Politics', pp. 350-351. 
25 Thonhill, Political Theory in Modern Germany, p. 31. 
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and stultifying. Instead of being fired by religious, ethical and political ideals, 'action has 
become simply a response to "economic compulsion" or to "purely mundane passions'''. 26 
The bureaucratic machinery was already 
at work, producing the cage of bondage of times to come, with which someday people, 
powerless like the fellahin of ancient Egypt, will be forced to comply, when a purely 
technical benefit - namely, a rational administration and provision - is the final and sole 
thing of value to determine the conduct of their affairs. 27 
Bureaucracy, Weber claimed, was characterised by its lack of conflict, and, therefore, could 
not be political, because the necessary conflict is impossible in a modem rationalised 
bureaucratic society. Weber believed that the bureaucrat ' ... is a man accustomed to 
performing his work dutifully and honourably in accordance with regulations and orders. ,28 
The role of the bureaucrat was 'being able to carry out that instruction, on the responsibility 
of the man issuing it, conscientiously and precisely in the same way as if it corresponded to 
his own convictions. ,29 This can best be summed up by the description of 'task-
responsibility'?O Bureaucrats are those who: -
serve narrowly defined administrative tasks and functions by developing and plying 
their technical knowledge about specialised subjects. Their claim to power and 
legitimacy is in fact based primarily on their technical expertise, in particular on their 
26 Wolin, 'Max Weber, Legitimation, Method and the Politics of Theory', pp. 414-415. 
27 Rune Slagstad, 'Liberal Constitutionalism and its Critics, Carl Schmitt and Max Weber' in Jon Elstar and 
Rune Slagstad, (eds.) Constitutionalism and Democracy, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 
119. (Weber, Gesammelte politische Schrifen, p. 322 
28 Weber, Political Writings, 'Parliament and Government in Germany under a New Political Order', p. 160. 
29 Weber, Political Writings 'The Profession and Vocation of Politics' , pp. 330-331. 
30 Responsibility as role/task fulfilment. When we have a perceived role in society or in an organisation that it 
is our duty to fulfil this is called a role or task responsibility. 
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skills at developing, and practically securing, rational solutions to politically defined 
problems and rational means to politically determined ends. 31 
That is, the bureaucrat's responsibility is to perform the task he IS assigned. He is 
accountable to the people who have entrusted him with the task, and is held to be 
responsible by them only if he fails to complete the task he was assigned, but he does not 
have political responsibility for the nature of that task. The inability of bureaucrats to be 
politically responsible led Weber to claim that it would be impossible for bureaucrats to 
become responsible political leaders. He claimed that 'the civil service had failed completely 
whenever it was confronted with political issues,32 Bureaucrats are, of course, like every 
other citizen responsible for their own personal conduct in their own lives, however, when it 
comes to political responsibility it is another matter. Indeed, Weber categorically denies that 
it is possible to hold bureaucrats politically responsible. Unlike other commentators, Weber 
does not conflate different types of responsibility, and also limits the scope of political 
responsibility, therefore, the bureaucracy can only be accountable for their tasks to the 
politicians who made the decisions and instigated the political action. 
Political responsibility also cannot be assigned to citizens, even though in 'The President of 
the Reich' Weber insists that the President must be elected directly by the people. He states 
that 'the head of state must rest unquestionably on the will of the whole people, without the 
intervention of intermediaries. ,33 It is clear that all citizens are to be included in choosing 
31 Daniel R. Sabia Jr. 'Weber's political ethics and the problem of dirty hands', Journal of Management 
History, Vol.2, No.1, 1996, p. 7. 
32 Weber, 'Parlament und Regierung im neugeordneten Deitschland, in Gesammelte politische Schriften p. 
351. Quoted in Thornhill, Political Theory in Modern Germany, p. 32. 
33 Weber Political Writings, 'The President of the Reich', p. 306 
68 
the president, although they can have little or no influence on the choice of candidates. Once 
chosen however, the position of the political leader is that of one 'who would be responsive 
to the presumed needs of the populace, but not responsible directly to it.,34 (my italics). Weber 
reminds citizens that they too have a responsibility (not political but personal) not to allow 
themselves to descend into the 'impotent self-abandonment to cliques.' Instead their role is 
to subordinate themselves to the president who is their safeguard of democracy.35 The role 
of the citizen is thus reduced to the selection (and perhaps removal) of the leader, but the 
citizen plays no meaningful role in influencing him whilst in office. 
A major omission from Weber's concept of political responsibility is that it does not really 
concern the community, despite the fact that the risks inherent within the political choices 
made by the charismatic leader do affect the community. Weber does not really see the 
function of political responsibility "within" the community, but at most only the significance 
of it "for" the community. 'According to Georg Picht, [political] responsibility has two 
dimensions. People are responsible for something, but they are also responsible to 
someone.' 36 We can see that in Weber's description of the scope and applicability of 
political responsibility, the charismatic leader is certainly politically responsible for 
something but not politically responsible to anyone. We will see in our discussion of the 
character, qualities and status of the charismatic leader that there is no concept of overt 
accountability to the citizen electorate. 
34 Stirk, Peter M.R., Critical Theory, Politics and Society, (London, Pinter, 2000), p. 95. 
35 Weber Political Writings, 'The President of the Reich', p. 308. 
36 Picht, Georg, 'The Concepts of Responsibility', translated and introduced by Davis, Winston, Religion, 28, 
1998, pp. 185-203, quoted in Davis, Winston, 'Max Weber on Religion and Political Responsibility', p. 47. 
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Weber's concept of political responsibility is, therefore, limited by his tendency to restrict 
political action and hence political responsibility to his charismatic leader. Having thus 
reduced political responsibility to the province only of the charismatic leader, in 'The 
Profession and Vocation of Politics' (1919) Weber finally offers us what appears to be a 
comprehensive account of the meaning of political responsibility and how it is possible. In 
doing so his arguments revolve around two different ethical stances which he thinks are an 
essential part of the motivation of the charismatic leader. Thus, he contrasts the ethic of 
responsibility with the ethic of conviction and draws the conclusion that 'the ethics of 
conviction and the ethics of responsibility are not absolute opposites'. They are, he claims, 
'complementary to one another, and only in combination do they produce the true human 
being who is capable of having a "vocation for politics". ,37 
Weber's description of a genume ethic of conviction IS contrasted with mere sterile 
excitement, and he warns us not to be fooled by the latter. He asserts that, 'it is my 
impression that, in nine cases out of ten, I am dealing with windbags, people who are 
intoxicated with romantic sensations but who do not truly feel what they are taking upon 
themselves.,38 Weber does not, however, give us any guidance on how we are to 
differentiate between genuine conviction and sterile excitement, except that the ethic of 
conviction arises from his definition of passion as the 'passionate commitment to a 
"cause'" .39 Weber himself acknowledges that simply holding an ethic of conviction is 
37 Weber, Political Writings, 'The Profession and Vocation of Politics', p. 368. 
38 Ibid., p. 367. 
39 Sabia describes the reality of the behaviour of those who operate from an ethic of conviction. 'What 
adherents to these ethics have in common ... is their willingness to dismiss as irrelevant or as inconsequential 
the consequences of their behaviour.' There are two different motivations that cause this response; either their 
convictions hold them to a deontological moral principle in which consequences have no place, as in Kantian 
ethics, or they are aware of the consequences but ignore them because they must not impinge on the ultimate 
good they seek to achieve. 
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insufficient to ensure political responsibility. 'Simply to feel passion, however genuinely, is 
not sufficient to make a politician unless, in form of service to a "cause", responsibility for 
that cause becomes the decisive lode-star of all action. ,40 To become a politician, therefore, 
one has not only to feel genuine passion but also to accept the responsibility for all the 
choices and outcomes relating to that cause. Weber was 'particularly concerned with the 
undeserved and paradoxical results of intentions. The ideal politician ... acts with an ethic of 
responsibility and thus soberly understands that evil often results from good intentions and 
that good intentions are not sufficient to bring about favourable results. ,41 Weber claimed, 
therefore, that in order to become a responsible political agent the politician also requires a 
decisive quality of judgement, because only that allows the politician to balance the risks 
and realities of the contingent world with the passionate commitment to the cause, 'in other 
words distance from things and people'. 'Only if one accustoms oneself to distance, in every 
sense of the word, can one achieve that powerful control over the soul which distinguishes 
the passionate politician from the mere "sterile excitement" of the political amateur. ,42 
What type of person will exhibit these qualities? Weber articulates the problem succinctly, 
'For the problem is precisely this: how are hot passion and cool judgement to be forced 
together in a single soul?,43 Walzer's analysis of the type of political leader that Weber is 
describing is that he is a tragic hero,44 '[the] mature, superbly trained, relentless, objective, 
40 Weber, Political Writings 'The Profession and Vocation of Politics', p. 353. 
41 Titunik, 'Max Weber on the Advent of the New Aristocracy', p. 688. 
42 Weber, Political Writings, 'The Profession and Vocation of Politics', p. 367. 
43 Ibid. 
44 This idea of a "tragic hero" is not original. Walzer's description is identical to that used by Smen 
Kierkegaard in Fear and Trembling, (Penguin, London, 1985). What differentiates the tragic hero from others 
is that he acts in the public realm and is thus subjected to the approbation and critical judgement of others. 
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responsible, and disciplined political leader [who] IS also a suffering servant. ,45 Walzer 
claims that : 
For Weber, the good man with dirty hands is a hero still, but he is a tragic hero .... Weber's 
hero is alone in the world that seems to belong to Satan, and his vocation is entirely his own 
choice ... The politician takes the sword himself, and only by doing so does he measure up to 
his vocation. With full consciousness of what he is doing, he does bad in order to do good, 
and surrenders his soul. Here is a man who lies, intrigues, sends other men to their death -
and suffers. He does what he must do with a heavy heart. None of us can know he tells us, 
how much it costs him to do his duty.46 
There is an alternative analysis of the type of political leader that Weber is describing which 
appears even more burdensome. In Walzer's language, the tragic hero is a good man with 
dirty hands. The tragic hero can, according to Kierkegaard, nevertheless disclose and explain 
his actions. 47 He can make his actions intelligible to others. In other words, the responsible 
agent can give an account of his actions. He does not need to keep his actions secret. When 
his actions are explained it is possible for others to understand them even if one does not 
agree with them or would have acted differently oneself. The tragic hero is, therefore, one 
who does not act on the ethic of conviction (that is a passionate commitment to a cause) 
because it is perfectly possible to explain, that is, give an account of, how the decisions were 
made by cool judgement. 
45 Walzer, Michael, 'Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands', Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 2, 
No.2,1973,p.I77. 
46 Walzer, 'Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands', p. 176. 
47 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, p. 117. 'The outcome will be as understandable to anyone as to the 
[tragic] hero, and there is no secret writing that only the [tragic] hero can read.' 
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The alternative and even more burdensome analysis is that Weber appears to be describing 
someone who Kierkegaard dubs the 'knight of faith'. This is because Weber goes beyond 
the claim that politics is an activity solely conducted with the head, which is precisely the 
road that the 'tragic hero' takes. He claims that 'if politics is to be a genuinely human action, 
rather than some frivolous intellectual game, dedication to it can only be generated and 
sustained by passion' to a cause.48 Weber seems to be suggesting that there is an element of 
"heart" or "faith" that goes beyond the cool judgement, distance and the political 
responsibility that he describes.49 What differentiates the 'knight of faith' from the tragic 
hero' is the 'knight of faith's' willingness to go beyond the universal, and involve faith.5o 
The implication of this is that the source of the 'knight of faith's' actions cannot be either 
explained or disclosed, except to those who have the same "faith" (passion for a cause). In 
Kierkegaard's concept the 'knight of faith' is answerable only to God, therefore' ... the 
knight of faith who, in cosmic isolation, hears never a voice but walks alone with his 
dreadful responsibility' ,51 is echoed completely in Weber's description; that 'in the ethic of 
conviction ... the Christian does what is right and places the outcomes in God's hands ... ,52 
Thus, according to Weber, the leader must not only be a hero, 'but must put on the armour 
of that steadfastness of heart which can withstand even the defeat of all hopes'. 53 
It is clear that Weber sets very high and heroic hurdles for those who pursue politics as a 
vocation. These hurdles are primarily, but not solely, internal. The internal sanction is guilt, 
48 Weber, Political Writings 'The Profession and Vocation of Politics', p. 353. 
49 Ibid., pp. 359-360. For 'acting by the maxim of the ethic of responsibility, ... means that one must answer 
for the consequences of one's actions.' Whereas, acting out of an ethic of conviction becomes a matter of 
personal faith, which is above the ethical, therefore political responsibility cannot exist. 
50 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, p. 107 'For faith is just this paradox, that the single individual is higher 
than the universal.' 
51 Ibid. 
52 Weber, Political Writings, 'The Profession and Vocation of Politics', pp. 359-360. 
53 Ibid., p. 369. 
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that the politician's 'willingness to acknowledge and bear (and perhaps repent and do 
penance for his guilt) is evidence, and it is the only evidence he can offer us, both that he is 
not too good for politics, and that he is good enough.' 54 That is consistent with Weber's 
interest in the 'inner justification of power', and its meaning for those who were in a 
position of power. The politician, according to Weber, is confronted with a series of ethical 
conflicts and he is 'responsible for what may become of himself under pressure from 
them.'55 This means balancing an ethic of conviction, embodied in the politician's 
commitment to a cause he has chosen, and an ethic of responsibility, which obliges the 
politician to attend to the consequences of his actions, in full knowledge that some of those 
consequences at least will be unknown to him at the time he acts. 
It can be seen that each new decision made by the charismatic leader generates enormous 
risks for himself and also for us. Unfortunately there is no alleviation of these risks for either 
us or the charismatic leader. Weber knew, however, that most political leaders would fail to 
fulfil the vocation of politics thus understood. The combination of 'passion, a sense of 
responsibility, judgement' that Weber required were too often absent. In their place the 
'mere "power politician'" parades his strength but this, Weber assured his audience, is 
pretence: 'The sudden inner collapse of typical representatives of this outlook (Gesinnung) 
has shown us just how much inner weakness and ineffectuality are concealed behind this 
grandiose but empty pose.' 56 One of the few external sanctions issued by Weber was a dire 
warning to any erstwhile political leader, 'Let us ensure that the president of the Reich sees 
54 Dovi, Sazanne, 'Guilt and the Problem of Dirty Hands', Constellations, Vo1.l2, No.1, 2005, p. 130. 
55 Weber, Political Writings, 'The Profession and Vocation of Politics', p. 365. 
56 Ibid., p. 354. It is not difficult here to recognise the representatives of the monarchic principle and the 
German military leaders who sought to hide their responsibility for defeat behind the assertion that the German 
army was stabbed in the back by the collapse of the home front as these 'typical representatives'. 
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the prospect of the gallows as the reward awaiting any attempt to interfere with the laws or 
to govern autocratically. ,57 This was not just empty rhetoric. Weber confronted Ludendorf 
at the end of hostilities in World War One with the recommendation that Ludendorf should 
just not lose power but should hand himself over to the victorious Allied powers for trial. 
We can see clearly that our claim that the concept of political responsibility is dependent on 
a developed concept of the political is evidenced in Weber's notion of political 
responsibility. He distinguishes between different types of responsibility and ultimately 
limits the ascription of political responsibility to the charismatic leader. Weber's concern 
with the effects of contingency and the impact of modernity lead him to invest all his 
aspirations for political responsibility within the character of the charismatic leader. This 
demands an ethical stance that obliges the politician to attend to the consequences of his 
actions in the full knowledge that some of those consequences at least will be unknown to 
him at the time he acts. This is such a heroic standard that most will never meet and which 
would undoubtedly lead to the evasion of political responsibility. This has implications for 
both the politician and for the political community for which he acts. Weber's concept does 
not really concern the community, despite the fact that the political choices made by the 
charismatic leader effect the community. There can be no idea that the charismatic leader 
should account to the community in any formal way for his actions, hence there is no place 
for the "truth" but only for conviction. There is also no place for forgiveness nor the redress 
of injustice. There is only torment (or self-sacrifice) which the leader should experience if he 
fails, and to some extent even if he succeeds, for he risks corrupting himself in succeeding. 
57 Weber, Political Writings, 'The President ofthe Reich', p. 305. 
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In other words, Weber does not really see the function of political responsibility within the 
community but at most only the significance ofitJor the community. 
Although this investigation illustrates the direct link between the concept of the political and 
political responsibility, the concept of political responsibility espoused by Weber has set the 
bar so high for the political actor that it will always invite evasion. There is no way back, no 
redemption, nor mechanism for a new beginning for Weber's politician. At the very least he 
would have to resign. It is the blunt truth that under parliamentary systems both here and in 
other western countries the consequences of giving an account when a situation has had 
undesirable outcomes almost inevitably attracts the most severe sanctions. The evasion of or 
refusal to give an account is hardly surprising if the only remedy is resignation as advocated 
by the Select Committee 'The resolution lays on Ministers the duty to give accurate and 
truthful information to the House. Any inadvertent error should be corrected at the earliest 
opportunity. If Ministers knowingly mislead the House, they should resign forthwith.,58 In 
Weber's case, at its most extreme, 'the shadow of the gallows' is all that awaits his 
heroic/tragic leader which would hardly induce, except in the most heroic of leaders, the 
impetus for accepting political responsibility. Perhaps more importantly the evasion of 
political responsibility for Weber's politician however tragic however heroic will cause 
lasting damage to the polity, and often creates conditions where new beginnings rely on 
false and corrosive narratives. This discussion has revealed other problems that require 
further investigation namely, contingency, justice and truth. 
58 Hansard, 12/02/97, Col 274-275. 
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The second thinker to be discussed is Hannah Arendt. We will again begin by attempting to 
establish whether or not the nature of the political relates to her subsequent notions of 
political responsibility. What is immediately clear is that the nature of the political is of 
paramount concern to Arendt. It will emerge from these discussions of the nature of the 
political and political responsibility that the areas of meaning, scope and applicability 
become self-evident as we uncover what amounts to a "theory" of political responsibility. 
Like Weber, a central theme that emerges from her writing and crucial to an understanding 
of her notion of the political, is her theory of action. Unlike Weber, her theory of action, 
given her acute awareness of the contingency and complexity of the world, is only 
intelligible when it is considered alongside her claims concerning new beginnings, plurality, 
forgiveness and promising. These claims are not only important to Arendt's theory of action, 
but, as will emerge during this discussion, will also be of paramount importance to a 
framework for political responsibility. By disentangling Arendt's understanding of the 
political from within this complicated structure it is also possible to identify how this 
circumscribes her understanding of political responsibility, which although not expressed 
directly, can also be disentangled from her writing. Thus, an examination of Arendt's re-
evaluation of the political and its implications reveals that political responsibility is so 
embedded within her theory of action that they are interdependent. 
Arendt was not a sequential writer,59 and like Weber, she did not engage in writing a 
systematic political philosophy. The motivations for her investigations into the nature of the 
political were to understand and explain the tragedy that had occurred in Europe. These 
investigations led her to critically evaluate the political stance taken by the various disparate 
59 Canovan, Margaret, Hannah Arendt, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 2. As with all of 
Arendt's 'thought trains' it is hard to plot the course of political responsibility through her writing. 
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Jewish populations, and led her to the painful and deeply controversial conclusion that 
Jewish political inaction had contributed to their marginal position in many countries. They 
had either denied their Jewish origins and become 'parvenus' ,60 or had retreated from the 
world into a state she calls 'worldlessness,.61 'By making dissociation the basis for their 
survival, the Jews came to conceive of their existence as almost totally separate and 
independent from the rest of the world. ,62 Their failure to be part of any political 
community, their 'worldlessness', when confronted by a ruthless, self-serving regime, had 
facilitated firstly their marginalisation, then their exclusion and finally their destruction. 
In 'We Refugees' 63 Arendt muses on the plight of those forced to flee from Europe. She 
articulates the peril in which one finds oneself if one has the great misfortune to be declared 
stateless. Her observations, that unlike the usual refugees, the Jews had not been guilty of 
any political activity against the states to which they belonged, are the beginnings of her 
further exploration of the consequences of this traditional lack of Jewish political action. 'A 
refugee used to be a person driven to seek refuge because of some act committed or some 
political opinion held. Well, it is true we have had to seek refuge; but we committed no acts 
and most of us never dreamt of having any radical political opinion. ,64 From her 
examination of the plight of the Jewish population in Europe, she developed a critique of 
60 Young-Bruehl, Elizabeth, Hannah Arendt, For love of the world, (New Haven, Yale University Press, 
1982), pp. 121-122. Young-Bruehl gives a clear description of the differences between parvenus and pariahs. 
Arendt, follows the thinking of Bernard Lazare in his comments on the Dreyfus case. Arendt similarly makes 
the distinction 'between pariah resisters and politically malleable parvenus'. 
61 Feldman, Ron H., (ed.) Hannah Arendt: The Jew as Pariah, (New York, Grove Press), p. 42. Arendt claims 
that 'the rootlessness of "the wandering Jew" antedates the rootlessness of the modem age, and more than any 
other factor was responsible for the world less, unrealistic and unpolitical perception Jews had of the world.' 
62 Ibid., p. 22. 
63 Arendt, Hannah, 'We Refugees', The Menorah Journal, January 1943, in Feldman, (ed.), The Jew as 
Pariah pp. 55-66. 
64 Arendt, 'We Refugees', p. 55. 
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modern society and a theory of action that is the basis of her notion of the nature of the 
political. 
Her critique of modern society begins with claims concerning the failure to act. In The 
Origins ojTotalitarianism, Arendt offers the following insight:-
Jewish history offers the extraordinary spectacle of a people, unique in this respect, 
which began its history with a well-defined concept of history and an almost conscious 
resolution to achieve a well-circumscribed plan on earth and then, without giving up 
this concept, avoided all political action for two thousand years. The result was that the 
political history of the Jewish people became even more dependent upon the 
unforeseen, accidental factors than the history of other nations, so that the Jews 
stumbled from one role to the other and accepted responsibility for none. 65 
When she generalised this perceived lack of political action by individuals to western 
society as a whole, she traced its cause to the capitalist system that had thrust the concerns of 
the household into the public sphere: 'an ever increasing tendency for human beings to 
conceive of themselves in terms of their desire to consume,' our retreat from the public 
political world into the private household world has rendered us impotent to instigate new 
beginnings. ,66 In The Human Condition, using the Greek polis as her model she 
demonstrated how the private and the public sphere had existed separately. She warns us 
that 'we therefore find it difficult to realise that according to ancient thought on these 
matters, the very term "political economy" would have been a contradiction in terms: 
whatever was "economic," related to the life of the individual and the survival of the species, 
65 Arendt, Hannah, The Origins o/Totalitarianism, (New York, Harcourt Brace & Co, 1951), 'Anti-semitism', 
p. 8. Quoted in Feldman, Ron H., (ed.) Hannah Arendt: The Jew as Pariah, p. 22. 
66 Arendt, Hannah, The Human Condition, (Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1958), p. xvi. 
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was a non-political, household affair by definition. ,67 In modem society in contrast, the 
private (matters of the household) has been elevated to become the political. The public 
sphere was, in contrast in the polis, a legally institutionalised space (the Assembly and the 
Agora) in which citizens would meet as equals to deliberate, debate and ultimately to make 
decisions on matters of common concern. Thus every citizen had in effect two separate 
existences, one that centred on the home and family (oikia), and the other the public life, the 
b · t· . 68 lOS pO lflCOS. 
Claims that Arendt had an overly utopian view of Athenian life are unfair, she was fully 
aware of its shortcomings. It is rather the damaging nature of the false analogies, which she 
claimed began with Plato, concerning the similarity between the hierarchical nature of the 
private household and the public political life that concerned her. Her concern was that the 
more we accept the truth of such analogies the less likely we are to insist on public equality 
and autonomy. 69 
Arendt's critique of modem society is thus based on the retreat, as she perceives it, into the 
isolation and darkness of household matters. Politics for Arendt takes place between equal 
individuals. It is only when people come together to communicate in the public realm that 
truth is possible, politics takes place in the light by men revealing themselves. It is through 
speech and action that one reveals who one is, in contrast to whom one appears to be, simply 
by existing in the world. It is through speech and action that 'men show who they are.' 'It is 
through the constitution of such a space of public freedom that human life gains a meaning 
67 Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 29. 
68 Ibid., pp. 25-26. 
69 Arendt, Hannah, Between Past and Future: Six Exercises in Political Thought, (New York, Penguin, 1961), 
pp.104-114. 
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beyond the contingency and fragility of its creaturely existence'. 70 These abilities that 
distinguish a being as human are the capacity for speech (texis) and action (praxis), these 
most important qualities are essential for the bios politicos.7l As is often the case with 
Arendt, she uses these particular terms in a technical way. By 'speech', she does not of 
course mean the sounds that are made merely to ask for wants and desires, and what counts 
as 'action' is not anything that could be undertaken by performing robots. Rather it is 
through speech and action that 'men distinguish themselves instead of being merely distinct; 
they are modes in which human beings appear to each other, not indeed as physical objects, 
but qua men.' 72 
It is in the nature of the political that Arendt's claims are so striking. Within her theory of 
action and her notion of the political there is inherent a "theory" of political responsibility. 
Firstly, unlike Weber, Arendt does not believe that political responsibility is confined to the 
political leader or even to political elites. As the political for Arendt exists only between 
people, then inherent within this claim is that individuals can, in specific circumstances, 
accept political responsibility and also have it attributed to them. This is to draw a firm 
distinction between the public and private world. The scope of political responsibility can 
only be within the public political realm. Arendt did not believe that it was possible or even 
desirable to lead an entirely political life. This is despite the criticisms that she had levelled 
at the Jewish community where an entire people shunned the political world and were lost. 
Like Weber, Arendt also does not conflate different types of responsibility, there is a very 
70 Wellmer, Albrecht, 'Arendt on Revolution', in Dana Villa (ed), Hannah Arendt, (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2000), p. 226. 
71 Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 25. 
72 Ibid., p. 176. 
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clear distinction in her thought between what she considers to be personal responsibility 
(private) and political responsibility (public). 
When and why would people choose to leave the safety of the private world and enter onto 
the public stage? Arendt is acutely aware of 'the courage that is necessary for one to leave 
the private realm ("one's private hiding place") and step onto the political stage ("showing 
who one is, ... exposing one's self') To accept this public exposure, this nakedness, is to 
become a political actor - a man who ... initiates, who creates as it were something new in 
the political world.' 73 This instigation of political action draws to the political actor risk, 
and also the ascription of, and demands for, the acceptance of political responsibility. 
It is possible to identify a second tenet of political responsibility that arises from her theory 
of action; that political responsibility involves making choices. There are times when 
choices are made by the private individual which cause him to leave the private world, to 
locate him firmly in the public realm and hence subject to some form of political 
responsibility even though that individual may well deny that this is the case. In both 
Eichmann in Jerusalem 74 and 'Personal Responsibility under Dictatorship', Arendt makes 
her view clear that no matter what governments decide, decisions, i.e. choices about 
behaviour, are always ultimately to be laid at the door of the individual. 'The non-
participators in the public life under a dictatorship are those who have refused to support it 
by shunning those places of 'responsibility' where such support, under the name of 
73 Smith, Roger W., 'Redemption and Politics', Political Science Quarterly, Vo1.86, No.2, 1971, p. 230. 
74 Arendt, Hannah, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil, (New York, Viking Press, 1961). 
This is the report of the trial of Adolf Eichmann for crimes against humanity which he had allegedly 
perpetrated as a bureaucrat in the Nazi regime. Eichmann was responsible for organising the transportation of 
millions of Jews to their deaths in concentration camps. 
82 
obedience, is required.' 75 She challenges the claims made by Eichmann at his trial, that he 
could not be held responsible for his actions because he was simply a "cog in a wheel" (and 
therefore interchangeable with every other bureaucrat). Arendt would not countenance such 
claims for uniformity, that it is indeed possible to be interchangeable. 'This sameness is far 
from being uniformity; just as men and women can be the same, namely human, only by 
being absolutely different from each other.' 76 So the sameness in men is only in their 
uniqueness. To the "cog in the wheel" argument Arendt countered with 'For to answer "Not 
I but the system did it in which I was a wheel", the court immediately raises the question: 
"And why did you become a cog or continue to be a wheel in such circumstances?,,77 
Arendt insisted that no matter how difficult the circumstances some action was always 
possible, but this would of course require that individuals make choices. Criticising just such 
claims that she made in Eichmann in Jerusalem concerning the behaviour of the Jewish 
Councils, Judenrate, her critics accused her of being unrealistic, that she was simply 
demanding that the Jews should have become martyrs or heroes. Arendt admitted that by the 
time the Final Solution began it was much too late for any concentrated action against the 
regime. Some action was, however, still possible. Even in situations that appear hopeless 
individuals can act; they can do something. There are choices to be made. Arendt was 
critical of claims that members of the Judenrate were simply continuing to give their support 
to members of their community that they had been providing right from the start, 'as though 
there were no difference between helping the Jews to emigrate and helping the Nazis to 
75 Arendt, Hannah, 'Personal Responsibility Under Dictatorship', The Listener, 6th August 1964, p. 205. 
76 Arendt, Men in Dark times, p. 89. 
77 Arendt, 'Personal Responsibility Under Dictatorship', p. 186. 
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deport them.'78 It was, therefore, impossible in Arendt's terms to deny being politically 
responsible.79 
The first two tenets of the "theory" of political responsibility, that is ''political responsibility 
is the concern of everyone" and ''political responsibility involves choices", are clearly 
discernible from her discussions of the possibility of, and the positive nature of, action. Her 
example of Eichmann and his choice to be, and remain, a "cog in the wheel" despite the 
appalling consequences of his actions is very significant because it means that the bureaucrat 
is not automatically immune from political responsibility, because every individual always 
has choices. It is evident from Arendt's attempt to understand and explain the tragedy that 
had occurred in Europe (and here we include the Eichmann trial report) that the narratives 
which formed the basis of the histories of these tragedies have long ago deviated from the 
truth. Similarly, the sense of injustice emanating from these tragic times still engendered 
enormous hostility towards Arendt the truth seeker. The denial of truth and justice troubled 
Arendt deeply as without both the whole premise of the potential for political action is lost. 
78 Arendt Eichmann in Jerusalem, (Second Edition, 1965), p. 284. 
79 Jonathan Glover describes an incident in which Henriette, the wife of Gauleiter von Schirach, saw Jews 
being rounded up one night in Amsterdam. She was "distressed" by the terrible screams of the women. 'She 
made representation about this to Hitler and everyone found the episode "very embarrassing".' (Glover, 
Humanity, (London, Jonathan Cape, 1999), p. 354.) Had the Judenrdte refused to co-operate and had not, for 
example given lists, and employed Jewish policemen to quietly round up victims for the scheduled transport, 
many more members of the non-Jewish population may have been similarly "distressed" by such sights and 
similarly made representation. This is the crux of Arendt's criticisms of the Judenrdte. Rather than, in her 
terms doing nothing, that is, in this instance, meekly complying with the regime, they could and should have 
made a decision not to participate. 'There certainly was a moment when the Jewish leaders could have said: 
We shall no longer co-operate, we shall try to disappear. This moment might have come when they, already 
informed of what deportation meant, were asked to prepare lists for the Nazis for deportation.' (Seyla 
Benhabib, 'Arendt's Eichmann in Jerusalem', in Dana Villa, (ed.), Hannah Arendt, (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2000), p. 70. Arendt quotes the calculation made by other observers that at least 40-50% of 
those who had escaped the Judenrdte and gone underground had survived. (Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem 
(Second Edition, 1965), p. 125. Arendt stated bluntly, 'The whole truth was that if the Jewish people had been 
unorganised and leaderless, there would have been chaos and plenty of misery but the total number of victims 
would hardly have been between four and a half and six million people.' (Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem, p. 
Ill.) 
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A second circumstance that arises to draw people out of the private into the public realm, is 
described by Arendt as when 'things fall apart' and men are' drawn out of hiding'. Political 
responsibility is then forced upon them - though such events are indeed 'rare moments'. 
Bound up with such 'rare moments' are the abilities to both think and judge, which are 
closely bound to the sphere of action, and are, therefore, facilities to which Arendt paid 
much attention. In 'Thinking and Moral Consideration', using Socrates as her model, Arendt 
claimed that jUdging is the prerogative of everyone and emphasised its importance at times 
of great danger. She claimed that thinking involves examining and challenging accepted 
views, 'thinking liberates the faculty of judgement. .. the most political of men's mental 
abilities. ,80 This thinking and judging is 'not the prerogative of the few but an ever-present 
faculty of everybody'. In her a laudatio to Karl Jaspers, Arendt comments on the uniqueness 
of Jaspers insight that both philosophy and politics concern everyone, they both 'belong in 
the human realm where the human person and his ability to prove himself are what count. ,81 
She notes wryly that Jaspers was aware that the political along with the responsibilities 
which that entailed was too important to be left to politicians.82 The crucial importance of 
this mechanism becomes clear in what Arendt calls: 
... those rare moments in history when "Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold;lMere 
anarchy is loosed upon the world," when "The best lack all conviction, while the 
worst/Are full of passionate intensity." At these moments, thinking ceases to be a 
marginal affair in political matters. When everybody is swept away unthinkingly by 
80 Arendt, Hannah, 'Thinking and Moral Considerations: A Lecture', Social Research, Vo1.38, No.3, 1971, 
p.445. 
81 Arendt, Men in Dark Times, p. 74 
82 Ibid., pp. 74-75. 
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what everybody else does and believes in, those who think are drawn out of hiding 
because their refusal to join is conspicuous and therefore becomes a kind of action. 83 
Arendt described two exceptional circumstances when men are drawn from the private into 
the public realm, but by far the greater experience is when men choose to leave the private 
realm and enter the political stage in order to make choices for themselves and others. This 
is the most important circumstance, for these choices are what the stateless are denied, the 
possibility of a place in the world 'which makes opinions effective and actions significant. ,84 
The negative effects of action became plain to Arendt when she examined modem society. 
Her critique of modernity was based on the imperative, intrinsic within modem society, to 
make everything possible. She was not blind to the dangers inherent within action and was 
all too well aware of the irreversibility and the unpredictability of action once set in motion. 
'The limitations of the law are never entirely reliable safeguards against action from within 
the body politic, just as the boundaries of the territory are never entirely reliable safeguards 
against action from without. The boundlessness of action is only the other side of its 
tremendous capacity for establishing relationships.' The problem with action in the 
contingent world is that the 'various limitations and boundaries we find in every body 
politic' are unable to offset 'its inherent unpredictability,.85 
Despite her concern with the boundlessness and unpredictability of action, nevertheless, 
Arendt is 'pre-eminently the theorist of beginnings.,86 'With the creation of man, the 
83 Arendt, 'Thinking and Moral Considerations: A Lecture', p. 445. 
84 Arendt, The Origins o/Totalitarianism, p. 296. 
85 Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 191. 
86 Ibid., p. vii. 
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principle of beginning came into the world.'87 Although Arendt's theory of action is based 
on this endless possibility of new beginnings, she is also aware of the inherent contingency 
of such new beginnings. Action is a double-edged sword. Thus, there are two separate but 
interconnected sets of claims concerning action. Firstly, her negative view expressing the 
inherent dangers in 'action into nature': 'Promethean powers - releasing processes with 
unfathomable consequences - are being exercised in a society of beings too absorbed in 
consumption to take any responsibility for the human world or to understand their political 
capacities. ,88 Secondly, there is her positive view of action developed from her examination 
of the problems she attributed to the lack of action by Jewish communities in Europe. So, 
although Arendt has this positive view of action she is aware that there is always a risk in 
beginning something new. 'It is the nature of beginning that something new is started which 
cannot be expected .... This character of startling unexpectedness is inherent in all beginnings 
and in all origins. ,89 The problem with new beginnings, as Arendt so graphically illustrates, 
is that their outcomes are always unpredictable and uncertain. Thus, completely cognisant of 
the contingency and complexity of the world, Arendt was fully aware that once chains of 
action are set in motion their outcomes are always unpredictable and irreversible. Arendt 
claimed that the only way to break these chains was through forgiving and promising. This 
is because the political actor inevitably incurs guilt and needs to be relieved of it. 
'Paradoxically, the man who creates a new beginning for others must himself, through the 
process of redemption, be allowed a new beginning. ,90 
87 Arendt, The Human Condition, p.I77. 
88 Ibid., p. xv. 
89 Ibid., pp. 177-178. 
90 Smith, 'Redemption and Politics', p. 230. 
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Just as her "theory" of political responsibility acknowledges that new beginnings are not 
possible without the acceptance of political responsibility and new beginnings are not 
possible without forgiveness and redemption, then the act of promising also has within it the 
acceptance of political responsibility. Arendt recognised that if the facility did not exist to 
release individuals from the consequences of their actions then we would be 'confined to 
one single deed from which we could never recover; we would remain the victims of its 
consequences forever. .. ,91 Plurality is essential for forgiving and promising to take place, 
forgiving and promising are only possible between people. Arendt understands fully the 
implications of accepting political responsibility, for without the possibility of redemption 
the leader is 'condemned to wander helplessly and without direction in the darkness of [his] 
lonely heart.,92 It is for this reason that she introduces the notion of forgiveness into her 
theory of action. The unpredictability of action is at least 'partially dispelled' by 'the 
twofold nature' of promising: 
... it arises simultaneously out of the "darkness of the human heart," that is, the basic 
unreliability of men who can never guarantee today who they will be tomorrow, and out 
of the impossibility of foretelling the consequences of an act within a community of 
equals where everybody has the same capacity to act. 93 
Thus, through forgiving and promising there is the possibility of redemption and for new 
beginnings. The contingency that confronts those who enter the political realm is 
ameliorated by the possibility of forgiveness and new beginnings, but there can be no 
guarantee of this without the full acceptance of all the premises of political responsibility. 
Even then, there will be cases like Eichmann, when the possibility of forgiveness even with 
91 Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 237. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Ibid., p. 244. 
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the acceptance of all the criteria we have outlined for political responsibility, will not be 
appropriate. Despite this caveat it is in marked contrast to the shadow of the gallows that is 
all that is offered by Weber. Arendt provides us with an alternative to Weber's tragic vision 
of political responsibility, but the very emphasis on new beginnings as well as 'those rare 
moments' still have traces of the tragic in them. Even so, Arendt gives us through forgiving 
and promising the means for a less heroic/tragic understanding of political responsibility. 
Arendt understands that there is a psychological impediment to the acceptance of political 
responsibility by political actors, that is fear of the consequences associated with the 
acceptance of political responsibility. To ameliorate this, she incorporates into her theory of 
action, forgiveness and promising. By this mechanism she demonstrates that she recognises 
that without the possibility of redemption all that remains is the risk of draconian sanctions. 
In the absence of mechanisms for redemption, the response of individuals is overwhelmingly 
to resist stridently having political responsibility ascribed to them, and to refuse resolutely to 
accept political responsibility. In Arendtian terms the significance of the tendency to evade 
political responsibility is that new beginnings cannot be embarked upon. As with Weber, 
Arendt's recognition of contingency and the importance of truth and justice require further 
investigation. 
The third thinker to be considered is Jiirgen Habermas. Whilst it was the tragedy that had 
occurred in Europe that had motivated Arendt to reassess the nature of the political and 
political responsibility, Habermas was provoked into a debate about political responsibility 
by the publication in 1953 by Heidegger of the Introduction to Metaphysics. Habermas, a 
great admirer of Heidegger's philosophical writings, was 'shocked' at the tone of these 
lectures, written in 1935. He was 'shocked' not only by the content which was 'fascist right 
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down to their stylistic details ... especially the sentence about the "inner truth and greatness 
of the Nazi movement", but also that Heidegger had allowed them to be published in 1953, 
'without explanation or comment' .94 Thus, one of Habermas' earliest published essays 
addressed the refusal by Heidegger, as a prominent intellectual, to accept that he had either 
personal or political responsibility for his political actions and the choices that he had 
made,95 ' ... the Nazi philosopher's denial of moral-political responsibility for the 
consequences of mass criminality. ,96 
It is evident that the acceptance of political responsibility was a guiding principle in 
Habermas' early thought and a direct reflection of his development of the notion of the 
political. We can see that even from this early stage in his career that Habermas has concerns 
about the acceptance of political responsibility for the political regime that had not only 
been countenanced by German citizens but had also been allowed to grow and flourish. This 
was the case not only for the direct perpetrators of the dreadful crimes committed by the 
regime, but also the responsibility, in his view, of an entire nation who were tainted even by 
their indirect association with such criminals. 'We made Karl Jaspers' distinction between 
collective guilt and collective liability our own and took very seriously the responsibility for 
the consequences of a regime that had been supported by the mass of the population.,97 
Thus, Habermas begins from the point that 'Insofar as we share a life-context and a history 
94 Habermas, Jiirgen 'Work and Weltanschauung: The Heidegger Controversy from a German Perspective', in 
The New Conservatism: Cultural Criticism and the Historians' Debate, (Cambridge, Mass., The MIT Press, 
1989), p. 161. 
95 Ibid., pp. 160-161. 'Habermas addressed this pertinent question to Heidegger:- Can even the planned mass 
murder of millions of people, about which all of us know today, be made understandable in terms of the history 
of Being, as a fateful error? Is it not the factual crime of those who were responsible for carrying it out - and 
the bad conscience of an entire people?' ('Zur VerOffentIichung von Vorlesungen aus dem Jahre 1935' in the 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 25 June 1953) 
96 Habermas, Jurgen, 'Public Space and Political Public Sphere - the biographical roots of two motifs in my 
thought', (Commemorative Lecture, Kyoto, 11 Nov. 2004), p. 8. 
97 Ibid., pp. 6-7. 
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with others, we have the right to call one another to account.' Only by holding one another 
to account can justice be secured and only in this way would true discourse be possible. This 
emphasis on discourse is clearly articulated in his 1965 inaugural lecture: 'What raises us 
out of nature is the only thing whose nature we can know, language. Through its structure, 
autonomy and responsibility are posited for us. Our first sentence expresses unequivocally 
the intention of universal and unconstrained consensus. ,98 
How to be able to hold one another to account for our actions and the processes by which 
this could be realised, encapsulates both the problems and perceived solutions that have been 
the focus of Habermas' writings for the last 40 years. This has led him to consider the 
position of the citizen in relation to government and law, and also the means by which 
citizens communicate with each other. This has involved him in discussions of political 
action and the choices and risks that are involved with this action, forming eventually the 
context to his theory of communicative action. His developed notion of the political starkly 
illustrates exactly who and why political actors have political responsibility. He concluded 
that political responsibility was the province of everyone and that it was individual and not 
collective. This political responsibility was predicated on citizens having both individual 
rights and the right to political participation and thus becoming both the authors and 
addressees of law. The key to authentic political participation is his theory of communicative 
action. 
Habermas is acutely aware that political action of necessity involves making choices and 
that these choices inevitably involve risk. Habermas' response to choice and risk contrasts 
98 Habermas, Jilrgen, Knowledge and Human Interests, p. 314. Quoted in Pusey Michael, Jiirgen Habermas, 
(Chichester, Ellis Horwood Ltd., 1987), p. 69. 
91 
sharply with that of Weber. Weber adopted a teleological model of action, and like others 
was concerned about the complex nature of modern society with its reliance on 
rationalisation for its legitimacy. Modern society, dominated and controlled as it is by the 
growth and expansion of bureaucracy, caused Weber to privilege instrumental and strategic 
action. The contingency of the world and the risks involved in starting something new 
results in strategic action having the ability to invoke risks for those who have had no 
involvement in the decision-making process. As we have already discovered, the decisions 
which only the charismatic leader can make may involve us in substantial risk without any 
discourse or our acquiescence or even our ability to hold him to account or to assign to him 
political responsibility. Habermas approaches the problem of contingency differently. The 
problem with Weber's teleological model and strategic action is that it 'provides only for 
actors who are oriented to their own success and not in reaching agreement. ,99 The 
contingency of the world dictates that of necessity strategic action always carries risk. 
Habermas, however, specifies that faced with 'risky decisions of strategic action' only those 
'who know what the risks they are willing to undergo' can decide whether to embark on the 
action. 
The sole possible justification [for strategic action] at this level is consensus, aimed at in 
practical discourse, among the participants, who, in the consciousness of their common 
interests and their knowledge of the circumstances, of the predictable consequences and 
secondary consequences, are the only ones who can know what risks they are willing to 
undergo, and with what expectations. 100 
99 Haberrnas, Jtirgen, 'Hannah Arendt's Communications Concept of Power', Social Research, Vo1.44, 1977, 
p.4. 
100 Haberrnas, Jtirgen, Theory and Practice, (London, Heineman, 1974), p. 33. 
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The corollary of this is that the participants who are unaware of the consequences, either 
primary or secondary, of the risks that will be involved in strategic action, are unable to 
make authentic choices about embarking on that action. This in tum means that it is 
impossible to assign to them political responsibility for the outcomes of that action. In order 
to be able to hold one another to account, and, therefore, politically responsible, Habermas 
developed a theory of political action based on his notion of the nature of the political. Thus, 
Habermas also has a theory of action but he divides action into two distinct types, strategic 
and communicative. 
Although Habermas was starting from a different position than either Weber or Arendt, he 
also saw an explicit link between political responsibility and the nature of the political. 
Habermas' project was to restore political participation through communicative action. His 
first task, therefore, was to reclaim the political. Habermas was critical that' since the end of 
the eighteenth century, the newly emerging social sciences and the disciplines of 
jurisprudence have drawn off the waters of classical politics.' 101 He acknowledged his 
indebtedness to Arendt for her re-evaluation of the role of the ancient Greeks and the life of 
the polis. This re-evaluation had succeeded in both reclaiming the role of the constitution 
and the re-amalgamation of theory and practice. For Habermas, it was essential to reclaim 
the role of the constitution from its normally perceived role of securing the climate for 
economic activity to that of providing social justice. 'If we read our constitution ... as texts 
about receiving social justice, then the idea of citizens prescribing laws for themselves -
according to which those subject to the law should regard themselves as the ones who make 
the law - takes on a political dimension: that of a society which deliberately acts upon 
101 Habermas, Theory and Practice, p. 41. 
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itself.,102 The separation of theory and practice is the problem that has a direct bearing on 
political responsibility. Relying heavily on Arendt's work, Habermas charts the change in 
the perception of the political from the ancients to the present day and thus, is able to offer 
an explanation of how it was possible for the dislocation between theory and practice to 
have occurred. 
Theory and practice are embodied within the role of the citizen, through consultation 
(communicative action) and the enactment of goals through administration, legislation and 
justice (strategic action). Thus, the citizens of the polis were the source of all power, and 
through their law-making they embodied both the role of lawgiver and addressee. There was 
no doubt about what it was they were responsible for, and that this dialogue of responsibility 
took place in the full glare of the public gaze. Thus, political responsibility was not 
perceived as a problem for the ancient Greeks, because in the minds of the ancients the 
separation of theory and practice was incoherent. In this view, therefore, it is impossible to 
separate their decision-making from their political responsibility; the citizen cannot resign 
his judgement and his responsibility. 'Public autonomy of citizens has priority over the pre-
political liberties of private persons, ,!03 and it is in the realm of this public life that political 
responsibility occurs. Political responsibility is, therefore, an axiom of political participation 
and public autonomy. It would have been impossible for citizens of the polis to alienate 
themselves from the outcomes of their political actions. Thus, political and responsibility are 
synonymous, to be a political animal was at the same time to be a politically-responsible 
animal. This public life has, however, to be clearly separated from the citizen's private 
102 Habermas, Jtirgen, 'Crossing Globalisation's Valley of Tears' ,New Perspectives Quarterly, Vol.17, No.4, 
2000, p. 51. 
103 Habermas, Hirgen, 'On the Internal Relation between the Rule of Law and Democracy', European Journal 
o/Philosophy, Vol.3, No.1, 1995, p. 16. 
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existence. In fact it is only in one of these two existences, namely the public sphere, in 
which political responsibility can occur. In the Athenian state, therefore, we have a clear 
notion of the political; it is the ability of all citizens who are all equally qualified to meet, 
discuss and ultimately make decisions on matters of common concern in public. Since the 
citizens were the law-makers, any attempt to deny their political responsibility for their 
actions would have been incoherent. Further, any citizen holding office was also required to 
give an account to his fellow citizens, in full and in public, for all the actions that he had 
carried out on behalf of the rest of the citizenry. The Athenian citizen l04 was, therefore, 
politically responsible for his actions and for the risks that those actions invoked. 
Continuing the work of Arendt, Habermas charts the change in perception from Man as a 
zoon politikon to the claim by St. Thomas, that Man is instead homo naturaliter est animal 
sociale.105 In St. Thomas's attempt to restore the political life from its largely negative role 
as recounted by St. Augustine, Habermas claims that the freedom of the citizen assured 
through public participation is sacrificed by Thomas for 'tranquillity and peace .... The 
central question of the old Politics, concerning the quality of governance, has been 
dropped.,106 With this change in emphasis to peace and the social, rather than the political 
nature of man, also came the rehabilitation of labour in the ordo civitas. The outcome of this 
change, according to Habermas, can be seen in the work of Hobbes. Man was no longer 
characterised as a communicative, political animal. Instead Hobbes, puts into the hand of the 
sovereign the exercise of all power, as the only infallible means to remedy 'the war of all 
104 Of course, "citizens" in this sense does not mean everyone. We know that Athenian society was segregated 
by both sex and status, it was delineated between men and women and those who were free and those who 
were enslaved. As well as all women and slaves, metics - non-Athenian Greeks and other free aliens were also 
excluded from citizenship. 
105 Habermas, Theory and Practice, p. 48. 
106 Ibid. 
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against all'. Locke, rejecting the authoritarianism of Hobbes, 'postulated the priority of 
human rights' .107 Habermas cites this change to explain that it had eventually led to the 
valuing of individual rights more than the rights of democratic citizens to political 
participation. 
The legitimacy of political action is, therefore, predicated on political participation. The 
legacy of strategic action leads Habermas to claim that for Weber 'the constitutional state 
does not ... draw its legitimation from the democratic form of the political will-formation of 
citizens. Rather, legitimation is premised solely on the aspects of the legal medium through 
which political power is exercised.' 108 Habermas contrasts Weber's claims unfavourably 
with the Arendtian view that 'in contrast to Weber, who sees the fundamental phenomenon 
of power as the probability that in a social relationship one can assert one's own will against 
the opposition, Arendt views power as the potential of a common will formed in non-
coercive communication. '\09 For Arendt legitimacy is predicated on the 'power [that] 
springs up between men when they act together, and it vanishes the moment they disperse.' 
Thornhill argues that Habermas outlines a consensual theory of legitimacy, according to 
which genuinely legitimate government is secured only when private needs are mediated 
through the discursive channels of the public sphere, and in which public opinion plays a 
regulatory role in the legislature' .110 
The prescription that Habermas delivers concerning the nature of the political is designed to 
reconcile strategic and communicative action, public and private autonomy, as a way to 
107 Habennas, Theory and Practice, pp. 92-94. 
108 Habennas, Jiirgen, Between Facts and Norms, (Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1996), p. 73. 
109 Ibid., p. 147. 
110 Thornhill, Chris, Political Theory in Modern Germany, (Cambridge, Polity Press, 2000), pp. 133-134. 
96 
establish the legitimacy of law and hence both the ascription and acceptance of political 
responsibility. Habermas claims that 'if the sources of justice from which the law itself 
draws its legitimacy are not to run dry, then a jurisgenerative communicative power must 
underlie the administrative power of the government.' III Thus he describes the 
incorporation of both strategic and communicative action. This is to be achieved by 
ensuring that the addressees and lawgivers are one and the same and hence can be 
politically responsible. 
The problem with modem western democratic governments is that the state legitimises itself 
'on the basis of its ability to reach into the private sphere to settle conflicts, not because it 
represents a public consensus'. The bureaucratisation described by Weber severs the 
political link between state and society.112 This becomes a serious problem when citizens 
perceive that they have no institutional links to the centres of power. 'Citizens, noting the 
irrelevance of parliaments to decision-making .. form extra-parliamentary citizen initiative 
groups to confront' the decision-makers directly. I 13 The citizens know that they are being 
excluded from political participation. 
The idea that the addressees of the law must also be able to understand themselves as its 
authors does not, [however], give the united citizens of a democratic polity a 
voluntaristic, carte blanche permission to make whatever decisions they like. The legal 
guarantee to behave as one pleases within the bounds of the law is the core of private, 
not public autonomy. Rather on the basis of this freedom of choice, citizens are 
accorded autonomy in the sense of a reasonable will-formation, even if this autonomy 
III Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, p. 147. 
112 Hager, Carol, 'Citizen Movements and Technological Policymaking in Germany', The Annals a/the 
American Academy, No. 528, July 1993, p. 44. 
113 Ibid. 
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can only be enjoined and not legally required of them. They should bind their wills to 
just those laws they give themselves after achieving a common will through 
discourse. 114 
A discussion of Habermas' qualified defence of 'civil disobedience' as a last resort in the 
absence of discourse will illustrate how he thought that 'extra-parliamentary citizen 
initiative groups [formed] to confront' the decision makers directly, could reclaim the 
political legitimacy of the addressees as lawmakers. 
In the albeit different if still tense, climate of the mid-1980s Habermas sought to defend the 
idea of 'civil disobedience'. A brief examination of his writing reveals that he considers it to 
be both 'the guardian of legitimacy' in democratic societies and also a response to 
inadequacies in deliberative democratic procedures. Habermas defines civil disobedience as 
'a non-violent, symbolic and illegal form of protest, undertaken with the intention of 
appealing to the formal institutions of the state on the one hand and the sense of justice of 
the wider political community on the other.' liS He does this against approaches that insisted 
that 'law is law' with all the vigour of what he presented as a legal positivism discredited by 
its complicity in the Third Reich. I 16 'Caught between legal positivism and power fetishism, 
many of our jurists are so fixated on the State's monopoly of legitimate violence that they 
put the conceptual and institutional division between Right and Violence in the wrong 
place.' I 17 Habermas insists that 'the modem constitutional state can only expect of its 
114 Haberrnas, Jiirgen, 'Constitutional Democracy, A Paradoxical Union of Contradictory Principles?', 
Political Theory, Vo!.29, No.6, December 2001, p. 767. 
115 Smith, William, 'Civil Disobedience and Social Power: Reflections on Habermas', Contemporary Political 
Theory, Vo!.7, 2008, p. 75. 
116 Haberrnas, Jiirgen 'Zivil Ungehorsam - Testfall fUr den demokratischen Rechtsstaat', [1983] in Haberrnas, 
Die neue Unubersichtlichkeit, , (Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, 1985), p. 97. 
117 Haberrnas, Jiirgen and Calhoun, Martha, 'Right and Violence: A German Trauma', Cultural Critique, 
No.1, Autumn 1985, p. 126. 
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citizens obedience to the laws if and in so far as it rests on principles worthy of recognition, 
in light of which that which is legal can be justified as legitimate - and, if necessary, can be 
rejected as illegitimate.' 118 
All attention falls on defending non-violent civil disobedience as the last vestige of 
extra-parliamentary legitimate opposition within constitutional democracy. Under the 
"shadow" of the big chill, with one's "back to the wall," when "even non-violent civil 
disobedience is illegal," Habermas' robust response to this one-sidedness 
understandably becomes one-sided. He defends both the unforced force of the better 
argument and the "unconventional means of influencing the formation of political 
will.,,119 
For Habermas, as for other political theorists, civil disobedience raIses moral dilemmas 
because of its illegality.120 He insists, however, that civil disobedience has to remain in a 
state of suspense between legality and legitimacy. More precisely he argued that civil 
disobedience has to be a 'morally based protest'. Personal interest or privately-held 
convictions do not suffice. Second, it has to be a 'public act' which is normally announced 
in advance in order to allow the authorities to take appropriate action. 'Therefore, civilly 
disobedient citizens at least have some kind of obligation to publicly explain their illegal 
actions to other members of the democratic community. They are, as it were, subject to the 
demanding requirements of communicative freedom, in that through the give and take of 
reasons in the public sphere they must be prepared to justify their resort to civil 
disobedience.' 121 Third, it should involve only the 'provisional violation' of specific laws 
and should not challenge the legal order as a whole. 'The legal procedure as a whole must 
118 Habermas and Calhoun, 'Right and Violence: A German Trauma', p. 126. 
119 Matustik, Martin Beck, Jurgen Habermas, (Maryland, Rowman & Littlefield, 2001), p. 112. 
120 Smith, 'Civil Disobedience and Social Power: Reflections on Habermas', p. 76. 
121 Ibid. 
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remain intact; what lohan Galtung calls "functional" resistance is not justified.' 122 Fourth, 
those engaged in civil disobedience should be prepared to bear the legal consequences that 
follow from their acts 'the disobedient must accept responsibility for the consequences of 
his actions.' 123 Indeed, Habermas presented this element of risk as some kind of surety for 
the moral basis of the disobedience. Those who wish to instigate civil disobedience 'must 
have acquired the sensibility, judgement, and readiness to take risks necessary to recognise 
continuing legal infractions of legitimacy'. He is adamant that civil disobedience 'is not a 
blank check for politically motivated disobedience of the law.' 124 Finally, disobedience 
must be of a purely 'symbolic character', that is, it must not involve any form of 
. I 125 VlO ence. 
We have a choice of course, and normally we do not have to do anything as challenging as 
this. We can choose to remain within the private world and decline to take up the 
responsibility that is involved in political responsibility, even where it involves us in no 
violation of the law at all. 
These dimensions of communicative freedom must be institutionalised through a 
constitutional system of rights that incorporates both the 'liberties of the ancients', 
political rights guaranteeing free and equal participation in democratic law-making, and 
the 'liberties of the modems,' private rights guaranteeing a sphere of personal freedom 
to pursue individual life-plans. These rights, then, allow for our exercise of 
122 Habermas and Calhoun, 'Right and Violence: A German Trauma', p. 137. (in Vierteljahresschrift fur 
Sicherheit und Frieden [Heft 1, 1983]) 
123 Habermas and Calhoun, 'Right and Violence: A German Trauma', p. 137. 
124 Ibid., p. 136. 
125 Habermas, 'Zivil Ungehorsam - Testfall fur den demokratischen Rechtsstaat', [1985] in Habermas, Die 
neue Uniibersichtlichkeit pp. 83-84, and p. 90. 
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communicative freedom on the one hand and our retreat from communicative freedom 
on the other. 126 
Habermas' claim that it is only in the political public sphere that citizens can be normatively 
held together explains why his later work is motivated by the idea that the kind of consensus 
embodied in the life-world can only be challenged at the expense of a risk. Habermas is 
concerned that when consensus and truth have gone from political discourse they are 
incredibly difficult to restore. 
What troubles Habermas is that there is no guarantee that having challenged/disrupted one 
consensus we will be able to re-establish a new one. This can happen not just in those 'rare 
moments', identified by Arendt, but when communicative freedom is violated, however, 
these circumstances may not be sufficient to 'draw us all out of hiding.' This is the major 
danger of embarking upon the 'new beginnings' privileged in Arendt's work. These risks 
led Arendt to also reject strategic action in favour of communicative action, 'to the human 
ability not just to act but to act in concert.' 127 Arendt favours action in concert because she 
is so aware that new beginnings always involve risk. Arendt takes into account that political 
actors make decisions for others, exposing these others to the risks incurred by these 
decisions. The contingency of the world means that when political actions are instigated 
there is never any guarantee or certainty concerning their outcome. She offers forgiving and 
redemption as a way of mitigating against this contingency and uncertainty, and avers that 
new beginnings and the acceptance and/or ascription of political responsibility are not 
possible without forgiveness and redemption. Arendt states that 'forgiving is the only 
reaction which does not merely react but acts anew and unexpectedly, unconditioned by the 
126 Habermas and Calhoun, 'Right and Violence: A German Trauma', p. 136. 
127 Arendt, Hannah, On Violence, (New York, Harcourt, Brace & World, 1970), p. 44. 
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act that provoked it and therefore, freeing from its consequences both the one who forgives 
and the one who is forgiven.' I28 
This statement by Arendt finds no parallel in either Weber's or Habermas' writing. Rather 
than Arendt's forgiving and redemption, Habermas proposes a process routed III 
development of his theory of communicative action wherein practical discourse IS 
understood as the process towards consensus in decision making. Hence, rather than relying 
on forgiveness and redemption for each party at risk, he assumes that his formula arising 
through practical discourse will ensure that it 'can be understood in the long run as a self-
correcting learning process,.129 New beginnings expose us to the risk that a consensus 
cannot be newly established. Decisions and actions are taken that do not take into any 
account the opinions of all effected parties: 'less powerful citizens cannot submit arguments 
in the public sphere in the hope of receiving a response from others.' 130 Rather than the 
retrospective forgiving and redemption advocated by Arendt, Habermas' solution is pre-
emptive. His idea is that only if all affected can follow through the procedure outlined in the 
theory of communicative action, can we reach a legitimate, i.e. real, consensus. 
Communicative action involves essential qualities of intelligibility, authenticity, truthfulness 
and moral appropriateness. Habermas, therefore, gives us a fuller version of what is 
involved in giving an account. The most infamous example in British politics of the lack of 
these qualities was the account of his conduct when he was accused of impropriety given by 
128 Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 241. 
129 Habermas, 'Constitutional Democracy, A Paradoxical Union of Contradictory Principles?', p. 774. 
130 Smith, 'Civil Disobedience and Social Power: Reflections on Habermas' p. 80. 
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John (Jack) Profumo to Parliament. 131 Profumo lied, i.e. he violated the presumptions of 
truth (and authenticity) without which we cannot found/justify new beginnings, a new 
consensus, or even more prosaic decisions. Indeed, it was his political responsibility not just 
to abide by such presumptions, but where they appear wanting or damaged, to reassert them 
or to provide the institutional framework within which they could be re-established. That is, 
what defines the political sphere provides, in part the criteria for political responsibility 
within it, and it is the politician's duty to restore the challenged or disrupted consensus and 
establish a new one through authentic discourse. It should be noted that it is the continuation 
of inauthenticity during the Blair government (Blair's spin), that is so debilitating because 
of the difficulties of the restoration of consensus once "truth and consensus has gone". 
These essential qualities of communicative action, especially truthfulness, will be utilised in 
discussions in a later chapter. 
Habermas emphasises that communication between individuals expands the 'inner life' of 
the person and expands the 'fragile network of relationships of reciprocal recognition. At 
the same time, she exposes herself to the risks of denied reciprocity. The morality of equal 
respect for all and for each one is intended to absorb such risks and is designed for the 
inclusion of the marginalised in the network of reciprocal recognition.' 132 Habermas echoes 
131 Profumo who was forced to resign after he confessed that he had lied in a personal statement made in the 
House of Commons on 22nd March 1963. Profumo who was then the Secretary of State for War in the 
Macmillan government, had a brief affair with Christine Keeler who earned her living as a "show-girl". Keeler 
was at the same time also having a relationship with the Soviet naval attache Captain Eugene Ivanov. 
Although no evidence was ever produced that this had any real security implications it was Profumo's fear 
that the exposure of his sexual misdemeanour would force him out of office that induced him to try to evade 
disclosure and, therefore, to lie. Profumo claimed that there had been 'no impropriety whatsoever in my 
acquaintanceship with Miss Keeler'. 'He had lied to his colleagues, his wife and to the Law Officers of the 
Crown. He had lied on the floor of the House ofCommons ... He had taken legal action and recovered damages 
[through the courts] on the basis of those lies.' Irving, Clive, Scandal '63, p. 107. When it was discovered that 
this was a lie, Profumo had to resign. This was the end of what had been a glittering political career. Although 
Profumo and his wife then became involved with charity work even this failed ever, even to the end of his life, 
to lead to his rehabilitation. 
132 Habermas 'Public Space and Political Public Sphere', pp. 5-6. 
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Arendt in her concern that property and wealth that normally ensure security within the 
state, have proved to be no substitute for the communicative network of relationships of 
reciprocal recognition. A stark example (other than that of the catastrophe of European 
Jewry) was the expulsion of the Asian community from Uganda. Without establishing a 
place for oneself in the world through discourse, the excluded, marginalised, risk having no 
place in the world at all. 
This examination, albeit brief, of the juxtaposition of the thought of Weber, Arendt and 
Habermas has confirmed that their respective understandings of the nature of the political 
have circumscribed their respective understandings of political responsibility. Weber 
differentiates the public and private realm, although he is clear that the political resides 
solely in the public realm. However, he reduces the political to the struggle between political 
elites for authority, in order to effect events, to command and wield power over others. 
Political action is not the prerogative of the community, but something done on behalf of the 
community in which they have only marginal participation. So constrained is his notion of 
the political that political action and, therefore, political responsibility becomes only the 
prerogative of the charismatic leader and is thus dependent on his character. Despite the 
tenor of 'The Profession and Vocation of Politics' it is possible to believe that Weber 
recognised the impossibility of finding a 'theory of political responsibility' that did not 
depend entirely on the inherent "integrity" of his 'charismatic leader'. 
Within Arendt's writing is embedded a strong "theory" of political responsibility that is 
circumscribed by her notion of the political. For Arendt, therefore, political responsibility is, 
in certain circumstances, the prerogative of every individual and involves choices, made in 
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the public realm by men revealing themselves. If we are to be allowed to take action to 
instigate new beginnings, and not be forever condemned by past actions, then there must 
also be the facilities of forgiving and promising. Habermas' notions of the nature of the 
political and political responsibility are co-dependent. For Habermas, like Arendt, political 
responsibility is also the prerogative of every individual, and is dependent on public 
discourse to involve consensual action. He bases this claim on the role that he assigns 
citizens as co-legislators who are therefore both the lawgivers and addressees of law. 
What does this examination tell us about political responsibility? It establishes that the 
nature of the political and political responsibility are inextricably linked. Rather than any 
general or generic connotations, political responsibility is a completely separate discrete idea 
not to be confused with legal, moral, criminal or any other type of responsibility. This may 
confirm that political responsibility is indeed a concept. What has also been revealed, 
however, is that political responsibility, can only be attributed to political actors who have 
left (or have been forced to leave) the private world and are operating in the public realm. 
For Weber this is restricted to one person, whereas for Arendt and Habermas it can 
potentially be many. This provides the first of the normative values towards the construction 
the concept of political responsibility; that political responsibility can only be ascribed to 
those who are operating in the public political realm. 
Each thinker has been concerned with issues of contingency and unpredictable 
consequences, that compound both the risks of action and the possibilities of political 
responsibility, therefore, the contingency of the world will be the subject of discussion in the 
next chapter. The discussion of the contingent world and the possibility of political 
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responsibility will reveal further important normative values. For unlike Weber, Arendt and 
Habermas privilege giving an account through public discourse as an essential component of 
political responsibility. Arendt and Habermas in particular have also emphasised the 
importance of truth in that account. They have also discussed the necessity to ameliorate the 
revealed problems of choice and risk in the contingent world in order to deal with the future 
through new beginnings as well as dealing with the past. Justice and truth are essential to 
this process. 
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Chapter Three 
Contingency and Political Responsibility 
The disagreements identified addressing cause and capacity demonstrated not only that these 
areas are contested but has illustrated the importance of contingency to this debate. Further, 
the problems revealed in the literature review associated with agency and the implications 
that this has for political responsibility ensures that this is an essential area for investigation. 
Commentators are not in any doubt that contingency is a real problem, especially to 
concepts of responsibility. Agreement on how or if this contingency can be addressed is a 
different matter, for in many cases it is claimed that the ascription of political responsibility 
relies on external factors, many of which are, in any real sense, beyond our control. This 
chapter will review some of the efforts that have been made to overcome the problems of 
contingency but also address some of the subsequent claims made concerning the 
impossibility of political responsibility in the contingent world. It will also examine the 
claims made by those who believe that despite the contingency of the world political 
responsibility is possible. The outcome of this discussion will be that notwithstanding the 
difficulties that contingency creates, political responsibility is a concept that is essential to 
the political process, and more specifically, to representative democracy. Despite our efforts 
we are, however, unable to discover a strategy that will offset the inherent unpredictability 
and irreversibility of the contingent world. Whilst acknowledging this contingency these 
discussions lead to speculation on strategies that might make the ascription and acceptance 
of political responsibility possible. 
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Recognising and attempting to understand the contingent nature of the world is not a modem 
phenomenon; even for the ancients it had never really been in any doubt. Homer, for 
example, in order to make seemingly unintelligible events intelligible to men, made the gods 
who were held responsible for such events, human, and thus intelligible. Nevertheless, even 
ascribing to the gods human characteristics thus making their actions and the world more 
predictable, did not prevent events happening 'by chance, at random, for no particular 
reason'. 1 This contingency was categorised by Aristotle as 'all matters that may be or may 
not be, that have happened but may not have happened, are by chance kata symbebekos or 
accidental or contingent as distinguished from what necessarily is as it is, what is and cannot 
not be.,2 As unpredictable as the natural world is, the most unpredictable animals that exist 
within it are human beings. As Arendt succinctly expresses it, 'everything that appears to 
human eyes, everything that occurs to the human mind, everything that happens to mortals 
for better or worse is "contingent," including their own existence.,3 Arendt quotes 
approvingly, Duns Scotus, a Franciscan friar, who in the thirteenth century pinpointed how 
this contingency occurs, "'I do not mean something that is not necessary or which was not in 
existence, but something whose opposite could have occurred at the time that this actually 
did. That is why I do not say that something is contingent, but that something is caused 
contingently." In other words, it is precisely the causative element in human affairs that 
condemns them to contingency and unpredictability.,4 Indeed for Arendt 'for better or 
worse man is "the dwelling place of the contingent"'. 5 
I Irwin, Terence, Classical Thought, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 14-15. 
2 Arendt, Hannah, The Life of the Mind, Two: Willing, (San Diego, Harcourt Brace &Co., 1971), p. 14. 
3 Arendt, Hannah, The Life of the Mind, One: Thinking, p. 60. 
4 Arendt, The Life of the Mind, Two: Willing, p. 138. 
5 Kohn, Jerome 'Freedom: the priority of the political', in Companion to Hannah Arendt, ed. Dana Villa 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 114. 
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When this contingency is associated with the political realm the causative element becomes 
particularly problematic. Arendt in The Life of the Mind charts some of the attempts that 
have been made to overcome it. Beginning with Plato, she describes how he manifests his 
disquiet in a search for "absolute truths" with pure knowledge, with things that are eternal 
and therefore unchangeable. In the Republic, Plato claims that it is only through the 
acquisition of knowledge that the answers to all problems is to be found, in the world of 
ideas, the Theory of Forms, and knowledge of the Form of the "Good" in particular. These 
Forms are not merely ideas 'but objective realities displaying their character to perfection 
and eternally,.6 To achieve this Plato had to deliberately exclude 'all matters concerning 
human affairs, because they were contingent; they could always be different from what they 
actually were.' 7 Plato's attempts to overcome the contingent nature of the world, however, 
relies completely on his entire vision, including irrefutable ideas of absolute truths and the 
authoritarianism that accompanied them in this vision. Arendt speculates on why the 
philosophical challenge of contingency 'which was for classical philosophy the ultimate of 
meaningless ... burst as a reality upon the early centuries of the common era'. She concludes 
that it may have been the Biblical doctrine that 'pitted contingency against necessity' or it 
may have been the 'shattering political experiences of these early centuries' that caused the 
'truism and plausibilities of ancient thinking' to be open to doubt.8 The rejection of the 
certainties of the ancients meant that the only other escape available from this contingency 
was not an alternative to Plato's political realm but the Christian idea of 'divine Providence. 
There was now no pretence that there was any way to overcome contingency in this world, 
6 Guthrie, W.K.C., A History o/Greek Philosophy, Vol. V, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1962), 
~. 378. 
Arendt, The Life o/the Mind, One: Thinking, p. 139. 
8 Arendt, The Life o/the Mind, Two: Willing, pp. 31-32. 
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but instead the expectation of an after-life when what had seemed contingent and 
meaningless in this world would become crystal clear' in the next one.9 
It is clear that not only is there no way of overcoming the contingency of the world, but also 
that there is little dissent when it comes to acknowledging that the modem world has 
become increasingly more uncertain and unpredictable. The implications, however, of this 
uncertainty and unpredictability on causation and human agency are matters on which there 
is little consensus. There are two distinct methods of dealing with the problems posed by 
contingency as it relates to political responsibility. The first are narratives that describe the 
nature of the political which are designed to overcome and/or mitigate against this 
contingency. Two of the three thinkers already discussed, Weber and Arendt, are good 
examples of this strategy. The second strategy is to deny that political responsibility is 
possible precisely because the world is so complex and contingent. 
Although Weber recognises the contingent nature of the world, nevertheless, he builds 
political responsibility into his concept of political action. Despite his understanding of 
contingency and the importance he places on political responsibility, political action is of 
course about making choices. Weber, concerned that the emergence of the centralised 
bureaucratic state had undermined the role of politics, tends, therefore, to restrict political 
action, and hence political responsibility, to the charismatic leader. 10 The charismatic leader 
is compelled, however, to make choices in a morally indeterminate world exacerbated by the 
complexities and contingencies of modem society. In an attempt to overcome these 
9 Arendt, The Life afthe Mind, Two: Willing, p. 27. 
10 Weber is intensely critical of a bureaucracy that is merely dedicated to the expansion of a centralised 
economy and which had, therefore, essentially separated the political into two distinct unconnected areas, one 
the sphere of private interest and the other, the sphere of administrative operations. 
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problems Weber is inevitably led to set heroic standards for his charismatic leader that will 
almost never be met. This gives the impression that 'Weber's hero is alone in the world that 
seems to belong to Satan.' Walzer sums up the problem in his analysis of Weber's political 
leader when he describes him as a "tragic hero" even though his vocation is entirely his own 
choice. 'The politician takes the sword himself, and only by doing so does he measure up to 
his vocation.' II , [The] mature, superbly trained, relentless, objective, responsible, and 
disciplined political leader [who] is also a suffering servant.' 12 Thus, for Weber political 
responsibility will only be possible for the charismatic political leader, and then only for the 
political leader who has a true vocation in politics. How unlikely that would be, Weber had 
explained so well in 'Politics as a Vocation'. 
Arendt, of course, also accepts regretfully the changed nature of human existence and that 
'human nature is itself contingent and fragile' .13 She reminds us that although we are 
causally responsible for every political event that occurs, it is the unpredictable nature of 
human beings that is problematic because we never really know definitively how people will 
act or react to any given situation. In The Human Condition, Arendt (echoing Heidegger), 
expresses the belief that the scientific developments that have occurred over a number of 
centuries have sucked human beings 'into an accelerating process of production and 
consumption' which have made the world appear even more contingent. 14 She notes that 
unlike the ancient thinkers, for us there is no escape into the realms of absolutes, or even 
into the vita contemplative in which a world seemingly contingent and meaningless could be 
II Walzer, Michael, 'Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands', Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 2, 
No.2, 1973, p. 176. 
12 Ibid., p. 177. 
13 Canovan, Margaret, 'Arendt's theory of totalitarianism: a reassessment', The Cambridge Companion to 
Hannah Arendt, (ed.) Dana Villa, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 34. 
14 Arendt, Hannah, The Human Condition, (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1958), p. xiv. 
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explained by the 'consoling thought of divine Providence.' 15 It is in her analysis of 
totalitarianism that Arendt solidifies this disquiet. She deplores what she views as the 
increasing dominance of technology, and the increase of human penetration into, and 
exploitation of, nature. She believes that this reflects a marked shift in human thinking. This 
phenomenon demonstrates 'modern man's deep-rooted suspicion of everything he did not 
make himself.' He now believes that 'everything is possible' .16 The one thing that 
'totalitarianism and its antecedents' have shown above all else is 'that we can perversely 
choose to embrace necessity and make ourselves and others the slaves of supposedly 
necessary processes.'(my italics)17 In her lengthy and repeated discussions of the conduct of 
Adolf Eichmann, Arendt forcefully draws to our attention the dreadful outcomes that can 
result from such choices. She believed that Eichmann had chosen to abdicate his personal 
political responsibilities and that this choice had led him to participate in great evil. She 
categorically rejected the claims made by Eichmann that there had been no other course of 
action open to him - that in fact, he had been powerless to act differently. The willingness to 
be politically responsible is crucial in such "dark times" when people are drawn out of 
hiding. She came to the controversial conclusion (especially as it was seen to be a direct 
challenge to the behaviour of beleaguered European Jewry), that despite the contingent 
nature of the world, political responsibility is always possible, but regrettably not always 
either chosen, ascribed or accepted. 
Many of those who claim that political responsibility is impossible (one exponent is 
Foucault) claim that, given the contingency of political action, it is not always possible to 
attribute responsibility to a particular agent for the effects of the power that is exercised by 
15 Arendt, The Life afthe Mind, Two: Willing, p. 27. 
16 Canovan, 'Arendt's theory of totalitarianism: a reassessment', p. 27. 
17 Ibid., p. 35. 
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that agent. Indeed, Arendt's claim that it is the people who inhabit this already contingent 
world who are themselves the 'dwelling place of the contingent', seems to lend support to 
those who claim that as the world is irredeemably contingent, it is neither reasonable nor 
feasible to maintain that the ascription or acceptance of political responsibility is possible. 
Further, those who question the very concept of human responsibility suggest that the most 
generous interpretation that can be made is that those who claim that political responsibility 
is possible are merely expressing an aspirational goal. A less sympathetic view is that they 
are at best self-deluding, or, an even more cynical interpretation is that they are perpetuating 
a myth that could be seen as fulfilling the role of another Noble Fallacy. 
The concept of "moral luck" is also often cited as an objection to the ascription of 
responsibility. The expression was introduced by Thomas Nagel and Bernard Williams about 
20 years ago and describes the problem caused where a significant aspect of what someone 
does depends on factors beyond hislher control. 18 Nagel and Williams claim that despite the 
fact people are not in control of many of the circumstances of their lives, and the results and 
consequences of their actions, we still continue to treat himlher as an object of moral 
judgement. 19 They argue that it is profoundly irrational to rush to condemn those have acted 
(as we judge), wrongly simply because of the circumstances in which they found themselves. 
If we concede that 'there but for the grace of God and the chances of history we all go', 
whilst still condemning the actions of those whom 'grace and chance did not favour', then 
we are acting irrationally. Although Arendt categorically rejected this argument when it was 
used by Eichmann to excuse his actions, this argument has been cited effectively in the case 
18 Cooper, David, 'Collective Responsibility, "Moral Luck," and Reconciliation', in War Crimes and 
Collective Wrongdoing, ed. Aleksandar Jokic, (Oxford, Blackwells, 2001), p. 207. 
19 Jacobs, Jonathan, 'Luck and Retribution', Philosophy, Vol. 74, 1999, p. 539. Jacobs alerts us to the fact that 
'it is very easy for human beings to exaggerate their autonomy and to think that they have control, when in fact 
they are only considering a very narrow "slice" of the usually untidy and complex realities.' 
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of "ordinary citizens" of Nazi Germany. These citizens 'had an opportunity to behave 
heroically ... and most of them are culpable for having failed this test. But it is a test to which 
the citizens of other countries were not subjected, with the result that even if they ... would 
have behaved badly ... they simply did not and therefore are not similarly culpable. ,20 
It is obvious how this could easily be transferred to politicians who could and do claim 
that they are at the mercy of forces over which they have no control and therefore can in 
no way be held responsible. For example, David Blunkett, when he was Home Secretary, 
claimed that:-
Who we hold to account and for what is a key question in the modem era that we must 
address. At the moment we have the worst of all worlds. Ministers are felt, believed and 
presented as having [political] responsibility for aspects of our life, our well being and 
our public services over which they do not have direct control... The power of the 
executive has changed through devolution, decentralisation and membership of the EU, 
while the decisions of global financial institutions and businesses have a major impact on 
our society. 21 
Thus, any claims that are made concerning the necessity of the acceptance of political 
responsibility by both politicians and individuals are contentious. Those who oppose such 
claims accuse supporters of wanting and demanding that political responsibility be possible 
without offering any evidence that it is any more than their aspirational goal. Part of the 
detractor's claim is that it is impossible to identify an agent as having the capacity to effect 
20 Nagel, Thomas. "Moral Luck", in his Mortal Questions (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1979), f. 34. Quoted by David Cooper, in 'Collective Responsibility, "Moral Luck," and Reconciliation', p. 207. 
1 Blunkett, David, Speech to Labour local government and women's conference, Cardiff, 
01/02/2002. Accessed on 16/04/2003 
[http://society.guardian.co.uklfutureforpublicservices/story/O%2C8] 1 February 2002. 
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outcomes, and that this would have to be possible in order to establish that an agent was 
politically responsible for an action or inaction. Whether political responsibility is possible, 
therefore, is dependent on whether or not one has a particular anthropocentric view of the 
world. Those who do not share this anthropocentric view claim that political responsibility 
is impossible. One example of a complex and highly developed alternative to the 
anthropocentric view of society is the autopoietic system22 described by Niklas Luhmann.23 
Thornhill claims that it is possible to extract from his work a theory that 'deliberately and 
consistently questions the anthropocentric foundations of action theory and liberal or 
humanistic postulations of individual and collective agency', based on 'Gehlen's theory that 
social institutions obviate the need for individual political response' .24 Lee argues that from 
Luhmann's perspective, humanist theories of society are examples of metaphysical 
speculation and wishful thinking.25 This, of course, has profound implications for any 
notions of political responsibility. What King and Thornhill claim, however, is that 
Luhmann does acknowledge that an essential element to the operation of the systems is that 
the fiction is maintained: that it is possible to assign political responsibility to an agent, even 
though the contingency and complexity of the world makes this impossible in practice. 26 
Arnoldi explains that Luhmann argues that in order to make an unintelligible world more 
intelligible, unlike the ancients who imputed to the gods human characteristics, we now 
prefer to rely on science and technology to provide answers and certainties. Luhmann, he 
22 Lee, Daniel, 'The Society of Society: The Grand Finale ofNiklas Luhmann', Sociological Theory, Vol. 18, 
No.2, (July 2000), p. 320. Luhmann borrows the principles of self-reference and autopoiesis from the 
cognitive biologists Humberto Maturana and Francesco Varela. A system is no longer thought to depend on its 
environment. Rather, a "closed" social system creates itself and its environment. 
23 Thornhill Chris, Political Theory in Modern Germany, (Cambridge, Polity Press, 2000). Thornhill claims 
that Luhmann has written extensively on many subjects, his work is both complex and interdependent. He has 
been influenced by many thinkers, including Carl Schmitt and Hans Kelsen. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Lee, 'The Society of Society: The Grand Finale ofNiklas Luhmann', p. 323. 
26 King Michael, & Thornhill, Chris, 'Will the real Niklas Luhmann stand up, please. A reply to John Mingers', 
The Sociological Review, Vo1.51, No.2, 2003, p. 284. 
115 
asserts, believes that rather than the increasing complexity of scientific and technological 
developments making the world more understandable, it has instead created an environment 
in which the world appears even more contingent. That 'during the last 300 years, the 
general perception of "the world" has changed from being grounded on a notion of 
universitas rerum or aggregatio cor porum to being simply an indeterminate horizon of 
further possibilities. More recently, this indeterminate horizon has grown to such a degree of 
complexity that the future most often is conceived of in terms of risks and contingency. ,27 
Luhmann's theory of modern society is, therefore, a theory of differentiation and 
complexity. Modern society is unlike pre-modern societies that were organised by class or 
estates and instead consists of discrete individual systems and sub-systems.28 Thornhill 
asserts that 'His ideas represent a movement away from humanistic conceptions of political 
action, liability and responsibility. [He] suggest[s] a vision of a de-centred society, in which 
actions cannot be imputed (or can only be symbolically imputed) to specific agents. Like 
Kelsen and Schmitt before him, Luhmann argues that systems revolve around the 
maintenance of fictions, or paradoxes, and that the imputation of personal agency to roles 
within the system is just one fiction upon which systems reside. ,29 The corollary of this is 
that if it is impossible to impute agency then it is impossible to ascribe or accept 
responsibility for actions. 
These claims were graphically illustrated in the British parliamentary system, when issues 
concerning the possibility of ministerial political responsibility had surfaced publicly during 
the Scott Enquiry set up in November 1992 following the collapse of the Matrix Churchill 
27 Arnoldi, Jakob, 'Luhmann: An Introduction', Theory, Culture & SOCiety, Vol.\ 8 No.1, p. 7. 
Extracts are from Luhmann, 1982 The Differentiation of Society and 1998, Observations on 
Modernity. 
28 Thornhill, Political Theory in Modern Germany, pp. 175-176. 
29 Ibid.,pp. 178-179. 
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tria1.3o Sir Richard Scott, its author, supported the views expressed by Sir Robin Butler, the 
head of the Civil Service, concerning political responsibility. Sir Robin's views are 
succinctly outlined here in the aftermath ofthe Scott Report, by Elizabeth Symons, the then-
General Secretary of the Association of First Division Civil Servants, 
... the argument is that the conduct of Government has become so complex and the need 
for Ministerial delegation of responsibility to, and reliance on the advice of, officials has 
become so inevitable as to render unreal the attachment of blame to a Minister simply 
because something has gone wrong in the department of which he or she is in charge. 
[This] responsibility-free zone is not linked to mistakes about operations, but to any 
mistakes - policy or operational- where the Minister has no personal involvement. 31 
Further, as Lee explains, modern societies according to Luhmann are differentiated into 
individual systems. 
Every societal system grows out of that system's own operations and history (82-83). 
Social systems construct themselves as they function. They have no objective essence-they 
have no metaphysical predisposition to be this way and not that way (60; 868-79). 
Systems are also not subjects - they cannot be reduced to some transcendent 
• 32 
conscIOusness. 
These systems fulfil specific social functions. They include the political system, the legal 
system, the economic system, the administrative system and so on. 'As the environment 
becomes increasingly complex .. , [yet] more systems - and more functionally specific 
systems - are required to organise this complexity. ,33 According to Strydom, Luhmann 
30 The senior executives of the Matrix Churchill Company had been accused of deliberately deceiving 
government ministers about the nature of export licences for machine tools to Iraq. The subsequent report was 
published on 15 February 1996. 
I Symons, Elizabeth, Government Accountability: Beyond the Scott Report, (London, CIPF A, 1996), p. 17. 
32 Lee, Daniel, 'The Society of Society: The Grand Finale ofNiklas Luhmann', p. 323. The page numbers 
within the quotation are from The Society o/the Society (Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft), Luhmann, Niklas 
(Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1997). 
33 Thornhill, Political Theory in Modern Germany, pp. 175-176. 
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named the principle by which systems create themselves 'double contingency' .34 As 
Thornhill explains, 'This means that systems create a code through which the components of 
the system order their operations, both functionally and temporally. ,35 For example, modem 
political systems are concerned with elections, power, and what is required for them to stay 
in office; they are dominated by the relationship between political parties, thus the code is 
government/opposition. 'Parties articulating promises and policies as "reformlno-reform", 
now constitute the binary scheme by which the exercise of power is formalised and 
limited. ,36 This double contingency means that the government has an expectation of what 
the opposition will do if the government carries out a particular action, and the opposition 
has an expectation of what the government will do in response. Thus the actions of the 
opposition are contingent on those of the government, as are those of the government on the 
opposition. 'The systems thus stabilise themselves by creating an internal self-referential 
code which must be ceaselessly extended as the complexity of both the system and the 
environment increases. ,37 These subsystems create their own environment and are, 
therefore, self-referential. 
A clear example of this formalised and limited structure occurred in the confrontation in the 
House of Commons between the Blair government and the main opposition party then led 
by Howard, in February 2004, over the war in Iraq. This confrontation was described and 
discussed by some areas of the press as if it were merely a struggle between government and 
opposition. This was in sharp contrast to what many had hoped would be an opportunity to 
34 Strydom, Piet, 'The Problem of Triple Contingency in Habermas', Sociological Theory, Vol. 19, No.2, (Jul., 
2001), pp. 167-170. Luhmann like Habermas 'borrows the neo-c1assical concept of double contingency from 
Talcott Parsons, who in tum extrapolated the concept from the classical contributions of symbolic 
interaction ism and social phenomenology. Parsons was the first to name and to give precise formulation to 
what he called "the fundamental proposition of double contingency of interaction" (Parsons 1977: 167).' 
35 Thornhill, Political Theory in Modern German, p.176. 
36 King, & Thornhill, 'Will the real Niklas Luhmann stand up, please', p. 282. 
37 Thornhill, Political Theory in Modern Germany, p. 176. 
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air the problems and criticisms that had been levelled at the government by those who were 
opposed to the war. It was hoped that this confrontation would be a means through which to 
explore the grave underlying structural problems with intelligence and the decision-making 
process that had been present before the war. These matters had become issues for 
increasing public debate and hostility during its first months. Although this confrontation 
was ostensibly to challenge the findings of the Butler enquiry and the intelligence, or lack of 
intelligence, which had precipitated the Iraq "war", the confrontation degenerated into a 
simple binary for/against between the leaders. The performance given by Blair resulted in 
the government being judged by back-bench members of parliament and the press as having 
triumphed in this encounter. As this encounter occurred in the political system, and each 
system, according to Luhmann, creates its own environment and means of dealing with its 
problems, based on the operation of this system Blair and the government were able to claim 
victory in this particular encounter. The net result was that the substantive issues over 
intelligence, security and government accountability remain umesolved. 
Unlike Weber, Thornhill claims that Luhmann assigns a key role in responsibility to the 
bureaucracy. According to Thornhill, Luhmann claims that modem democracies are divided 
into two separate but connected systems - government and administration and that it is the 
administration that has primacy in the relations between these systems. In fact it is in the 
bureaucracy that real political power is located. 'The function of the political system -
government - is merely to set the premises for the decisions made within the 
administration .... The government is itself not directly responsible for political decisions.' 
Thus, he claims, it is merely a fiction to pretend that the 'political sphere has measurable 
control over the administration. ,38 The political sphere is reduced 'to its precise function, 
38 Thornhill, Political Theory in Modern Germany, p. 179. 
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[that is] to the satisfaction of the need for collectively binding decisions.,39 This argument 
is precisely the one infamously used by Michael Howard, the then-Home Secretary, to 
abrogate any responsibility he may have had over prison breakouts. Instead, it was the then-
Director General of Prisons, Derek Lewis, to whom Howard alone assigned the blame, and 
who was subsequently sacked. Howard claimed that there was a clear separation between 
policy and operations. Consequently because he, Howard, was only responsible for "high" 
policy, he could not in any way be to blame for the prison breakouts that had occurred. He 
claimed that the actual security in prisons was a matter solely for the administration and 
therefore an entirely different system, over which he claimed he could not have, and did not 
have, any control. 
Arnoldi describes how in The Society of the Society (Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft), 
Luhmann argues that the functional differentiation of society results in there being no point 
from within society from which society as a whole can be viewed. Thus there does not exist 
a central position from which universal observations can be made, therefore it will always be 
impossible to take an overview of society.4o Arnoldi concludes that it will be, in Luhmann's 
view, therefore, impossible to engage in any co-ordinated steering of society. This is because 
the meaningful world of the economic system is not the meaningful world of the political 
system and so on. ,41 These claims made by Arnoldi, if correct, mean that Luhmann reduces 
the parameters of political action not only to a framework in which formalised decision 
making takes place, but also confines it to its own discrete sub-system, which has profound 
implications. In his terms, the political system cannot claim influence over areas of 
operation that fall outside of its own system. This, of course, impacts directly on claims 
39 Ibid., p. 192. 
40 Arnoldi, 'Niklas Luhmann, An Introduction', p. 2. 
41 Ibid., p. 7. 
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concerning the ability of politicians to make co-ordinated policies on economics, education 
or environment, or to even have any ability to engage in "joined-up" government. An 
example of this denial was clearly illustrated in what could be considered disingenuous 
claims made by the then-Home Secretary David Blunkett. He rightly claimed that the police 
officially have operational independence and are therefore an alternative system outside of 
the political system. Blunkett, however, conveniently ignored the fact that the government 
not only controls the finances allocated to the police services (both directly and indirectly by 
capping spending in local authorities) but also signals to the police service through the 
legislative system which areas the government considers to be its priorities. Strategies such 
as Operation Trident, for example, were instigated to stop gun crime after it had received 
much press coverage and had a high political profile, especially in London. 
As King and Thornhill describe Luhmann's theory, people do not exist as autonomous 
beings independently of society's communicative subsystems. They claim that he rejects 
absolutely 'human agency as a basis for accounts of social reality and systemic 
legitimacy. ,42 The significance of these ideas should not be underestimated. We can see 
how these notions of closed and self-referential systems reflect the thinking of modem 
western governments. The implications of restricting political action to its own discrete sub-
system not only concern the ease with which the concept of ascribing political responsibility 
to politicians can be negated, but also that this in turn impacts on the expectations of the 
electorate. It is not merely the contingent and complex nature of the modem world that 
renders governments powerless in many areas. If the "people" ascribe to the government 
political responsibility for all areas of their lives then they are simply mistaken in that belief, 
42 King, & Thornhill, 'Will the real Niklas Luhmann stand up, please', p. 279. 
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although Luhmann acknowledges that it is a necessary fiction upon which the systems 
reside. 
Most politicians are of course eager to accept any suggestion that they may not necessarily 
be held to be politically responsible for their actions. Politicians of all colours exhort 
citizens to accept their political responsibilities, whilst there has been simultaneously the 
. . 
mcreasmg trend m most western democracies to place the 
bureaucracy/administration/management of all areas of civil society outside the political 
arena, making the identification of politically responsible agents impossible. This separation 
of political decision making from the administration has also perversely allowed politicians 
to claim that this will somehow make the politically responsible agent more, rather than less, 
easily identifiable and therefore produce more political responsibility. Nowhere is this 
phenomenon more clearly demonstrated than in the Cave Creek disaster that occurred in 
New Zealand. Far-reaching state sector reforms had been instigated in New Zealand in the 
late 1980s, and were supposed to enhance and make transparent both political responsibility 
and administrative accountability. Instead, because they had separated policy and 
administration into two different and incompatible systems, when the new system was tested 
in practice, it merely demonstrated Luhmann's claims concerning the ability to deny agency. 
The disaster at Cave Creek on 28th April 1995 serves as an illustration that despite what had 
been heralded as "truly remarkable" public management reforms, the functionalist view of 
society and the accompanying inability to identify politically responsible agents is prevalent. 
This accident at Cave Creek was an unprecedented tragedy in New Zealand's history in 
which 14 young people died, and 4 were injured, when a viewing platform, on which they 
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were standing, collapsed in Paparoa National Park.43 A commission of inquiry was 
convened and was conducted by G.S. Noble, a district court judge. Unfortunately the 
commissions findings published late in 1995 did little to illuminate the "enveloping haze" 
that the tragedy had uncovered in the public service reforms. Until the Cave Creek disaster 
tested them, reforms such as the State Sector Act of 1988 and the Public Finance Act of 
1989 had been heralded as 'seminal pieces of legislation', and had generated world-wide 
interest. It was claimed that they had been designed to deliver 'among other things, a much 
clearer delineation of the respective roles of ministers and chief executives in the public 
services. ,44 At the heart of these reforms, it was claimed, had 'been the "rediscovery" of the 
distinction between "policy" and "administration. '" [This] renders departments [of 
government] responsible for the production of "outputs," which are in tum purchased by 
ministers so that they (the ministers) may fulfil their responsibility for achieving policy 
"outcomes". The experience of Cave Creek shows that this can be a stilted, legalistic, 
structure of separate responsibilities, one that is out of kilter with the flow and nuance of 
1 1·· ,45 rea po It1CS. 
The Cave Creek disaster caused much public controversy, and there were calls for the 
resignations of the minister responsible for, and the chief executive of, the Department of 
Conservation whose employees had built the viewing platform. When the disaster was 
investigated, however, the new language of "outputs" and "outcomes" offered no more help 
in assigning political responsibility for the tragedy than the 'old language of policy and 
administration'. As Gregory points out, the "outcome" in this instance was horribly visible 
43 See Gregory, Robert, for a full account of the tragedy. 'Political Responsibility For Bureaucratic 
Incompetence: Tragedy at Cave Creek', Public Administration, Vol. 76, Autumn 1998, pp. 519-538. 
44 Gregory, Robert 'Country Report, A New Zealand Tragedy: Problems of Political Responsibility', 
Governance, Vol. 11 No.2. April 1998, p. 234. 
45 Ibid., pp. 235-236. 
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and precisely measurable, 14 people dead and 4 injured. Given that the minister was 
responsible for "outcomes", and the chief executive for "outputs," then it seemed clear that 
the minister should be held politically responsible. But is not the building of a viewing 
platform a matter for the administration and an "output" in this case? Does this mean then 
that it is the chief executive and not the minister who is politically responsible? In fact 
neither man accepted political responsibility. Although the day after the tragedy the 
department had acknowledged its responsibility for the faulty design and construction of the 
platform, and although there were calls for their resignations, neither man resigned over this 
issue. There is no doubt that what was revealed was that the policy and administrative 
systems were separate, discrete and incompatible. The minister was clearly politically 
responsible for policy that also included the safety of visitors. The chief executive, however, 
operated (in the words of the judge), within a culture that had been developed to do more 
with less money.46 This was a culture in which financial considerations were the most 
important issue, and in which a duty of care of all those using the facilities was not part of 
the chief executives contract. As Simon Upton, who eventually took over this portfolio 
stated, 'There is a pretty fierce wall between politicians and the management of the 
operation. We simply can't interfere. ,47 
The outcome from this separation of the political and administrative systems, is, if we refer 
to Luhmann's theory, all too predictable: 'actions cannot be imputed (or can only be 
symbolically imputed) to specific agents ... Luhmann argues that systems revolve around the 
maintenance of fictions, or paradoxes, and that the imputation of personal agency to roles 
within the system is just one fiction upon which systems reside. ,48 This was precisely the 
46 Gregory, 'Country Report, A New Zealand Tragedy: Problems of Political Responsibility', p. 232. 
47 Ibid., p. 237. 
48 Thornhill, Political Theory in Modern Germany, pp 178-179. 
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findings of the Cave Creek Inquiry. Gregory reports that in his view 'the judge concluded, 
controversially that "no individual or particular collections of individuals was singly or 
jointly [politically] responsible for the Cave Creek tragedy'" (my italics). Although Gregory 
claims that the judge's statement was controversial, in line with Luhmann's theory, it was 
alas all too predictable. As Gregory states, 'under the new regime ministers and chief 
executives now have statutory grounds for playing the game of passing the buck .... There 
remains a strong public perception that justice has not been done, let alone seen to have been 
done. ,49 This problem of justice, or rather injustice, is a serious one that has the potential to 
undermine the democratic political system and will be investigated in the next chapter. 
Although Luhmann appears to make a compelling case, there are of course many that reject 
his theory. Those who dismiss Luhmann's claims maintain that notwithstanding the 
contingency and complexity of the world, political responsibility is a viable concept. They 
go even further in their claims, suggesting that the very nature of the contingent and 
complex world means that being able to identifY a politically responsible agent is essential. 
The paradox for the supporters of political responsibility is that far from negating its 
possibility, 'the contingent nature of politics points to the urgency of assuming responsibility 
for the society we create and the norms by which we live.,50 This becomes increasingly 
more important because developments of science and technology have 'enhanced human 
power beyond anything known or even dreamed of before'. Dangers such as nuclear energy; 
such 'Promethean powers - releasing processes with unfathomable consequences - are 
being exercised in a society of beings too absorbed in consumption to take any responsibility 
49 Gregory, 'Country Report, A New Zealand Tragedy: Problems of Political Responsibility', p. 239. 
50 Schaap, Andrew, 'Power and Responsibility; Should we Spare the King's Head?' Politics, Vol. 20, No.3, 
p.134. 
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for the human world or to understand their political capacities.'5! Added to the nuclear 
threat and the increasingly widespread deployment of nuclear weapons are other weapons of 
mass destruction which render the defence of state borders ineffectual and nullify the ability 
of governments to protect the society within. The unprecedented growth in consumption has 
precipitated 'a world economic regime that ignores borders in the movement of capital 
investment to a degree that effectively curtails states in the management of their economic 
affairs. ,52 Other phenomena include 'the proliferation of global and transnational threats 
that transcend state borders, such as those that damage the environment, or threaten states 
through migration, population expansion, disease, or famine; and the creation of a global 
communication network that penetrates borders electronically'. 53 'It is a power over matter, 
over life on earth, and over man himself; and it keeps growing at an accelerating pace. ,54 
The rise of new superpowers that threaten both old economies and the world environment 
have further fuelled the calls from those who believe that political responsibility is essential. 
There is no doubt that those who advocate the concept of political responsibility appreciate 
the contingent nature of politics. Even Hans Jonas, for example, who is described as an 'old 
conservative' and who is defined by his advocacy of 'a return to positions prior to 
modernity' ,55 clearly acknowledges the altered nature of human existence, which has 
'lengthened the reach of our deeds'. Nevertheless, he also challenges the conclusions that 
the contingent nature of the world negates the possibility of political responsibility. He 
51 Arendt, The Human Condition, p. xv. Arendt believed that this new phenomena had become even more 
challenging because it was coupled with 'the advancing secularisation, or rather, de-Christianisation, of the 
modem world, [this] entirely new emphasis on the future, on progress, and therefore on things neither 
necessary nor sempitemal, would expose men of thought to the contingency of all things human more radically 
and more mercilessly than ever before.' 
52 Bobbitt, Philip, The Shield 0/ Achilles: war, peace and the course o/history, (London, Penguin, 2003), 
Pc' xxii. 
3 Ibid. 
54 Jonas, Hans, The Imperative o/Responsibility, (Chicargo, University of Chicago Press, 1984), p. ix. 
55 Stirk, Peter M.R., Critical Theory, Politics and Society, (London, Pinter, 2000), p. 56. 
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argues that rather than contingency diminishing the role of political responsibility, as 
claimed by some, the contingent nature of the world does in fact move '[political] 
responsibility, into the centre of the ethical stage. ,56 Those, like Jonas, who support this 
view that political responsibility is not only possible but essential are fulsome in their claims 
for its importance to the democratic process. In fact according to this view, political 
responsibility is the very cornerstone of democracy; that the value of being able to both 
ascribe political responsibility to those engaged in the political process, and the acceptance 
of political responsibility by the electorate, cannot be overestimated. They claim that it is the 
only way in which the contingency of human behaviour can in any way be negated. 
This is just one example of such a claim made by President Ernesto Zedillo, when he made 
his third State of the Nation address to both chambers of the Mexican Congress in 
September 1997. In his address, Zedillo claims that an ethic of political responsibility is 
indispensable: 
I have always been confident that free and open competition ... would enable each of us 
to shoulder our commitment to democracy in the practice of a genuine ethic of political 
responsibility.... [This] ethic of responsibility serves the interests of us all because, 
within the framework of the law, it must govern our civic life; it must govern the 
treatment given and received by each of us in our democratic life. We are all going to 
need that ethic of responsibility, because enormous tasks lie before us that can only be 
completed through respectful collaboration among the branches of the government.57 
56 Jonas, The Imperative of Responsibility, pp. ix-x. 
57 Zedillo, Ernesto, 'The Nation: Progress and Challenges', Text of the Third State of the Nation Address, 
delivered by President Ernesto Zedillo to both chambers of the Mexican Congress, 01/0911997, my italics. 
[http://www.embamex.co.uklpressI1997/gbrOI397.html] Accessed on 16/04/2003. 
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Further claims were made for the importance of political responsibility by President Leonid 
Kuchma of the Ukraine in his New Year Speech (December 31 st 2002). Kuchma claimed 
that he saw agency and political responsibility as the panacea to overcome his country's 
social and economic problems. He hoped there would be an end to the 'eternal Ukrainian 
political ping pong' because of the ascription of the long awaited political responsibility and 
transparency instigated after the general elections in March 2002. He continued: -
Everyone is doing something, but nobody is responsible for anything. From now on, 
those whom you have elected and who have formed the government will no longer be 
able to say: we have nothing to do with the government ... .The president will indeed 
interfere when a political need for this arises. But the main responsibility rests with the 
majority and its government. 58 
These are amongst many other similar claims made about the possibility and necessity of 
political responsibility. Is this just one more leap of faith, as Luhmann claims? These 
arguments appear insoluble and have been the subject of acrimonious debates between many 
political thinkers including Habermas, Ulrich Beck and Luhmann. Luhmann and Beck are in 
agreement over the lack of legitimacy in modem political systems and the resulting 
diffuseness of power. However, Thornhill claims that whereas for Luhmann the bureaucracy 
is the last location for politics, for Beck political action is located in the sphere of civil-
social action. Nevertheless, he argues that both thinkers agree that society is without 
'structured modes of agency and volition,' and that for both Beck and Luhmann, 'the spaces 
of human authority and decisiveness are located only in those areas which no longer really 
matter, from which power has already departed. ,59 In contrast, Thornhill argues, that 
'Habermas' own political nightmare is a society in which all traces of human value-
58 Kuchma, Leonid, 'New Year Speech', (Ukrainian Television via BBC Monitoring Service) 
Ihttp://www.uanews.tv/achives/eposhtaJep045.htm] (1 January 2003). Accessed on 16/0412003. 
9 Thornhill, Political Theory in Modern Germany, pp. 202-203. 
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orientations have been eroded by the functional operations of administrative systems, and in 
which the political system acts as an organ of technical-scientific dictatorship, run by 
bureaucratic elites.'60 Thus, Arnoldi argues that 'Where Habermas's work seeks universal 
principles, Luhmann's theory only sees principles that are self-referential, that is principles 
that, paradoxically, are based on themselves. ,61 Thus, Habermas believes that society exists 
beyond the boundaries of its subsystems; his notion of the "life-world,,62 is one of 
communicative interaction, from which political legitimacy arises. 
King and Thornhill warn us that despite Luhmann's best endeavours and the sophistication 
of his arguments there are many others (including Habermas) who argue that there is no 
validity to his claims that the systems are in fact self-referential and self-reproducing. As the 
systems Luhmann describes have no boundaries that are physically identifiable then, 
'Ultimately, since nobody can prove or disprove the existence of a closed system, you either 
accept the possibility that Luhmann's scheme will offer a valuable way of observing society 
or you do not.'63 The alternative view that dismisses Luhmann's theory of closed 
differentiated systems does not, however, automatically open the door to the acceptance that 
political responsibility is possible. If, as King and Thornhill claim, his theory of closed 
differentiated systems needs a leap of faith to be accepted, then so according to Luhmann do 
the alternatives. 'Sociologies based on human agency (whether "the individual" 
"organisations of people" or "social groups") also demands a leap of interpretive faith and 
counterfactual assertions of rational influence and control. ,64 Perhaps King and Thornhill 
ask the wrong question when they seek to find whether the anthropomorphic or autopoietic 
60 Thornhill, Political Theory in Modern Germany, p. 157. 
61 Arnoldi, 'Niklas Luhmann, An Introduction', p. 2. 
62 Life-world, 'a term borrowed from Husserl's phenomenology, is the sphere in which the inner nature of 
social being is socialised, the sphere of human interaction'. Thornhill, p. 153. 
63 King, & Thornhill, 'Will the real Niklas Luhmann stand up, please', p. 279. 
64 Ibid. 
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system offers the most 'useful and critical insights into the nature of society and its 
operations. ,65 Perhaps we do not need to come to any decision based on the supposed 
theoretical superiority of one theory over the other. What does need to be taken into account, 
however, is that although Luhmann denies that it is possible to identify an agent who can be 
held to be politically responsible, nevertheless he acknowledges that this is an essential 
fiction upon which the system resides. 
Commentators such as Thompson appear to support Luhmann's claims for the impossibility 
of being able to assign political responsibility because of the complex and contingent world. 
Thompson calls this the "problem of many hands". Modem government, it is claimed, is 
complex and diverse with officials from often different (and sometimes competing) 
departments being involved in decision-making.66 This results, therefore, in the 
impossibility of any clear and direct line of political responsibility. Woodhouse also 
understands this problem, and whilst discussing the convention of ministerial responsibility, 
claims that the adoption of Hart's terminology which centres on "role" rather than "causal" 
responsibility, might be a way to reformulate the convention in order to ensure ministers 
cannot avoid political responsibility. She claims that 'the focus on role, rather than causal, 
responsibility means that the need to find some ministerial involvement, however, slight, in 
departmental fault is diminished.' This, she claims, therefore, undermines the difficulties 
that occur when ministers seek to invoke the distinction between operations and policy 
already identified, in order to avoid responsibility.67 Whilst agreeing that it is essential to 
clarify the situation, Gray and Jenkins scathingly dismiss such policy/operational 
65 King, & Thornhill, 'Will the real Niklas Luhmann stand up, please', p. 279. 
66 Thompson, Dennis F., 'Moral Responsibility of Public Officials: The Problem of Many Hands', American 
Political Science Review, Vo1.74, 1980, pp. 906-907. 
67 Woodhouse, Diana, 'The Reconstruction of Constitutional Accountability,' Newcastle Law School Working 
Papers, 2000/1 0, p. 5. 
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distinctions as the 'construction of a blame-free zone into which ministers can retreat at 
ease. ,68 Thus, according to Luhmann, this leaves us with the apparent dilemma of the 
implausibility of political responsibility and yet the inevitability of maintaining the "fiction" 
of responsibility.69 Luhmann's assertion does seem to be an all too plausible account of 
contemporary political life. Indeed Pitkin claims that 'our governors have become a self-
perpetuating elite that rules - or rather, administers - passive or privatised masses of people. 
The representatives act not as agents of the people but simply instead of them.' 70 
Luhmann's account, however, as illustrated in the Cave Creek disaster, can ultimately lead 
to cynicism and a sense of impotence by the electorate. Indeed, Shklar claims that any 
failure to identify those who are politically responsible 'enfeebles representative government 
and encourages political cynicism and passivity'. 71 
Despite its plausibility, however, Luhmann's model is ultimately self-destructive. It ascribes 
a function to the political sphere, the generation of generalised legitimacy, which its own 
account of the co-existence of contingency and a fictive responsibility must undermine. 
Politics will become impossible because of the technical expansion of political objectives 
within the administrative system. Lee reports that Luhmann claims that modern democracies 
have the political system divided into two separate but interconnected systems: government 
68 Polidano, Charles, 'The Bureaucrat Who Almost Fell Under a Bus: A Reassertion of Ministerial 
Responsibility? Political Quarterly, 2000, p. 177. 
69 Dunn, Delmer D., 'Mixing Elected and None elected Officials in Democratic Policy Making: Fundamentals 
of Accountability and Responsibility', in Democracy, Accountability and Representation, (ed). Przeworski, 
Adam, Stokes, Susan C. and Manin, Bernard, et aI, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 298. 
Luhmann's claims that it is a "fiction" are bolstered by facile accounts such as Dunn's where no proper 
analysis of the possibility of the ascription of political responsibility has taken place. Dunn states confidently 
that 'accountability focuses on the obligation owed by all public officials to the public, the ultimate sovereign 
in a democracy for explanation and justification of their use of public office.' Dunn does at least acknowledge 
that this may be problematic by admitting that sanctions are required 'to sustain responsiveness'. Dunn ignores 
the real impediment to the acceptance of political responsibility, that is the complex and contingent world, 
where his na'ive line of political responsibility does not exist. 
70 Pitkin, Hanna Fenichel, 'Representation and Democracy: Uneasy Alliance', Scandinavian Political Studies, 
Vol.27, No.3, 2004, p. 339. 
71 Shklar, Judith, The Faces of Injustice, (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1990), p. 83. 
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and administration. Lee claims that as Luhmann gives primacy to the administrative system, 
his description of the influence of the government sphere about decision-making and 
planning is that they are slowly subsumed into the functions of the administrative system. 
Thus, political legitimacy is transferred from the political to the administrative system.72 
'His autopoietic theory of social systems rejects normative proposals that state and society 
are bound together by contractual or reasoned motivations. Politics, he argues operates by a 
code that has no correspondence with the social sphere.' 73 Thus, each separate sphere 
operates on decisions made to regulate the activities within that sphere, to give order to the 
system or sub-system by self-regulation which makes it impervious to influence from 
outside the system. 'This, in Luhmann's account, represents the supreme paradox of modern 
society as it gives rise to an abundance of self-descriptions, self-deceptions and self-
justifications to which the system itself is blind and which can be seen only by external 
observers of the system.'74 We, the external observers of the system (in this case the 
political system), believe that we can influence it because we believe that we are also part of 
the system. However, in Luhmann's analysis it is obvious that this is just another fiction 
created to maintain the system. When it becomes apparent that those who thought they were 
part of the system are not part of the system and are not able to influence it, this gives rise to 
the cynicism already mentioned. It is, however, exactly this belief, that society can effect the 
political system, on which the political system depends for its legitimacy. After all, the 
political system (at least in most western countries) is believed by society to be a democratic 
representative government. If, as Thornhill asserts, Luhmann claims it is impossible to 
72 Lee, Daniel 'The Society of Society: The Grand Finale of Niklas Luhmann', p. 329. Luhmann rejects the 
importance ascribed to the political system as being a residue from the old dominance of "super-codes", 
Deism, Historicism, Marxism, Positivism, and Relativism etc. He claims that they are unable to give meaning 
to all reality and are inherently flawed because, despite what they do observe, they are blind to everything else. 
73 Thornhill, Political Theory in Modern Germany, p. 178. 
74 King, & Thornhill, 'Will the real Niklas Luhmann stand up, please', p. 283. 
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establish causal relationships because it is impossible to impute agency, then rather than 
merely being 'just one fiction on which systems reside' this nullifies any idea of the 
ascription of political responsibility. 
Luhmann's model must be rejected because it fails to provide legitimacy and is ultimately 
self-defeating. Therefore, the aspiration for the ascription of political responsibility must be 
pursued in a more direct and practical way. The democratic idea of representative 
government may offer a different way of ameliorating the problem of contingency and the 
ascription of political responsibility through an exploration of the concept of representation. 
There are many expositions concerning representation but by far the most comprehensive 
and authoritative discussion is in the seminal work of Hanna Pitkin, The Concept of 
Representation. Pitkin's discussion is wide-ranging and involves the exploration of two 
alternative theories of representation, the authorisation view and the accountability view. It 
is worth examining these theories in detail because it may be possible to identify how 
political responsibility might become a reality. 
Authorisation theorists assume that those operating within the "political system" are 
representatives with a formal contractual relationship75 with those represented, and that this 
'agent has been authorised in advance to obligate the principal'. 76 Luhmann's model of 
autopoietic systems, although appearing radical (and despite his claims that society and the 
political system have no correspondence with each other), nevertheless falls within a 
tradition that understands politics and political responsibility in terms of authorisation. The 
75 Of course Luhmann rejects any notion of a formal contractual relationship whilst maintaining that such a 
contractual relationship is a paradoxical fiction on which the system resides and from which it gains its 
legitimacy. 
76 Pitkin, Hanna Fenichel, The Concept of Representation, (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1967), pp. 
38-39. 
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authorisation view is convincingly dismissed by Pitkin but despite the shortcomings she 
identifies, the authorisation theory nevertheless has a long history and many proponents. 77 
The problem with the theory is that 'such formalistic conceptions are unsatisfying because 
they are indifferent to "what goes on during representation"'. Pitkin's unorthodox argument 
is that if scholars persist in that indifference, then representation "as a substantive activity" 
will [indeed] be irreconcilable with the realities of political life.78 It may be as well to 
remind ourselves what are the "realities of the political life" of a representative in a 
representational democracy. As Disch quoting Pitkin reminds us, 
He or she "is a professional politician in a framework of political institutions, a member 
of a political party who wants to get re-elected, and a member of a legislature along with 
other representatives". He or she must take into account multiple and competing factors: 
bargains with his or her colleagues in the legislature; the agenda and interests of the 
party; the ideals of the nation as a whole; not to mention his or her own "views and 
opinions". All this operates in addition to the diffuse and conflicting interests of the 
plurality that is his or her constituency. In short, "in legislative behaviour a great 
complexity and plurality of determinants are at work, any number of which may enter 
into a legislative decision".79 
The authorisation theory has, however, been so influential that Pitkin, whilst dismissing it, 
describes no less than three different versions. She starts with Hobbes' account in Leviathan. 
Hobbes understood the need for social action: that a society can only exist as a society when 
it has representatives to act for it. The problem Pitkin identifies with Hobbes' understanding 
77 'Writers from Edward Sait to Avery Leiserson, from Sir Ernest Barker to Karl Loewenstein, from John 
Plamenatz to Joseph Tussman' and Eric Voegelin. Pitkin, The Concept of Representation, pp. 42-44. 
78 Disch, Lisa, 'Representation "Do's and Don'ts": Hanna Pitkin's The Concept of Representation, p. 220 
Professor of Political Science, University of Minnesota, p. l1.www.univ-parisS.frlscpo/lisadisch.pdf-
Accessed on 30/03/200S 
79 Ibid., pp. 12-13. The quotations are from Pitkin, The Concept of Representation, p. 220. 
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of representation is that it is incomplete. In Hobbes' terms 'a representative is someone who 
has been authorised to act. This means that he has been given a right to act which he did not 
have before, while the represented has become responsible for the consequences of that 
action as if he had done it himself. ' 80 
Whilst both Weber and Luhmann subscribe to the authorisation theory, the outcomes are 
different. For Weber, as we have already noted, to be engaged in the political is to be 
engaged in a struggle, striving for a share of power or for influence over the distribution of 
power. Weber had categorically denied that the bureaucracy, because of its characteristic 
lack of conflict, could be the source of political decision-making and therefore of any 
political responsibility. He reasoned that the election of the President by the whole 
electorate would ensure that the President would be able to stand outside mere party 
politics.8l There is no doubt here that the President is authorised by the electorate, however, 
there is no mechanism in place by which the electorate can hold him to account. The 
position of the political leader is of one 'who would be responsive to the presumed needs of 
the populace, but not responsible directly to it'. 82 Nevertheless, Weber did issue a dire 
warning to any erstwhile political leader that we would 'ensure that the president of the 
Reich sees the prospect of the gallows as the reward awaiting any attempt to interfere with 
the laws or to govern autocratically.,83 Unlike Weber, for Luhmann we authorise our 
political representatives to 'merely set the premises for the decisions made within the 
administration,' over which the elected representatives have no measurable control. 84 
80 Pitkin, The Concept of Representation, p. 39. My italics. 
81 Weber insists that a popularly elected President authorised by the electorate' is the palladium of genuine 
democracy ... " Weber, Political Writings, Lassman, Peter & Speirs, Ronald (eds.) (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1995), 'The President of the Reich', p. 305. 
82 Stirk, Critical Theory, Politics and SOCiety, p. 95. 
83 Weber, Political Writings, 'The President of the Reich', p.305. 
84 Thornhill, Political Theory in Modern Germany, p.178. 
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The authorisation View of representative government is misleading, according to Pitkin, 
because it mistakes part of the concept of representation for the whole. 
It defines representing in tenus of a transaction that takes place at the outset, before the 
actual representing begins. To the extent that he has been authorized, within the limits of 
his authority, anything that a man does is representing ... There is no such thing as 
representing well or badly; either he represents or he does not. There is no such thing as 
the activity of representing or the duties of a representative; anything done after the right 
kind of authorization and with its limits is by definition representing. 85 
-
Another major flaw with the authorisation theory is, as Disch rightly observes, 'the habit of 
defining political representation by analogy to the various forms of private representation 
assuming that the political representative-like the legal advocate, the deputy, the guardian, 
or the specialist- stands in a "one-to-one, person-to-person" relationship to a principal' .86 
The inadequacy of this assumed one-to-one relationship, which is inherent within the 
authorisation view, is demonstrated by Griffiths.87 He points out that if authorised consent 
were sufficient for political representation, then the representation of a citizen's interest 
would not even be necessary! 88 
85 Pitkin, The Concept of Representation, p. 39. 
86 Disch, 'Representation "Do's and Don'ts": Hanna Pitkin's The Concept of Representation', p. 11. 
87 Fein, Haskell 'Hanna Pitkin's The Concept of Representation' Nous, Vol. 14, No.1, 1980, A. P. A. Western 
Division Meetings. (Mar., 1980), p. 112. Fein claims that Pitkin is much indebted to Griffiths and his article 
"How Can One Person Represent Another?" Griffiths is one of the few philosophers who has been interested in 
the concept of political representation, but his examination of the concept, unlike Pitkin's, takes place against 
that background question "Why government?". He distinguishes four distinct senses of representation, which 
he labels "descriptive representation," "symbolic representation," "ascriptive representation," and a kind of 
representation which he calls "representation of interests." It is the representation of interests that Pitkin 
believes to be the key in representation. 
88 Ibid. 
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Griffiths makes plain the embarrassing similarity between the governance of lunatics by 
their agents ... and the governance of citizens by their representatives in parliament. In 
neither case is representative government by consent, for neither lunatic nor citizen has a 
choice over whether to be represented or not. Nor is the difference a matter of the 
representation of interests. In fact, it is more reasonable to demand, both for lunatics and 
of citizens,... that their respective governments be representative by virtue of 
representing interest, than be representative in any other way. 89 
What we expect as the represented IS that m some way our representatives will be 
responsible to us. Thus, we assume that m essence, 'what differentiates the governing 
relationship between a lunatic and his ascriptive representative, from the governmg 
relationship between citizen and his ascriptive representative in a parliament, ... is that the 
parliamentary representative must in some manner be responsible to the citizen in a way that 
the agent of a lunatic need not. ,90 Thus, in terms of the possibility of political responsibility 
we must, as Pitkin also does, reject the authorisation view. The possibility of political 
responsibility being assigned to the representative is impossible because the authorisation 
theorist believes that to act as a representative is to be given the right to act in such a way 
that the person represented bears all the responsibility for the actions of the representative. 
The consequence of this results in the acts of the representative being treated solely as acts of 
the represented. This in effect passes all political responsibility for the actions of the 
representative to the represented. 
89 Fein, 'Hanna Pitkin's The Concept of Representation', p. 112. 
90 Griffiths, A. Phillips, "How Can One Person Represent Another?" The Aristotelian Society, Supplementary 
Vol. XXXIV(l960), p. 200. 
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The alternative to the authorisation theory is the accountability theory. This initially appears 
to offer more opportunities for the representative to be assigned political responsibility. In 
the accountability theory 'the agent will be held accountable after the fact to defend what he 
or she has done in the principal's name.,91 As 'Carl Friedrich claims if A represents B, he is 
presumed to be responsible to B, that is to say, he is answerable to B for what he says or 
does. ,92 The accountability theory as it is usually constituted is, however, equally flawed. 
This is despite the claims by its supporters that this theory is perceived to be 'a response and a 
corrective to the authorisation view. ,93 Supporters of the accountability theory claim that 
theorists such as Weber have 'simply and inexplicably missed the meaning of 
representation. ,94 The problem is that authorisation theorists have simply viewed a 
representative as a person who has been elected and is therefore, authorised. Although 
agreeing in principle with the idea of holding a representative to account Pitkin argues, 
however, that the claims postulated by the accountability theorists that it is essential to hold a 
representative to account, is merely a 'device'. 'That the point of holding him to account after 
he acts is to make him act in a certain way' .95 She claims that this strategy also misses the 
point because despite the claims of the authorisation theorists to the contrary, this strategy is 
less about accountability and more about control. Although it is indeed the case that a 
representative who knows that he will be held to account may well 'act responsibly and 
respond to the desires of those to whom he must account'. Nevertheless, it is also equally true 
that 'a representative who acted in a completely selfish and irresponsible manner could not be 
criticised as long as he let himself be removed from office at the end of his term. ,96 This is 
starkly illustrated in the response by Tony Blair when he was asked to give an account of his 
91 Disch, 'Representation "Do's and Don'ts": Hanna Pitkin's The Concept of Representation', p.3. 
92 Pitkin, The Concept of Representation' p. 55. 
93 Ibid., p. 57. 
94 Ibid., p. 58. 
95 Ibid. 
96 Pitkin, The Concept of Representation', p. 58. 
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reasons for going to war with Iraq. In an interview with Peter Stothard, Blair stated that 'he 
was prepared to be held to account [ only] by God for "those who have died or have been 
horribly maimed as a result of my decisions',97, whilst also acknowledging that it was the 
electorate's right to remove him from office at the next election. This illustrates how this 
formalised accountability theory is also flawed with the "accountability" amounting to no 
more than the representative being subject to election. 
There is, however, an alternative account that overcomes the objections levelled at both the 
authorisation and accountability theory. In terms of its contents it is also an accountability 
theory, but it differs from the formalistic accountability theory that Pitkin rejected. To 
illustrate how it differs, Pitkin asks us to consider, what exactly is going on during 
representation? The answer to this question that demonstrates Pitkin's alternative view has 
two requirements. The first is that it: 
.. conceives of representation as an activity rather than as a relationship ... When an agent 
represents a principal, the agent makes decisions and commitments that the principal is 
bound to honour, and acts in ways that the principal must own. It follows that a concept 
of representation must make it possible to pass judgement on the content of those 
decisions, commitments and acts. Thus the second requirement is that a concept of 
representation be substantive. If the consequences of the decisions and commitments that 
a representative makes are to be binding on a constituency, it is not enough to say that 
the representative had the right to act for that constituency regardless of what he or she 
did and notwithstanding the manner in which he or she conducted himself or herself. The 
97 Stothard, Peter, http://news.bbc.co.ukl2hi/uk news/politics/2998165.stm Accessed on 09/03/2004. The full 
text ofthis report was published in the Times Magazine, May 2003. 
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constituency must recognise itself in what the representative has done and in the way he 
or she went about doing it. 98 
In other words, what is the substance of the activity of representation and how does this 
activity differ from others in which one person is understood to act in the place of another? 
The answer is that political representation is not like private representation. Political 
representation differs from private representation because 'political representation is 
intrinsically and inevitably transformative... it creates for a dispersed and diffuse 
constituency an interest or principle that did not pre-exist the act of representation, thereby 
drawing them together in a way that they would not be without the act of representation.' 99 
That is the creation and maintenance of community that is constituted through political 
action. 
Unlike the authorisation and accountability theories, Pitkin's claims, in her alternative 
theory, that political representation must be able to attribute a capacity for action and 
judgement to both the principal and the agent. 'The representative must act independently; 
his action must involve discretion and judgement; he must be the one who acts' .100 But, 'the 
represented must also be (conceived as) capable of independent action and judgement, not 
merely being taken care of.' This is because we only need representation where interest is 
involved (activity rather than relationship), that is, neither where decisions are 'merely 
arbitrary choices,' nor where we are 'content to leave matters to the expert' .101 There is 
however, 'always the potential for conflict, .. .if it occurs an explanation is called for. [The 
98 Disch, 'Representation "Do's and Don'ts": Hanna Pitkin's The Concept of Representation', p. 3. 
99 Ibid., p. 12. 
100 Pitkin, The Concept of Representation, p. 209. Yet this is not the agency of a specialist or guardian because 
Bolitical questions are not reducible to matters of fact or expertise. 
01 Ibid., p. 2 I 2. 
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representative] must not be found persistently at odds with the wishes of the represented 
without good reason in terms of their interest, without a good explanation [an account in 
public] of why their wishes are not in accord with their interest' .102 (my italics) 
More precisely [the representative] should be prepared to give that account in public 
under the full glare of the public gaze. More fundamentally, when he acts in the political 
realm he should always be mindful that should he ever be required to do so, he should 
always be able to account for his actions. Thus he ought to have reasons for what he 
does, and be prepared to justifY his actions to those he acts for, even if this accounting or 
justification never actually takes place. 103 
Thus, whilst Luhmann's (putative) authorisation model is oriented to issues of control and 
causation, the alternative accountability model is oriented to the relationship between 
people, politicians and electorate, representatives and represented, understood in terms of 
shared (and disputed) interests. Above all, this accountability model described by Pitkin 
must be viewed in terms of the creation and maintenance of a community that is constituted 
through political action. Thus, although the alternative accountability model appears to 
offer more prospects of redeeming the concept of political responsibility, by giving an 
account in public, contingency is still a major problem. Notwithstanding the benefits of the 
alternative accountability model, contingency nevertheless still threatens to undermine the 
community that is thus constituted through political action. Accountability does not and 
cannot solve the contingency problem because contingency is a problem for 
acting/beginning, starting something anew/the future. Accountability deals only with the 
past. For by giving an account, one is giving an account of what one has already done. 
102 Pitkin, The Concept of Representation, p. 209. 
103 Ibid., p. 119. 
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Accountability therefore anchors us firmly to the past without necessarily instigating a new 
beginning. 
To reiterate, we had hoped that identifying how political responsibility was possible within 
a representational democracy would help us to overcome the problem of contingency. What 
we have discovered is that although this discussion has helped us to develop a core attribute 
within the concept of political responsibility, i.e. giving an account in public, this cannot 
overcome the contingency of the world. The corollary of this seems to suggest that Luhmann 
is right and that the possibility of political action is reduced to one of his necessary fictions. 
An alternative explanation is, however, that rather than it undermining political action, the 
contingency of the world is the catalyst that makes new beginnings possible. Arendt, for 
example claims that it is only by taking political action that is, acting to deliberately change 
our world, which releases us from being merely labouring animals interested only in our 
own survival. Thus viewed, political action transforms us into human beings confronting 
each other as human beings, and starting something new. Politics and political action for 
Arendt takes place between equal individuals. Thus, it is only when people come together to 
communicate in the public realm that truth is possible; politics takes place in the light by 
men revealing themselves. It is through speech and action that 'men show who they are.' 'It 
is through the constitution of such a space of public freedom that human life gams a 
meaning beyond the contingency and fragility of its creaturely existence' .104 
104 Albrecht Wellmer, 'Arendt on Revolution', in Dana Villa (ed), Hannah Arendt, (Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 200), p. 226. 
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The risks as well as the positive attributes associated with political action are, however, also 
summed up concisely by Arendt. The problem with all action, which includes political 
action, is that once taken it is an irreversible and unpredictable process. This means that one 
can never know the outcomes of one's actions, and one's actions despite whatever one 
intends, can go disastrously wrong. 105 The risks involved in political action are, however, 
particularly acute. It is also the case that 'new beginnings or action in concert carries no 
necessary moral charge and can be undertaken in the name of evil as well as good.' 106 The 
twentieth century in particular was littered with examples of such action. 
Action takes place in the public realm where, falling into an "already existing web of 
human relationships," it is affected by "innumerable conflicting wills and intentions." 
Consequently, "action almost never achieves its purpose." Action does have 
consequences, however, "boundless" consequences that, again, we are unable to control. 
Indeed, "one deed, and sometimes one word, suffices to change every constellation" and 
"the process of a single deed can quite literally endure throughout time.'" Action, more 
over, is in a predicament, the "predicament of irreversibility." 107 
The acute risks that are involved in political action suggest that to be a political actor 
reqUlres courage. Arendt, for example, believed that moderation and courage were 
intrinsically linked to politics and that courage was an essential ingredient of action. The 
contingent nature of the world means that to act with others is to initiate and to incur 
responsibilities for processes one cannot control. She refers to the courage that is necessary 
for one to leave the private realm ("one's private hiding place") and step onto the political 
105 Arendt, The Human Condition, pp. 236-237. 
106 King, Richard H., 'Endings and Beginnings: Politics in Arendt's Early Thought', Political Theory, Vol. 12, 
No.2. (May 1984), p. 248. 
107 Honig, B., 'Arendt, Identity, and Difference', Political Theory, Vol. 16, No.1. (Feb., 1988), p. 83. 
Quotations are from The Human Condition, pp. 184, 190,233. 
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stage ("showing who one is ... exposing one's self'). Nevertheless one has to 'accept this 
public exposure, this nakedness, [in order] to become a political actor - a man 
who ... initiates, who creates as it were something new in the political world.' \08 To act, 
therefore, requires the 'courage to stick one's neck out, to emerge from the anonymity and 
security of private life and risk unknown consequences.' 109 There are two serious outcomes 
to this predicament caused by action. One is that 'without being forgiven, released from the 
consequences of what we have done, our capacity to act would, as it were, be confined to 
one single deed from which we could never recover: we would remain victims of its 
consequences forever.' 110 As Smith states, 'paradoxically, the man who creates a new 
beginning for others must himself, through the process of redemption, be allowed a new 
beginning.' III The second outcome is that others will be unwilling to step out of the private 
realm into the unforgiving light of the public sphere. Paradoxically, under circumstances 
where there is no possibility of redemption, those willing to step out of the private realm are 
only those who are prepared to accept the 'self-descriptions, self-deceptions and self-
justifications' that Luhmann ascribes to the political system. 
In The Human Condition Arendt addresses these problems directly. The problem with action 
in the contingent world is that the various limitations and boundaries that we find in every 
body politic are unable to offset its inherent unpredictability. It is because of this 
unpredictability and irreversibility that Arendt advocates forgiving and promising the 
purpose of which is not to deny contingency but to cope with the inevitability of it. The 
notion of forgiveness in the political realm is, however, a controversial concept. Smith, for 
108 Smith, Roger, W., 'Redemption and Politics', Political Science Quarterly, Vo1.86, No.2, 1971 p. 230. 
Smith notes that 'the political actor inevitably incurs guilt and needs to be relieved of it'. 
109 lacobitti, Suzanne Duvall, 'The Public, the Private, the Moral: Hannah Arendt and Political Morality', 
International Political Science Review, Vol. 12, No.4, p. 287. 
110 Arendt, The Human Condition, pp. 236-237. 
III Smith, 'Redemption and Politics', p. 230. 
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example, claims that Arendt's solution, 'political forgiveness is not a genuine possibility in 
modem society and perhaps it never has been available to society as a whole.' 112 Similarly 
Digeser, claims that 'at first blush, forgiveness appears to be a rather soft-headed, unrealistic 
way to respond to anything political, let alone governmental wrongs.' 113 Arendt, however, 
argues that because of the unpredictability of human affairs forgiveness releases us from an 
otherwise endless chain reaction of revenge and hatred. 114 In fact, she is critical of the 
'ancient Greek politics - the model, in other respects, for her image of the political - for 
remaining "untouched by the predicament of unpredictability" and for lacking a concept of 
forgiveness.,115 
Arendt is of course aware that forgiveness has religious overtones, and has always seemed to 
be 'unrealistic and inadmissible' in the public realm. Arendt is, however, 'neither bestowing 
religious attributes on forgiveness nor proposing a political theology (as defined by Carl 
Schmitt) according to which all terms of the political are eminent religious terms.' 116 
Instead, despite its religious overtones, Arendt rejects completely any suggestion that it 
cannot be transferred to the secular, even though forgiveness is usually in the private realm 
and is often thought to be dependent on the Christian concept of love. She insists that 
forgiveness in the public sphere is not dependent on love but instead is dependent on 
respect, 'what love is in its own, narrowly circumscribed sphere, respect is in the larger 
lIZ Smith's argument, p. 220, is, however, one dimensional and fails to reflect the multi-layered interdependent 
nature of Arendt's argument. 
113 Digeser, Peter, 'Forgiveness and Politics: Dirty Hands and Imperfect Procedures', Political Theory, Vo1.26, 
No.5, 1998, p. 700. 
114 Forgiveness in Arendt's terms must not be confused with condoning or excusing. 
115 Jacobitti, 'The Public, the Private, the Moral: Hannah Arendt and Political Morality', p. 239. The Human 
Condition, p. 194. 
116 Weigel, Sigrid, 'Secularization and Sacralization, Normalization and Rupture: Kristeva and Arendt on 
Forgiveness', PMLA, Vol. 117, No.2. (Mar., 2002), p. 322. 
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domain of public affairs.' 117 Respect in this sense is not based on admiration or esteem, 'it 
is regard for the person from the distance which the space of the world puts between us.' 118 
There is no doubt, however, that in modern democracies there appears to be little respect for 
political actors. As Pitkin observes we are 'cynical and sulky, deeply alienated from what is 
done in our name and from those who do it.' 119 This is a double bind, we fail to respect 
political actors because they fail to give an account of their actions and accept their political 
responsibilities, and they fail to give the necessary accounts and take political responsibility 
because there is no redemption. 120 
Does forgiveness help to resolve this dilemma, and if so, what activities are involved in the 
act of forgiving?121 It is the fact that the person was prepared to step, with courage, out of 
hiding into the "space-between" and instigate action, that commands our respect and, 
therefore, in this instance, also our forgiveness. By being asked to forgive we are not here 
being asked to act selflessly, for as Arendt points out, 'forgiving serves to undo the deeds of 
the past, whose "sins" hang like Damocles' sword over every new generation.' 122 Like 
punishment, forgiveness seeks to put an end to something that without interference would 
go on endlessly. Of course, on a literal level, forgiveness cannot undo the deeds of the past, 
1I7 Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 243. My italics. 
118 Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 243. 
119 Pitkin, 'Representation and Democracy: Uneasy Alliance', p. 339. 
120 Honig, 'Arendt, Identity, and Difference', p. 94, Ftn 49. Honig claims quite rightly that 'nowhere in Arendt's 
discussion of forgiveness in The Human Condition does the term responsibility appear'. Honig however, 
claims that 'its absence is problematic, for the attribution of some form of responsibility is a postulate of 
forgiveness.' Puzzlingly she then claims that 'Arendt would have done better to avoid the term forgiveness 
altogether and to substitute "dismissing" for "forgiving" instead of treating the two as synonyms.' In the light of 
Arendt's continual emphasis on responsibility, it seems perverse to suggest that she had deliberately chosen to 
omit notions of responsibility from forgiveness. It seems more likely that Arendt understood that the very idea 
of responsibility for action to be inherent within and axiomatic to (as Honig herself suggests) the concept of 
forgiveness. 
121 Digeser, for example states that 'to get a handle on the viability of forgiveness as a political concept, we 
need to consider the meaning and character offorgiveness, our ability to address political wrongs fully, and the 
appropriateness of other options.' He is yet another commentator who whilst addressing the political sphere 
makes no attempt to differentiate between different types of responsibility. Digeser, 'Forgiveness and Politics', 
r:. 700. 
22 Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 237. 
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in fact undoing the deeds of the past is the most obvious thing that it cannot do; once a deed 
is done it is done. In fact 'the transgression cannot be removed from the realm of social 
facts. Even "God cannot make the past not to have been". The unalterability of the past is 
constitutive of physical reality, but not of meaning and interpretation.' 123 Indeed, the very 
act of forgiveness itself necessarily presupposes the transgression. Each time forgiveness is 
offered a transgression is invoked, is remembered. Without the transgression there would be 
nothing to forgive, so forgiveness cannot eliminate the transgression.' 124 
There are claims (such as those of Honig) that Arendt overestimates the power of 
forgiveness. 125 Pettigrove reminds us, however, that 'the distinctiveness of forgiving rests 
on the fact that it cannot be seen as a consequence of the initial transgression. Forgiveness, 
unlike revenge, is not merely a reaction to the misdeed.' 126 
[T]he act of forgiving ... is the only reaction that acts in an unexpected way and thus 
retains, though being a reaction, something of the original character of action. Forgiving, 
in other words, is the only reaction which does not merely re-act but acts anew and 
unexpectedly, unconditioned by the act which provoked it and therefore freeing from its 
consequences both the one who forgives and the one who is forgiven. 127 
123 Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles II. 25. 1023: (Deus non protest facere quod praeteritum non fuerit), quoted 
in Glover, Jonathan, Responsibility, (London, Harmondsworth, 1970), p. 96. 
124 Pettigrove, Glen, 'Hannah Arendt and Collective Forgiving', Journal a/Social Philosophy, Vol. 37, No.4, 
Winter, 2006, p. 484. 
125 Honig, 'Arendt, Identity, and Difference', p 94. Honig claims that 'Even if we accept her [Arendt's] claim 
that forgiving frees both parties from the consequences of the original trespass, the act of forgiving has 
consequences of its own which Arendt does not consider. The parties involved become, respectively, "the one 
who forgives" and "the one who is forgiven." As such, the former has cause to feel virtuous or generous, and 
the latter grateful and indebted. Thus relations of equality, crucial to Arendt's account of politics, are 
undermined by forgiveness, just as, in Kant's view, they are by philanthropy.' This of course presupposes that 
the relationships were equal in the first instance, which in terms of elected representatives and the represented 
they clearly are not. 
126 Pettigrove, 'Hannah Arendt and Collective Forgiving', p. 484. 
127 Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 241. 
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Petti grove highlights the centrality of forgiving to overcoming the problem of contingency. 
He states that 'our discussions suggest that forgiving is even more like what Arendt 
identifies as the faculty necessary for [continuing] political life.' He enumerates three ways 
in which forgivingness can undo the deeds of the past and can invite us into a new future: 
The deed is now a thing of the past rather than something continually present. Second, 
setting the deed aside in this way reinterprets its importance in the present and 
reinterprets the perpetrator in the light of present and future possibilities rather than 
exclusively in terms of past actions. Third, by so doing it creates the opportunity for new 
actions and new relations not determined (or at least not wholly determined) by the 
transgression and invites the transgressor into this new future. 128 
Thus, the power of forgiveness is that it has the ability to stop the transgressor from forever 
being seen in the light of her transgression. 'To say "I forgive you", is to let the other know 
that you shall not define her as wrongdoer, reducing the scope of who she is to this 
transgression.' 129 This perhaps explains the plight and tragedy of Jack Profumo, who, 
because he did not give an account of his transgression and ask for forgiveness, was always 
known, despite a subsequent life of "good work", as the man who lied to Parliament over a 
sex scandal. He was always reduced to his transgression. As a result of not being forgiven 
one's ability to begin something new, especially in the aftermath of wrongdoing, is limited. 
'I cannot, for example, reconcile myself to another if they see my show of repentance as 
another insincere strategy in the selfish pursuit of my own goals.' 130 This is exactly what 
Parliament saw in the eventual statement that Profumo was forced to make to the House. 
128 Pettigrove, 'Hannah Arendt and Collective Forgiving', pp. 484-485. 
129 Ibid., p. 485. 
130 Ibid., p. 482. 
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Forgiveness is normally seen as a personal private act. Forgiveness, in terms of political 
action, however, cannot be undertaken in solitude, 'forgiving enacted in solitude or isolation 
remains without reality and can signify no more than a role played before one's self.,]3] 
Indeed plurality is specifically the condition of political life, on the presence and acting with 
others. Thus forgiving must be a public affair. To illustrate the impossibility of such action 
Smith cites the case of Jack F. Kennedy and the disastrous invasion at the Bay of Pigs in 
Cuba. It is true that Kennedy did become 'a depressed lonely man, [who] felt personally 
responsible for the many lives lost,' and that he was 'contrite, repentant [and] aware of the 
need for reconciliation'. ]32 Although he did all of this in private and also in private blamed 
everyone else for the disaster, he, nevertheless, formally accepted sole political 
responsibility in public. Kennedy, however, never gave an account of his actions. To be 
forgiven requires giving an account, of speaking and acting together, which is the only 
possible means of redemption from the predicament of irreversibility. This Kennedy never 
did. 
No matter how persuasive this strategy may be in theory, the cynicism surrounding political 
actors may give rise to grave doubts about their motivation and intent. A primary limitation, 
however, must be the substance of the transgression for which the political actor seeks 
forgiveness. Unless this action is restricted to "high policy" then the process is reduced to 
the symbolic imputation described by Luhmann, a device for the maintenance of the fictions 
upon which the systems allegedly reside. For example taking political responsibility for past 
events for which the political actor could not and did not have any direct association is 
exactly the sort of symbolic attribution that Luhmann describes.133 Even a restriction to 
131 Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 237. 
132 Smith, 'Redemption and Politics', p. 222. 
133 For example apologies made by politicians for the slave trade and the massacres of indigenous peoples. 
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"high policy" can attract this criticism that this is a hollow device that will be reduced to a 
ritualistic process of confessing transgressions and receiving an automatic absolution. Such 
circumstances, which deal only with past events, would, however, offer no solutions to the 
contingency of the world. Giving an account and accepting political responsibility cannot be 
done in return for forgiveness: on the condition that forgiveness should follow. There can be 
no guarantee in advance of forgiveness. Further, forgiveness also does not and cannot imply 
the remission of punishment. By its nature, forgiveness requires that an injury is 
acknowledged and the offender is held accountable for his or her actions. In fact forgiveness 
'may require stern treatment of (the offender) with exposure and investigation of (the 
offender's) weakness' .134 This is the contingency that the politician must face, but it must 
be possible to believe that short of criminality, even where accepting political responsibility 
rightly entails loss of office, forgiveness is a possibility. The tragedy of Jack Profumo was 
not that he lost his office, but that because of his behaviour the possibility of forgiveness 
never existed. 
Forgiveness, is not, however, an exoneration of the politician's actions but an acceptance of 
the reality of those actions, but being forgiven for past deeds is only the first step. To allow 
engagement in further future action, to overcome the uncertainties of the future, requires the 
faculty of making and keeping promises, the possibility that through forgiving and 
promising the political process can move forward into the future. In fact forgiving and 
promising are inextricably linked. 'Both of them make possible a shared future, reducing the 
uncertainties of that future by letting others know what they can expect from US,.135 By 
134 Downie, R. S.,'Forgiveness', Philosophical Quarterly Vol., 15, 1965, p. 130. Quoted by M. 1. Kurzynski in 
'The Virtue of Forgiveness as a Human Resource Management Strategy', Journal o/Business Ethics, Vol. 17, 
1998, p. 81. 
135 Pettigrove, Hannah Arendt and Collective Forgiving', p. 485. 
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forgiving someone their transgression we are in effect promising them that we will no longer 
simply see them in the light of their transgression. That we are prepared to 'invite them into 
a new future' on an expectation that they will act differently.136 The transgressor by 
accepting our forgiveness in effect promises to act differently from the actions of the past. 
Arendt emphasises the unique role of forgiving and promising in a contingent world. She 
agrees that human beings cannot live in a completely contingent world, and she understands 
that sources of stability must be sought. She insists that promising is the source of stability 
in the human world because 'the function of the faculty of promising is the only alternative 
to a mastery which relies on domination of one's self and rule over others.' As Arendt says, 
these two faculties, forgiving and promising belong together because 'binding oneself 
through promises, serves to set up in the ocean of uncertainty, which the future is by 
definition, islands of security without which not even continuity, let alone durability of any 
kind, would be possible in the relationships between men.' 137 
In the case of Jack Kennedy we can see that the distrust and cynicism felt about politicians 
hangs on his failure to be an authentic actor in the terms of representational democracy. As 
we have seen, integral to the concepts within representational democracy is the giving of an 
account of his activities by the political actor. The adoption of the mechanisms suggested by 
Arendt, and the giving of a true public account by Kennedy of the disastrous invasion of 
Cuba, may have allowed political relationships between the Cuban and the US 
administrations to move on from the forty years legacy of hostility and mistrust. Like all 
action, forgiving and promising involves risk. The risk to the politician is of giving an 
account with the possibility of forgiveness but no guarantee in advance that forgiveness for 
136 Ibid. 
137 Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 237. 
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the transgression will be forthcoming. The risk to society is that we have to enter into a 
shared future through the facility of promising with only the politician's assurances that he 
will not transgress in the same way in the future. 
The second normative value of a concept of political responsibility is that to be politically 
responsible the political actor, 
should be prepared to give that account in public under the full glare of the public gaze. More 
fundamentally, when he acts in the political realm he should always be mindful that should he 
ever be required to do so, he should always be able to account for his actions. Thus he ought 
to have reasons for what he does, and be prepared to justifY his actions to those he acts for, 
even if this accounting or justification never actually takes place. 138 
The nature and integrity of this account will be discussed later under truth and political 
responsibility. What the work of Arendt offers us that is so important is, as we have shown, 
that forgiving and promising offers the possibility that the political process can move 
forward despite the impediments of a contingent world. This discussion has outlined a 
workable concept of political responsibility within a contingent world; however, there are 
consequences to these conclusions of which we need to be aware. This is not a 
straightforward prescriptive strategy but the proffering of a concept of forgiveness and 
promising along with all the pitfalls and consequences that this entails. It generates, like all 
innovative concepts, many unpleasant risks and necessary compromises that may, for 
instance, push us in the direction of forgiving some things that we would not be inclined to 
forgive. 
138 Pitkin, The Concept of Representation, p. 119 
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Chapter Four 
Justice, Injustice, Reconciliation and Political Responsibility 
It became apparent from the outset that if political responsibility was to become a useful 
concept, some of the seemingly intransigent problems identified in the literature review 
would have to be addressed. One of these intransigent problems is the issue of justice, or 
more precisely, the issue of injustice. This consideration of injustice might initially appear 
to be a diversion because injustice is an outcome or consequence of the lack of political 
responsibility, rather than necessarily part of the process. Rather than being a diversion, 
however, the discussion in this chapter will demonstrate how essential it is that injustice and 
the effects of injustice are understood. This understanding is crucial because the sense of 
injustice that is generated by a lack of political responsibility has a damaging effect on the 
political process. 
The strategy needed to investigate injustice is not, however, straightforward. It had quickly 
become apparent in earlier discussions that attempts to understand political responsibility by 
addressing agency and cause created more problems than they solved, yet this is the route 
that is invariably undertaken in discussions of injustice. It is equally true that the same 
conflation of different types of responsibility that has already been encountered in previous 
discussions is also prevalent in any discussion of injustice. This conflation arises because in 
most examples, the responses to demands for political responsibility have involved only the 
perpetrator and punishment of one form or another (usually the loss of office), or the 
avoidance of punishment. There has rarely been any other response than the loss of office, 
and in Bagehot's view this loss of office 'may not be a remedy at all; it may only be a 
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punishment. ,1 The remedy that Bagehot refers to is that required by both the victims of the 
injustice, and in the case of political responsibility, to the damage done to the political 
process itself. With this in mind, if we are to understand the true significance of injustice to 
both political responsibility and the political process it is clear that a different strategy will 
need to be employed. This strategy will involve firstly examining injustice as a concept, in 
order to reveal how it is constituted, how it is engendered and how different types of 
responsibility are conflated. It will then be possible to speculate on strategies that may be 
able to overcome the effects of injustice as it relates to political responsibility that in tum 
have a direct bearing on the political process. 
Before examining injustice as a concept, however, there are several issues that need to be 
acknowledged both as a background and rationale to further discussion. Even the most 
cursory review of literature reveals that the inability to assign and/or the failure to accept 
responsibility of almost any kind is a real and persistent problem. That the problem of 
injustice, and how it relates specifically to political responsibility, is a serious one was 
illustrated in the Cave Creek tragedy. Gregory at the end of his detailed account and 
analysis of the tragedy articulated why the concept of political responsibility cannot be 
ignored, no matter how difficult it is conceptually. He asserts that the failure to identify 
those who were politically responsible for the disaster is the direct cause of the sense of 
injustice which is felt not only by those immediately involved and their relatives and friends 
but even more disturbingly by the population as a whole. It is then, potentially, a very 
serious problem because it damages the entire political process. Gregory claims that it is the 
persistent failure to acknowledge, understand or address the sense of injustice that is 
I Gregory, Robert, 'Political responsibility for Bureaucratic Incompetence: Tragedy at Cave Creek', Public 
Administration, Vo1.76, Autumn, 1998, p. 534. 
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generated by the failure to explicitly identify those politically responsible that is so 
damaging to the political process. As he observes in the Cave Creek tragedy, even after a 
public enquiry 'there remains a strong public perception that justice has not been done, let 
alone seen to have been done.,2 Gregory is not alone in delivering dire warnings concerning 
the effect that the lack of political responsibility and the sense of injustice that this 
engenders has on the political process. Shklar reinforces this view, as she points out that 
'individual anger may become public distrust ... and its eventual consequences are not 
insignificant.' She understands that any failure to identify those politically responsible 
'enfeebles representative government and encourages political cynicism and passivity.' 3 
The belief that one has been the victim of injustice is not, in many instances, transitory. 
Although instances of injustice abound, there should be no underestimation of the 
persistence and the power that is exerted by them. The type of cases that arouse these 
powerful and persistent feelings of injustice are regretfully, many and widespread. For 
example, questions concerning how and to whom political responsibility can be allocated 
are still relevant and emotive topics of discussion and debate over such issues as the 
enslavement of Africans by Europeans, or the ruthless eradication by settlers of indigenous 
native peoples in both the Americas and Australasia. To attempt to address such issues may 
appear in one sense to be an indulgence, for surely the passage of time will rectify or nullify 
this sense of injustice. If it is ignored it must surely eventually be able to be assigned to the 
past. McCall Smith warns us, however, that conversely, in such cases 'the passage of time 
seems to play little role: the requirements that justice be done is not defeated by the 
historical distance separating events from its final resolution. Indeed, in some cases, 
2 Gregory, Robert, 'A New Zealand Tragedy: Problems of Political Responsibility', Governance: An 
International Journal of Political Administration. VoUI, No.2, p. 239. 
3 Shklar Judith N., The Faces of Injustice, (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1990), p. 83. 
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historical distance seems to sharpen the sense of anger which the victims, or their 
descendants feel. ,4 Thus the sense of injustice felt by individuals does not appear to lessen 
with the passage of time instead they are merely condemned to live with it. The sense of 
injustice is so persistent and pervasive that both British and Australian Prime Ministers have 
recently offered apologies for injustices in the past carried out against indigenous Africans 
and Australians, even though in some cases the injustice had occurred centuries earlier. 
Also in the more recent past, whilst the House of Lords deliberated over the nature of his 
crimes (criminal or political) and determined the fate of General Pinochet of Chile, who had 
been arrested whilst visiting Britain, the injustice felt by his victims was once again thrust 
into the public arena. 5 The' grief of his victims regained its voice and showed the world a 
Chile whose transition to democracy remains precarious,6 precisely because this matter 
remains unresolved. When such tragic incidences of injustice are, however, undisclosed and 
therefore publicly unacknowledged, rather than ameliorating the problem a different 
problem is created, but the sense of injustice is just as intense. In Spain, for example, after 
years of enforced silence, forensic archaeologists have only just begun to excavate mass 
graves from the Civil War, dating from as early as 1936. No one knows the exact total of the 
dead killed in the Civil War and just "tossed" into these mass graves, but as many as 30,000 
is a frequently quoted figure. The Civil War and its aftermath have not been discussed in 
Spain until now. It is claimed that as a result of this lack of discussion, there is a sense in 
4 Mc Call Smith, Alexander, 'Time, Guilt and Forgiveness', in Lethe's Law: Justice, Law and Ethics in 
Reconciliation, (eds.) Christodoulidis, Emilios & Veitch, Scott, (Hart, Oxford, 2001), pp. 47-48. 
5 In 1978 the military junta led by Augusto Pinochet Ugarte had passed a self-amnesty to protect themselves 
from prosecution for the murders, torture and "disappearances" that had been instigated after the overthrow of 
Chile's elected President Salvador Allende. Pinochet was arrested in London on 16th October 1998 at the 
request of a Spanish judge. On 24th march 1999, the Law Lords decided that Pinochet was extraditable to 
Spain for crimes against humanity. This was subsequently halted by the Home Secretary Jack Straw on 2nd 
March 2000. 
6 Schafer, Burkhard, '''Sometimes You Must be Kind to be Cruel"', in Lethe's Law, p. 18. 
156 
Spain that it is a 'country without a memory' and therefore, 'without a history'. 7 Muldoon 
claims that this is 'particularly true where the "new history" casts a shadow over the moral 
foundation of the political order.' 8 This lack of discussion does not mean that these events 
have been forgotten, it is rather that these memories have had to be suppressed. In Spain, 
this suppression was imposed initially to maintain the Fascist dictatorship but subsequently 
encouraged to facilitate democratic stability. At this distance in time, however, finding 
perpetrators would be impossible. It is not this that the Association for the Recovery of 
Historical Memory, in Spain, seeks. Rather, they claim that only the excavation of the 
graves and being able to assign political responsibility for the mass killings will give 
families the chance to move on from the horror of the events. 
Merely assigning and/or accepting political responsibility does not of itself, however, solve 
the problem. The strategy sometimes adopted by politicians, in which an individual 
politician declares that he/she is prepared to accept political responsibility for a particular 
incident or matter, does nothing to assuage this sense of injustice. We have already 
identified examples of this practice, in the actions of Richard Nixon, John F. Kennedy and 
John Nott. There are two more recent examples of this behaviour. Firstly Tony Blair's 
response whilst giving evidence to the Hutton inquiry into the death of the scientist David 
Kelly. Baldwin claims that Blair 'was not going to make the same mistake' as the Defence 
Secretary Geoff Hoon had done whilst he was giving evidence to the enquiry when he 
[Hoon] appeared to be passing the buck. Instead Blair 'repeatedly emphasised that he took 
7 Transcript from 'Crossing Continents', BBC Radio 4 (Broadcast), 15 July 2003, p.5. The broadcast included 
harrowing descriptions by surviving family members of other family members being taken away. They 
presumed that they were dead but had no access to records or to graves of the deceased. They expressed the 
wish not for retribution but for an account of what had taken place and why it had happened. 
8 Muldoon, Paul, 'Reconciliation and Political Legitimacy: The Old Australia and the New South Africa', 
Australian Journal o/Politics and History, Vol.49 No.2, p.185. 
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full responsibility for the actions of his Government.,9 Unfortunately this responsibility did 
not amount to giving a full account of the events that led to Kelly allegedly committing 
suicide. The second example is the resignation of Beverley Hughes from her ministerial post 
in charge of immigration at the Home office. The issue concerned her denial of any 
knowledge of the practice of relaxing passport checks on immigrants from Romania and 
Bulgaria. She resigned when it was later revealed that she had been warned a year earlier 
about the related abuses in the issuing of passports in these two countries. 'This 
inconsistency meant that she had failed her duty of personal accountability and 
responsibility' .10 Her resignation and acceptance of responsibility did nothing, however, to 
illuminate the position of David Blunkett the then-Home Secretary in this affair, and left 
many questions unanswered leaving 'an impression of incompetence and deviousness'. 
Peter Riddell observes that 'no wonder Tony Blair looked so uneasy at his press conference 
yesterday. In order to fulfil the doctrines of accountability and responsibility, the 
Government has a lot more explaining to do.' II A Minister simply accepting political 
responsibility without giving a full account does nothing to assuage the sense of injustice 
that has been generated. 
In all of these instances, and there are, alas, numerous others from around the world, the 
sense of injustice felt by the victims is palpable and the divisions this causes in the societies 
effected is damaging. Similarly to the aftermath of the Spanish Civil War, Ratner and 
Abrams, whilst discussing atrocities committed in more recent wars bemoan the fact that so 
little has changed in the intervening years since the Nuremberg Tribunal. Understanding 
injustice, and the necessity for the identification of those to whom political responsibility 
9 Baldwin, Tom, 'Buck stops here for leader with keen eye on his image', The Times, 29 August 2003. 
IO Riddell, Peter, 'The three tests of ministerial responsibility', The Times, (London, 2 April 2004), p. 9. 
Thompson Gale Document Number CJl14875537 
II Ibid. 
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can be ascribed, is not, however, just an exercise designed to assuage the grief and anger of 
individuals nor is it simply a matter of academic concern. Although these are indeed serious 
and pressing concerns, what is also a major pressing concern is that this 'continued failure 
to address the crimes of the past through some mechanism leaves open the wounds in 
society.' 12 (my italics) 
Prior to an examination of any mechanisms that may be created III order to address 
injustices from the past, it IS necessary to understand the nature of injustice and its 
aetiology. Understanding what this sense of injustice is, how it is generated and how it can 
be overcome, is not at all straightforward. In Gregory's discussions of the Cave Creek 
tragedy, his assertion that justice was not done let alone seen to be done strikes a 
sympathetic chord. However, it is not immediately clear what this injustice consists of. 
There was certainly no doubt that the park employees who built the viewing platform that 
collapsed did not build it to acceptable safety standards. Nevertheless, it seems that the 
prosecution and punishment of these individuals would not negate the sense of injustice that 
Gregory refers to. It is not difficult to understand why the survivors and the relatives and 
friends of the dead and injured should feel that they have been treated unjustly. No one 
resigned or was prosecuted for their part in the deaths and injuries; that indeed, as Gregory 
states, justice was not done let alone "seen to be done". Why this tragedy generated such a 
sense of injustice amongst the population in general, who had not been directly affected is, 
however, rather more difficult to explain. In order to understand why the general popUlation 
also has a sense of injustice it is necessary to understand the process that produces this sense 
of injustice that will apparently generalise into the population as a whole. 
12 Ratner, Steven R., & Abrams, Jason S., Accountability for Human Rights Atrocities in International Law, 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001), p. 336. 
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In order to understand these feelings of injustice, how they relate to political responsibility 
and to suggest strategies that may allow them to be overcome, it will be necessary to look at 
injustice in a general sense and then to relate it specifically to the political realm. However, 
whilst it is true that the nature of justice has been the subject of wide ranging speculations 
from the ancient Greeks onwards, this has not been the case for injustice. The centrality of 
justice to any discussion of the state, and therefore critical to the very nature of the political, 
was already apparent in the writings of Plato. Nevertheless, claims concerning the nature of 
justice have always been contentious. For example even in Plato's writings Callicles in the 
Gorgias claims that the imposition of justice is merely a conspiracy of the weak against the 
strong. Whilst in Republic ii, Glaucon and Adeimantus claim that it is an agreement to a set 
of rules that is to everyone's advantage whereas, Thrasymachus in Republic i claims that 
justice merely reflects the interests of the strong. 13 This preoccupation with justice that so 
exercised ancient Greek thinkers has continued to be true of philosophers in general. 
The continual search for a theory of justice and how it relates to the political realm does not, 
however, command universal approval. Richard Rorty, for example, claims that even some 
of the 'most original theorists of recent times [do not give us] any useful new tools'. 14 
Indeed he claims that if we abandon a God' s-eye point of view then we had also better 
abandon any notion of trying to charge the idea of justice with normative meaning. 15 Rorty 
asserts that we need no more "theories" but instead should adopt a pragmatic model. 'We 
should think of politics as one of the experimental rather than of the theoretical 
13 Plato, Georgias, 482E-483D; Republic ii, 357 A-359C; Republic J ,343B-344A, all in Irwin, Terence, (ed.), 
Classical Philosophy, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 303-306. 
14 Rorty, Richard, 'An Exchange on Truth, Freedom and Politics, Critical Inquiry, 16, 1990, p. 641 
15 Ibid., pp. 633-634. 
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disciplines.,16 Nevertheless, despite such caveats there have been prodigious amounts 
written about justice by philosophers and non-philosophers alike. It is the case, however, 
that writers 'have not always observed the distinction between questions of analysis and 
questions of criteria, i.e., the distinction between what justice is and how to determine 
instances or non-instances of it.' 17 Thus, whilst discussions of examples of injustice 
abound, indeed they are present on a daily basis in both the broadcast media and also in 
print, there is little discussion of what injustice is. That this is the prevailing attitude to 
injustice is demonstrated by the lack of literature that deals with injustice theoretically. As 
Shklar claims 'the sense of injustice, the difficulties of identifying the victims of injustice, 
and the many ways in which we all learn to live with each other's injustices tend to be 
ignored, as is the relation of private injustice to the public order.' 18 Shklar notes that 
although 'every volume of moral philosophy contains at least one chapter on justice', she 
asks, where are the similar discussion concerning injustice? She claims that discussions of 
injustice would 'at the very least ... begin to shorten the distance between theory and 
practice when one looks at our actual wickedness, rather than only at pictures of what we 
ought to be and do.'\9 It is also the case that even when injustice is discussed in most of 
these volumes 'it is taken for granted that injustice is simply the absence of justice, and that 
once we know what is just, we will know all we need to know' concerning injustice.2o 
Why, Shklar asks, 'do most philosophers refuse to think about injustice as deeply or as 
subtly as they do about justice?,21 
16 Rorty, Richard, 'From Logic to Language to Play: A Plenary Address to the Inter-American Congress', 
Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 58 (1986), pp. 752-753. Quoted in 
Rorty, 'An Exchange on Truth, Freedom and Politics', p.641 
17 Woozley, A.D., 'Injustice', American Philosophical Quarterly, Monograph Series No.7, 1973, p. \09. 
18 Shklar, Judith N., The Faces o/Injustice, (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1990), p. 15. 
19 Shklar, Judith,' Giving Injustice Its Due', The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 98, No.6, (Apr., 1989), p. 1136. 
20 Shklar, The Faces 0/ Injustice, p. 15. 
21 Ibid., p.16. 
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This lack of discussion and lack of clarity concerning discussions of injustice initially seems 
somewhat inexplicable. As we have seen, the sense of injustice is powerful and persistent 
indeed perhaps it is the prevalence of injustice that is the problem. Shklar states that 
Rousseau clearly articulates that, 'the sense of injustice [is] a universal human disposition, 
an ineradicable social emotion and a politically significant phenomenon.,22 She correctly 
points out that injustice has always been with us 'in the voices of Job and Jonah and Hesiod 
at the dawn of literary history', and asks what would Dickens have 'had to write about 
without the sense of injustice. ,23 The political significance of injustice was not, however, 
uppermost in the mind of great thinkers like Socrates whose investigations were based on 
discovering what justice is. Whilst each of us would have difficulties if confronted by a 
Socratic figure demanding to be instructed on the nature of justice, we do not seem to have 
the same difficulty with injustice; we know it when we see it, - or do we? Shklar cautions us 
that it is important that we distinguish between injustice and misfortune. When, for 
example, do the misfortunes caused by a hurricane then become matters of injustice? 
Perhaps if the local authorities (as in New Orleans) have failed to maintain the levies that 
should have kept the flood water out? She warns us that, human nature being what it is, we 
are likely to see injustice if we identify with the plight of the victim but if in any way we 
could be even remotely implicated in the responsibility for the disaster then we are likely to 
claim that it is caused by misfortune. Whilst the difference between misfortune and injustice 
can be a troublesome distinction in many cases of responsibility, Shklar claims that in terms 
of political responsibility it is less problematic. Indeed she claims that political theory seems 
to be the ideal place to discuss injustice, rather than leaving discussions of political 
responsibility to philosophers. She notes that 'In politics, the difference between misfortune 
22 Shklar, The Faces of injustice, p. 86. 
23 Ibid., p. 83. 
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and injustice clearly makes sense and can serve our interests - if we use it intelligently,24 
because 'injustice is not a politically insignificant notion.'25 Shklar, however, alerts us to 
the difficulties. For although 'the sense of injustice is eminently political,'26 the problem 
with injustice is that it is the 'speciality of losers', so that although the sense of injustice has 
not been altogether ignored, it has not really played an important part in political thought. 27 
There is one notable exception to this lack of scrutiny of injustice. Shklar draws our 
attention to a monograph by A.D. Woozley.28 This monograph on 'Injustice' provides a 
clear insight into how a sense of injustice can occur. Woozley begins his argument by 
outlining the usual way in which injustice is viewed. He claims that 'from Aristotle on it has 
seemed natural to think of injustice within the context of distribution of advantages or 
disadvantages' .29 We can see a specific example of this in Rawls' Theory of Justice in 
which Rawls challenges how primary goods are distributed amongst individuals and 
explains how the failure to distribute primary goods justly can result in some individuals 
being endlessly discriminated against. Thus, Rawls claims, we tend to view injustice as 
discrimination between individuals or groups of people or certain classes of people. 
Woozley challenges this notion that defines justice, and therefore injustice, in terms of 
distribution and discrimination, not because he has any doubts 'that the most conspicuous 
cases of injustice are those involving discrimination, but [that] I am inclined to think there is 
something more fundamental, that it is not so much the discrimination itself that is offensive 
as what is involved in the discrimination.' 30 
24 Shklar, The Faces of Injustice, p. 56. 
25 Ibid., p. 16. 
26 Ibid., p. 83. 
27 Ibid., p. 84. 
28 Woozley, A.D., 'Injustice' American Philosophical Quarterly, Monograph 7 Oxford, 1973. 
29 Ibid., p. 113. 
30 Ibid. (my italics) 
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The very basis of injustice, he claims, is that it can only occur between agents. In fact, it is 
Woozley's contention that 'in every case the person to be treated justly or unjustly, has a 
claim on the agent, and the agent in not meeting the claim is guilty of injustice. ,31 Woozley 
designates the nature of these claims that can be made on the agent as 'justicising factors'. 
These include such things as need, desert, and transaction, but the two that are of most 
interest to us and to our discussions of injustice are those he calls 'special relations' and 
'conformity to rule'. The significance of 'special relations' becomes apparent if we return to 
the definition of a representative and the duties that this imposes as outlined in the previous 
chapter from the work of Pitkin. It is clear that there is a special relationship that exists 
between politicians and the electorate, and that this special relationship produces special 
rights, i.e. that the representative must be accountable to his constituents. As Pitkin 
describes it, the representative 'must not be found persistently at odds with the wishes of the 
represented without good reason, in terms of their interest, without a good explanation of 
why their wishes are not in accord with their interest.' Thus, we could legitimately claim 
that when our interests are not met and no explanation, or no adequate explanation, is given 
concerning why this has occurred then it is possible, by Woozley's designation, to claim 
that we have been treated unjustly. 
Turning to the second justicising factor, 'conformity to rule', Woozley reminds us that in 
order for society to be able to function it is essential that it is perceived that the general rules 
of society 'should both be fair and be fairly operated'. More importantly, he claims that each 
one of us also 'has a claim that the general rules of society should be observed. ,32 The 
impetus to conform to these rules, he claims, is not dependent on either the legality or 
31 Woozley, 'Injustice', p. 114. 
32 Ibid., p. 119. 
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morality of the rules, but instead 'depends on those being the rules by which the game is 
being played. ,33 For as Kant claimed, unless a rule is a universal law and generally 
observed then it has no value. 
This of course leaves us open to the problem of what exactly constitutes a rule. Woozley 
does admit that 'it is not easy to be precise about what constitutes something being such a 
rule', however, he does not think that this is really a problem. It can be something that is 
laid down by statute, conversely, 'it can be as little as it being a matter of reasonable 
expectation, which is enough to create a rule, and [thus] to open the way for just and unjust 
treatment of others' .34 
When companng the democracies of ancient Greece and modern representational 
democracy, we have already identified that in both we have a right to expect an account to 
be given should we require it. It would then appear that in Woozley's terms that this would 
be a "reasonable expectation" and, therefore, the lack of such an account to be perceived as 
a matter of injustice. In fact Woozley's definition of injustice confirms just that. His 
definition of injustice is that injustice 'consists of treating people differently - more 
accurately, worse - than they have a right to expect'. 35 
Woozley is of course a realist and acknowledges that there is a considerable difference 
between expectations and actual behaviours, between expecting that someone will behave in 
a certain way and expecting someone to behave in a certain way. We might, for example, 
expect, because that is what we believe the essence of political representation to be, that a 
33 Woozley, 'Injustice', p. 119. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
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politician will give us an account of his actions. We might also not expect that he will 
actually behave in this way because it has been our experience that politicians are usually 
evasive, tell us only half truths or attempt to obfuscate the situation, or in some cases, just 
plain lie. This, however, must not dictate the veracity of our expectation. As Woozley 
explains, 'a demand on a person does not fail to be reasonable just because the expectation 
that he will meet it fails to be reasonable. ,36 In order to illustrate this clearly Woozley offers 
the example provided by Kant and his habit of taking a walk everyday at so precisely the 
same time that his neighbours could set their watches by him. Woozley explains that the 
neighbours will have no reason to complain that Kant would be letting them down, as a 
regulator of time, if one day he failed to walk at the particular time. 'For them to be entitled 
to complain, not only would Kant have to know that they were relying on him as their 
watch-regulator, but they would have to know that he knew, and he would have to know 
that they knew that he knew. ,37 
When we extrapolate from this example of the behaviour of Kant to our politician in a 
representational democracy, it is clear that our elected representative does know that we are 
relying on him, because that is why we elected him. There can be no doubt in our minds that 
he knows this (ie. we are relying on him) and he certainly knows that we know that he 
knows this, otherwise we would have no grounds to dismiss him. In this relationship 
between the represented and the representative, as Woozley points out, 'the claim to justice 
within the context of rules is the claim to reasonable expectation of conformity to rule 
should not be disappointed.' In fact, 'injustice consists of failing to treat victims of it in the 
way in which they can expect to be treated. ,38 In representational democracies we expect 
36 Woozley, 'Injustice', p. 121. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid. 
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that our elected representatives will be politically responsible, in fact the representatives' 
'accountability focuses on the obligation owed by all public officials to the public, the 
ultimate sovereign in a democracy for explanation and justification of their use of public 
office.,39 When representatives fail to do this, according to Woozley, they behave unjustly. 
He claims that injustice is 'somehow an affront or an insult to the promisee as a human 
being.' 'In this case the insult is first conferring a right on him, [the right to be given an 
account which is inherent within representational democracy] and then behaving as if you 
had not'. Thus injustice fundamentally is 'the affront done to a man as a human being by not 
treating him in the way that he can expect to be treated.' Thus, 'it is not the absence of 
justice that we get excited about, but the absence of justice where it should be present. ,40 
Woozley points out that it is 'no accident that it is indignation rather than merely anger that 
we feel at injustice, whether we or others are its victims.'41 We can see that this fits with 
Pitkin's account of representation, that we should be able to be given an account if we ask 
for it, and are rightly affronted when what we believe to be our right is not respected. 
This explanation of injustice perhaps makes sense of the claims made by Gregory 
concerning the Cave Creek disaster. This had been the first significant test for the State 
sector reforms of 1988 and 1989, which had been described at the time as "truly 
remarkable". They had been instigated because there had been several occasions where 
ministers had actively sought to distance themselves from political responsibility when 
things had gone wrong in their departments. It had been hoped that instigating these reforms 
would overcome the concerns over the "enveloping haze" of ministerial responsibility. It 
39 Dunn, Delmer D., 'Mixing Elected and Nonelected Officials in Democratic Policy Making: Fundamentals of 
Accountability and Responsibility', in Democracy, Accountability and Representation, (ed). Przeworski, 
Adam, Stokes, Susan C. and Manin, Bernard, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999), p. 298. 
40 Woozley, 'Injustice', pp. 109-110. 
41 Ibid., pp. 121-122. 
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was claimed that 'the reforms were designed to ensure that the respective responsibilities of 
ministers and their officials were clarified, and that the performances of senior officials 
could be more rigorously assessed, and rewarded or sanctioned accordingly. ,42 We can see 
from Woozley's account of injustice why the outcome of the Cave Creek disaster caused 
such anger, resentment and consternation amongst the general population in New Zealand. 
The public had firstly been assured that they did indeed have a right to ascribe political 
responsibility to politicians and that the reason that reforms were necessary was that the 
current convention was inadequate. They were led to believe that the problem with the 
current convention of "ministerial responsibility," was that it 'placed too much emphasis on 
its supposed requirement that ministers accept liability for actions performed. ,43 The 
reforms would, it was claimed, ensure that there was a much clearer delineation of the 
respective roles of ministers and their chief executives so that the pathways of responsibility 
were much clearer. Thus, having been assured that they had a right to expect to be able to 
hold ministers politically responsible, and the reassurance that these reforms would ensure 
that this would be delivered, the public were outraged when the new system not only did not 
deliver the promised clarification which they expected but also led to more obfuscation than 
the original system. In Woozley's parlance, the public believed that they had had a right 
conferred on them, but when the delivery of that right was demanded by the public in the 
Cave Creek disaster, politicians behaved as if that right had not been conferred. Thus, if 
promises are made that heighten expectations when these expectations are frustrated the 
disappointment generated will be intensified. 
42 Gregory, 'A New Zealand Tragedy: Problems of Political Responsibility', p. 234. 
43 Ibid. 
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The department responsible for building the viewing platform that had collapsed with such 
disastrous consequences immediately admitted that this was directly attributable to the 
faulty design and construction, for which they were solely responsible. Thus, the public and 
those bereaved had, they believed, the right to expect that the Minister of Conservation and 
the Chief Executive of the Department of Conservation responsible for the national park 
would give a full and frank account of the tragedy. When it was discovered in the enquiry 
that budgets had been cut, the public wished to know, amongst other details, why the 
decisions to reduce budgets had been made, and who had decided to allow the unskilled, 
unsupervised workers to construct the viewing platform. The Minister of Conservation, as a 
member of the government, was politically responsible for both the reforms intended to 
increase clarity, and also the budgetary constraints under which the Chief Executive acted. 
The public had a right to demand that they be given an account of not only what happened 
at Cave Creek but also why the heralded reforms failed to work and why the budgetary 
constraints had been made. 
There is no doubt that in such cases there is a great public demand for retribution. Under the 
terms of the state sector reforms, the public and the bereaved had been led to believe that 
they had a right to hold politicians and bureaucrats to account. When this supposedly new 
responsive system was tested by the Cave Creek tragedy those rights, which had appeared to 
be enshrined within the legislation, were nevertheless negated. Gregory is right to conclude 
that it is only by officials, elected or appointed, fulfilling these obligations that the integrity 
of the governmental systems can be maintained.44 He claims that it was 'the failure on the 
part of the Cave Creek principals to say sorry in a way that was unmistakably sincere, 
44 Gregory, 'Political responsibility for Bureaucratic Incompetence: Tragedy at Cave Creek', p. 533. 
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because they did not believe that their (in)actions directly caused the tragedy, [that] in a real 
sense enhanced rather than diminished their responsibility for it. ,45 
What was actually required was a remedy that not only restored public faith in the 
competence of the government but also their trust in its fairness, compassion and, therefore, 
its legitimacy. 'Reinvesting legitimacy in the state has become inseparable from managing 
the legacies of the past'. 46 Although this is of course all perfectly correct, what is missing 
from this list, and at the heart of Woozley's claims of injustice, is that the public in general 
and the bereaved and maimed were not given the consideration that they had a right to 
expect. That having allegedly re-organised the state sector to make the lines of 
accountability and responsibility more transparent, the government then refused by their 
actions, after the Cave Creek tragedy, to fulfil this obligation. There is little wonder that 
Gregory reports that 'the failure of political responsibility over Cave Creek has done 
nothing to reduce the high levels of public cynicism that already existed in New Zealand 
towards, politics, politicians and political institutions. ,47 What is so damaging is that these 
failures create within citizens the feeling of being alienated from the institutions of state, in 
this case the representational democratic process, and results in these processes being 
perceived as 'foreign, bifurcating, and hostile or indifferent to their needs' .48 As Woozley 
reminds us it is the affront or insult that results in the victims of the injustice becoming 
alienated from the social world in which they find themselves located, and Shklar is in no 
doubt that 'normal human beings can tell when they are being affronted. ,49 
45 Gregory, 'Political responsibility for Bureaucratic Incompetence: Tragedy at Cave Creek', p. 534. 
46 Muldoon, Paul, 'Reconciliation and Political Legitimacy: The Old Australia and the New South Africa, 
Australian Journal of Politics and History, Vol. 49, No.2, 2003, p.186. 
47 Gregory, 'Political responsibility for Bureaucratic Incompetence: Tragedy at Cave Creek', p.535. 
48 Hardimon, Michael 0., Hegel's Social Philosophy, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1994), p.l. 
49 Shklar, The Faces of Injustice p 90. 
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The resignation or dismissal of the minister responsible is not of itself the only (or 
complete) solution. In this case when the minister did eventually resign (4 months later), it 
did little to assuage the anger and sense of outrage that had been generated. Gregory 
cautions us that whilst 'dismissal may have satisfied retributive instincts it may also have 
denied the opportunity for the sort of genuine responsible action necessary to reaffirm 
symbolically the integrity of governmental institutions. ,50 Dismissal or resignation even 
where it might be right and necessary is not in itself sufficient. Not only is it insufficient to 
exhaust all the requirements of the content of what it is to accept political responsibility, in 
fact dismissal or resignation is not the only thing that people actually want. There is no 
doubt that they frequently want retribution, and that they might not be able to disentangle 
this desire for retribution from these other "things". Despite this, it is possible to discern a 
desire for something other than retribution. The requirement to give an account is central to 
the possibility of meeting the desire for these "things" other than retribution. Giving an 
account of past action serves two purposes. Firstly it fulfils the role required of a 
representative in a representational democracy and more importantly, it identifies and 
explains what went wrong. Secondly, within the explanation of what went wrong in the past 
is the remedy to prevent a re-occurrence in the future. It is, therefore, possible to extrapolate 
from Gregory's suggestion that 'the opportunity for the sort of genuine responsible action 
necessary to reaffirm symbolically the integrity of governmental institutions' has within it 
the possibility that this reaffirmation could take the form of a plausible promise concerning 
future government action. It is possible that a credible account from a minister may lead to 
promises of government action in the future, which is often all that the aggrieved actually 
want. 
so Gregory, 'Political responsibility for Bureaucratic Incompetence: Tragedy at Cave Creek', p. 533. 
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Having established what injustice is and how it relates to the political realm, it is now 
necessary to investigate the effects that injustice has on the perceptions of individuals of 
their place within the political process. As Hardimon states, those who are dealt with 
unjustly perceive the political process as 'foreign, bifurcating, and hostile or indifferent to 
their needs'. 51 Injustice and the effects of injustice are so pervasive because of the 
complexity of its manifestations; for example, criminal, moral, legal and political. The 
complexity of these manifestations of injustice results in there being a complexity of 
remedies that purport to overcome its effects. 
The reVIew of available literature revealed that attempts to aSSIgn responsibility often 
become enmeshed III the difficulties of attempting to separate different types of 
responsibility, for example separating responsibility for criminal acts from responsibility for 
political acts, of which there are many examples. When the difficulties of separating 
different types of responsibility are addressed, however, this can produce its own 
problems. 52 
The experience in France is a case in point. As well as the problems of collaboration and co-
operation with the Nazi regime, which has never been resolved and still remains a matter of 
deep controversy, there is also a more poignant example of where criminal, moral, legal and 
political responsibilities have become conflated. In a moving account of the massacre that 
occurred in Oradour-sur-Glane in the Limousin region of west central France, Sarah Farmer 
51 Hardimon, Hegel's Social Philosophy, p.l. 
52 This is exemplified by the sharp contrast between the subsequent response and recriminations against the 
perpetrators of crimes after the fall of the German Democratic Republic, and the far from satisfactory process 
that took place at the end of the Second World War. 'In Germany the debate over the legal response to the 
crimes of the former GDR opened old wounds when the ... comparison to the abject failure of the criminal 
justice system to deal with the atrocities of the Nazi dictatorship entered into the public debate.' Schafer, 
Burkhard, 'Sometimes You Must be Kind to be Cruel', in Christodoulidis, Emilios & Veitch, Scott, (eds.), 
Lethe's Law, p 18. 
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describes first the trauma of the massacre and then the betrayal by French politicians of their 
vow to bring the perpetrators to justice. SS troops had encircled the town and rounded up all 
the inhabitants dividing the men from the women and children. They marched the men to 
nearby barns and shot them all. They then locked the women and children into the church 
where they also were shot. The soldiers then set fire to the church and the rest of the village. 
In all, 642 inhabitants were massacred and the village devastated. 
The trial of some of the perpetrators that took place in Bordeaux in 1953 illustrated the 
conflict between the two sides. On one side there were those who argued for moderation and 
conciliation, and others who, like Camus, argued that 'forgiving collaborators meant 
sacrificing the ideals for which the resisters had died, as well as betraying the dead by 
allowing their executioners to go free. ,53 The lack of justice felt by the families of the 
victims of this Nazi atrocity brought with it lasting bitterness. The village returned the Cross 
of the Legion of Honour it had been awarded after the war in recognition of the suffering. 
Thus, added to the' sentiment of very great pain and of survival there was added a sentiment 
of injustice, abandonment, and, at times, revolt. ,54 The sense of injustice and anger still 
remains unresolved although the massacre took place on 10th June 1944.55 It is not at all 
clear, however, how this sense of injustice can be overcome. At a point that is over 60 years 
from when the event took place, retributive justice would be impossible. 
One attempt to overcome the effects of injustice and balance the demands for criminal 
retribution with the needs of the victims and society as a whole has been the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in South Africa. The TRC was constituted to overcome 
53 Farmer, Sarah, 'Post war Justice in France: Bordeaux 1953', in Deak, Istvan, Gross, Jan T., & Judt, Tony, 
(eds.), The Politics of Retribution in Europe, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2000), p. 195 
54 Ibid., p. 205. 
55 Ibid., pp. 194-211. 
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deep divisions caused in a society in which there was institutionalised discrimination. This 
resulted in often large sections (if not the majority) of the population being treated unjustly 
because their rights as citizens had been arbitrarily removed from them. The TRC is a useful 
example because it highlights the importance of reconciliation. It also reveals, however, that 
the failure to differentiate between different types of responsibility, and in particular the 
conflation of criminal, moral and political responsibility often thwarted the desired 
outcomes of reconciliation it sought to achieve. The strategies that were adopted in South 
Africa, which privileged truth telling and the process of reconciliation between the victim 
and perpetrator above everything else, was seen by many to ignore the very real sense of 
indignation experienced by those aggrieved. 
The experiments in both South Africa and Australia have invoked 'a state sponsored 
discourse of reconciliation' in an attempt to help to 'restore legitimacy to liberal states 
confronted with a "broken moral order".56 Although there has been much praise for the 
experiment in South Africa that culminated in the work of the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (TRC) there have also been criticisms. These criticisms have mostly centred on 
how learning the truth facilitates the process of reconciliation with the perpetrators of 
crimes. There have also been concerns about the morality and constitutionality of the 
subsequent amnesty provisions. 57 Thus, the 'initial enthusiasm has been replaced by an 
increasing sense of disillusion, and a feeling that the TRC has left the country as divided as 
56 Muldoon, Paul, 'Reconciliation and Political Legitimacy: The Old Australia and the New South Africa', 
Australian Journal of Politics and History, Vol. 49, No.2. 2003, p. 182. 
57 Amnesty is another difficult problem. Whilst it is obvious that self-amnesty of the type that Pinochet 
awarded himself on leaving office is designed solely to protect him from any criminal proceedings this is not 
necessarily always the case. To be given amnesty one has first to acknowledge that one did in fact commit the 
crime. See discussions by GUnther, Klaus, "'Guilt" and the Politics of Remembrance', pp. 3-16; Schafer, 
Burkhard, 'Sometimes You Must Be Kind to Be Cruel', pp. 17-31 and Veitch, Scott, 'The Legal Politics of 
Amnesty', pp. 32-46 all in Christodoulidis, Emilios & Veitch, Scott, (eds.), Lethe's Law. 
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before.,58 This is particularly true if the perpetrating and victimised community are forced 
to co-exist, and are obliged to live together in full knowledge of the past. It is the case that 
it may well be in the interests of the perpetrators to admit to their crimes, Arendt reminds us 
of the words of Socrates when he claims that 'it is better to be wronged than to do wrong'. 
That 'it would be better for me that my lyre or a chorus I directed should be out of tune and 
loud with discord, and that multitudes of men should disagree with me rather than that I, 
being one should be out of harmony with myself and contradict me. ,59 Being one with 
oneself, means of course that I, as a perpetrator of a crime or a wrong, have to live with 
myself as a criminal or a wrongdoer. Thus, confessing one's faults and asking forgiveness 
of those who have been wronged or their relatives, as did many who appeared before the 
TRC may, if Socrates is right, have a beneficial effect on the perpetrators. It is less clear 
how this process benefits the victims and/or their families. 
There is no doubt, however, that in some cases this process has also been very beneficial to 
the victims and/or their families. 6o Nevertheless, that many victims or their families have 
benefited by or from this process may be because of a quality peculiar to Africa. 61 It is this 
quality that Tutu claims made so many victims choose forgiveness rather than retribution or 
revenge. This process, it is claimed, has the ability to re-empower victims or their families 
by giving them the opportunity and choice to forgive the perpetrators. It is claimed that this 
58 Schafer, Burkhard, 'Sometimes You Must Be Kind to Be Cruel', in Lethe's Law: Justice, Law and Ethics in 
Reconciliation, p. 18. 
59 Arendt, Hannah, 'Thinking and Moral Considerations: a Lecture', Social Research Vo1.38, No.3, 1971, 
p.445. 
60 The daughter of one of the Cradock Four stated that 'we want to forgive, but whom should we forgive.' The 
Cradock Four were four men who were abducted and assassinated outside of Port Elizabeth on 27 June 1985. 
Roermund, Bert Van, 'Rubbing Off and Rubbing On: The Grammar of Reconciliation' in Lethe's Law, p. 177. 
61 Tutu, Desmond, No Future Without Forgiveness, (London, 1999), p. 34. Tutu claims that there is a 
particular quality which is a central feature of the African world-view, that of ubuntu (Nguni) or botho 
(Sotho). This concept has no direct translation into English. It seems to mean belonging, participating, sharing, 
that my humanity is bound up inextricably with yours. For a person to have ubuntu,or botho which is 
considered to be high praise, means that they are generous, hospitable, friendly, caring and compassionate. 
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allows them to move on with their lives, 'a burying of the past'. This process is not, 
however, universal and is clearly insufficient for some. Steve Biko's family is only the most 
prominent among many who question the morality and constitutionality of the amnesty 
provisions, which allow perpetrators to go free in exchange for full disclosure of their 
crimes.62 The problem is that the truth about the past that is revealed by the discourse of 
truth and reconciliation 'is not a dead past, but a past that continues to shadow and stalk the 
present - whether as "sleeping wound", "repressed memory" or "haunting ghost".63 For 
some, including the family of Biko, rather than healing wounds 'the tendency of the TRC to 
"dictate forgiveness" amounted to a further assault upon the dignity of those who had 
suffered under the apartheid regime.,64 
It is the case that the 'South African TRC hardly focused on the apartheid system per se but 
[instead] on the atrocities committed to keep minority rule in power. ,65 It is not the 
uncovering of the truth that is the problem, however, rather it is the insistence that there 
should be forgiveness by the individuals or their families of the perpetrators. Digeser warns 
us that 'political forgiveness should not be performed unless the government has publicly 
acknowledged the wrong that it has done: victims and transgressors must agree on a history 
of what has happened. This acknowledgement is reasonable because some common 
understanding of who did what to whom is a minimal demand for justice. ,66 Muldoon 
points out that 'unless survivors were willing to embrace the kind of unconditional 
forgiveness that Jacques Derrida has recently elaborated, a forgiveness that works 
62 Veitch, Scott, 'The Legal Politics of Amnesty', in Christodoulidis, Emilios & Veitch, Scott, (eds.), Lethe's 
Law: Justice, Law and Ethics in Reconciliation, p. 44. 
63 Muldoon, Paul, 'Reconciliation and Political Legitimacy', p. 188. 
64 Villa-Vicencio, c., 'Getting on with life: A Move Towards Reconciliation', in Villa-Vicencio, C. and 
Verwoerd, W. (eds), Looking Back, Reaching Forward, (Cape Town, Cape Town University Press, 2000), 
p. 201. 
65 Muldoon, 'Reconciliation and Political Legitimacy', p. 193. 
66 Digeser, Peter, 'Forgiveness and Politics: Dirty Hands and Imperfect Procedures, Political Theory, Vo1.26, 
No.5, 1998, p. 707. 
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independently of any admissions of guilt or contractual obligation for penance, the process 
of reconciliation inevitably 'ground to a halt.' 67 It would seem that without strategies to 
address the deep sense of indignation and affront that characterises a feeling of injustice, the 
project of reconciliation demands special qualities of faith, forgiveness and goodwill which 
are only rarely characteristics displayed by those who have been affronted. 
The conventional notion of forgiveness argues that the injured party must have a change of 
heart towards his or her victimiser. .. arguing that forgiveness requires either the actual 
elimination of resentment to a commitment to the process of eliminating it. Because 
resentment is such a powerful emotion forgiveness is difficult. If forgiveness does indeed 
require this kind of deep transformation then it may not be a reasonable or relevant response 
to political injustices. 68 
Indeed, after the suffering that they have already endured, why should we even think that 
those who have been the subject of such injustice should also be required to forgive. 
If injustice is to be overcome and reconciliation achieved then there must be an alternative 
route. The TRC attempted to address grievances that for the most part were the result of 
criminal acts. Many of these acts were perpetrated by personnel employed by the state or by 
its agencies. Despite attempts to investigate the means by which a philosophy of apartheid 
had penetrated institutions such as the legal, media, health etc. there was no attempt to 
attribute political responsibility in any meaningful way. In fact, the TRC 'encountered an 
"overarching sense of denial" among apartheid leaders and beneficiaries of their [political] 
responsibility for the past. ,69 Similarly, the Cave Creek disaster highlighted the problems 
associated with attempts to discover cause and agency and the subsequent reluctance to 
67 Muldoon, 'Reconciliation and Political Legitimacy', pp. 192-193. 
68 Digeser, 'Forgiveness and Politics: Dirty Hands and Imperfect Procedures', p. 702. 
69 Nagy, Rosemary, 'The Ambiguities of Reconciliation and Responsibility in South Africa', Political Studies, 
Vo1.52, 2004, p. 715. Quotation from the Commission report Vo1.5. p.198. Nagy points out that despite F.W. 
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ascribe responsibility to political actors and to administer punishment. As Gregory points 
out, even the public enquiry did little to illuminate the "enveloping haze". 
Unfortunately, this phenomenon is a recurring pattern. A recent example in Britain, the 
Hutton inquiry into the death of the scientist David Kelly, established that everyone was to 
blame but that no one was responsible. However, the sense of injustice that is felt when such 
tragic events are not satisfactorily resolved is not only extremely distressing for those 
directly involved, but also, as Gregory claims, damaging to the entire political process. If 
the remedy for this sense of injustice is not the identification of agency and cause and 
subsequent punishment, as it would be in a criminal matter, then an understanding of how 
this sense of injustice develops will help us to comprehend the distinctiveness of political 
responsibility. 
Although it has already been established that political responsibility is a completely 
different type of responsibility with its own normative values, what it has in common with 
other types of responsibility is that the absence of political responsibility also engenders 
feelings of injustice. Thus, the response to injustice, the sense of being affronted, is not 
differentiated by the absence of any particular type of responsibility, but just by the absence 
of responsibility in general. We have shown how in the case of political responsibility we 
are dealing with a completely different and discrete concept that is often wrongly equated 
with other types of responsibility. However, the sense of injustice is the common element 
that we feel and is not affected by what type of responsibility has been denied to us. It is the 
affront, 'the special kind of anger that we feel when we are denied promised benefits and 
de Klerk's seemingly fulsome apology for the apartheid system (TRC, 1998, Yol.5, p. 197) he always denied 
political responsibility for the gross human rights violation. Instead he 'insisted that murder and torture were 
the result of over-zealousness, misinterpretation or mala fides intentions.' Nagy, p. 716. 
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when we do not get what we believe to be our due' .70 As there is no differentiation between 
feelings of injustice generated by different types of responsibility (although these might well 
differ considerably in intensity) in this instance, despite earlier criticisms of this process, it 
is possible to examine one type of responsibility to shed light on another. 71 We are 
therefore able to examine criminal responsibility and discover and understand the aetiology 
of what is involved in engendering a sense of injustice. Once this has been established it will 
then be possible to see if this can be generalised to reflect a similar process in political 
responsibility. 
Despite the consistent nature of the feeling of affront, 'the affront done to a man as a human 
being by not treating him in the way that he can expect to be treated,' 72 the path to 
overcoming this affront is dependent upon different remedies appropriate to differing types 
of responsibility. Bearing this in mind, criminal responsibility is being used in order to 
illustrate the process involved in engendering the feeling of being affronted. In criminal 
responsibility, the first step is to understand the mechanisms that result in the sense of 
injustice that is felt when the person who is responsible for a crime is not identified and 
punished. The process may be described in these stages:-
1. crimes that have been committed are not acknowledged/sufficiently acknowledged 
by the state and/or other members of society; therefore, 
2. the perpetrators are not prosecuted (or revealed) or only a insignificant! 
representative number are, e.g. the former Nazis in Germany post-1945 and the 
70 Shklar, The Faces of Injustice, p. 83. 
71 One problem that has already been identified and subjected to criticism in the literature review, is the 
contlation of different types of responsibility for example moral, legal and criminal and the use made by Hans 
Jonas of parental responsibility to shed light on political responsibility. 
72 Woozley, 'Injustice', pp. 109-110 
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subsequent Nuremberg Tribunal or the Truth and Reconciliation Commission; 
therefore, 
3. the perpetrators (apart from a very small number of them) are not punished in a 
legal/judicial sense, or revealed as criminals to the wider population (they may of 
course personally suffer from feelings of guilt), justice is not "seen to be done" both 
by the victims and the wider community; the victims are perceived by themselves 
and others in the community to have been treated unjustly; therefore, 
4. reconciliation cannot take place between victims and perpetrators, or even more 
crucially between victims and their social world; therefore wounds remain unhealed 
in society. 
The meaning of "social world" that is being utilised here is Hegel's definition. Hardimon 
explains that Hegel understands the social world as something more than "society". His 
notion of a social world 'refers to the framework of the central institutions and practices of 
social and political life of society or a society of a certain type.' It gives a more complete 
picture than "society", however, because it 'conveys the idea that society forms a "world -
the world of social institutions and practices' into which we are born, live out our lives and 
die.?3 Hardimon states that Hegel requires that every member of civil society should ask 
themselves the same question; can I be reconciled to the social world? Hardimon's 
interpretation of Hegel's answer to this question is illuminating. He claims that 'modern 
people are fully at home in the social world if and only: 
1. the social world is a home, 
2. they grasp that the social world is a home, 
3. they feel at home in the social world, and 
73 Hardimon, Michael 0., Hegel's Social Philosophy, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 16-
17. 
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4. they accept and affirm the social world.' 74 
The concept of being at home in the social world, as Hardimon reminds us, is for Hegel 
'both an objective and subjective matter. It is not wholly subjective [however], since there is 
an objective condition the social world must meet - that of being a home - if people are to 
be at home there.'75 Firstly, we must discover what is it that objectively makes the social 
world a home. Hardimon clearly elucidates Hegel's complex arguments, which when they 
are so distilled, become concepts which are both familiar and to some extent commonplace. 
Similarly to the ancient Greeks, Browning claims that for Hegel modem people have two 
personas. 76 Unlike the ancients, however, one persona is as an individual and one is as a 
social member of the community.77 Thus, Hardimon claims that 'the social world is a home 
if and only if it makes it possible for people to actualise themselves as individuals (to 
actualise their individuality) and as social members (to actualise their social 
membership). ,78 In order that this may be possible, the social world must have the 
necessary framework and contain the necessary institutions to not only permit but to 
positively encourage this actualisation to occur, both as an individual and as a social 
member. Part of this actualisation is that individuals must be able to 'participate in central 
social institutions', and this must occur 'in the normal course of things' as who they are. 79 
Secondly, what is it that subjectively makes the social world a home? For this to happen it is 
necessary that the central institutions promote subjective freedom. Hardimon states that in 
74 Hardimon, Hegel's Social Philosoph" p. 95 
75 Ibid. 
76 For the Greeks the two personas were the private and the public. There is no doubt that the Greeks 
privileged the public over the private. 
77 Browning, G .K., 'Plato and Hegel: Reason, Redemption and Political Theory', History of Political Thought, 
Vol. VIII, No.3, 1987, p. 387. 'Hegel is critical of Plato's neglect of individual freedom, he is at pains to 
emphasise that a rational state must integrate individual freedom with the universal claims of the community.' 
78 Hardimon, Hegel's Social Philosophy, p. 102. (my italics) 
79 Ibid., pp. 102-106 
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Hegelian terms this 'involves the freedom of individuals to pursue their own separate and 
particular interests, and actualise their own freely chosen life plans, to act in accordance 
with their own private consciences, and to assess their social roles and institutions from their 
own subjective standpoint.' This is to be achieved not only through negative freedoms, but 
also positive ones, including the state, 'within which people can find political community.'8o 
Thus, for the social world to be a home, people must be simultaneously recognised not only 
as individuals but also as members of the political community. 
Hegel, of course, divides the modern social world into three components: the family, civil 
society and the state. It is the state that we are most concerned with here, because it is the 
state with its "monopoly of violence" that is charged with ensuring the prevention and 
detection of crime and the bringing to trial and punishment of wrongdoers. Hardimon claims 
that Hegel 
contends that the administration of justice provides people with one sort of recognition - legal 
recognition - by protecting their legal rights. The fact that it does so is important, since it 
means that there is an official body that provides formal recognition of the individuality of 
society's members (of their legal status as bearers of individual rights). 81 
Hardimon claims that Hegel believes that this confers on members what he dubs "positive 
social rights" that is 'rights that members of civil society hold as members of civil society 
against civil society.'82 That 'what is recognised .. .is not just the moral dignity of the 
inviolable individual, but also the individual qua citizen, as members of a political 
community whose purpose is to promote the freedom of all from tyranny and 
80 Hardimon, Hegel's Social Philosophy, pp. 111-112. 
81 Ibid., p. 196. 
82 Ibid., pp. 196-197. 
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subordination.'83 If this interpretation of the process is correct then we can begin to gain 
some insight into the sense of injustice and alienation felt by victims of state perpetrated 
and/or condoned crime.84 
The most devastating example of this failure to promote the freedom of the individual and 
protect them from tyranny and subordination occurred in Germany in the 1930s. The 
Nuremberg laws introduced in 1933 separated the Jewish population in Germany from the 
rest of the German population. We can see that the whole scale negation of the rights of the 
Jewish population by the Nazi regime resulted in the Jewish population becoming alienated 
from their social world. The way that Hegel deals with this negation of rights and 
subsequent alienation is to advocate that the perpetrators are punished. 
The concept of punishment is, however, itself contentious. There are two main types of 
theories of punishment - the utilitarian and the retributive. The utilitarians rely on outcomes 
and the retributive (of which there are different versions) claim that punishment is justified 
because the offender has voluntarily committed a wrong act. Hardimon claims that Hegel's 
theory, although of course incorporating elements of both of these is relevant because of its 
restorative element. Nevertheless, Hegel, like Hobbes, considers punishment to be a 
'politicalobligation,.85 We can therefore speculate that the punishment of perpetrators, that 
Hegel believes to be so vital, will allow victims to be reconciled again to their social world. 
Whilst Hobbes believed that punishment was necessary for the 'protective function of the 
83 Bohman, 'Punishment as a Political Obligation', p. 569. We can see how this view is in sharp contrast to 
Plato's ideas of the place of the individual. The Republic describes a state whose purpose is to curtail the anti-
social desires and preferences of the individual that could undermine and destabilise the common good. When 
states refuse to acknowledge the wrong done to citizen they are treating their citizens in the same way as Plato 
in The Republic, the citizens are being treated "as things" that can be ignored rather than as they are entitled to 
be treated, as people. 
84 Ibid., p. 568. Crimes that are committed against members ofthe community by, or condoned by, the state in 
essence results in the members being excluded from the whole human community. 
85 Ibid., p. 552. 
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state', Hegel argues that punishment 'is to "restore the right" rather than to be a preventative 
threat. ,86 Cooper claims that Hegel's theory of punishment can be 'mostly neatly 
encapsulated in the claim that punishment "annuls" crime. ,87 This is not an easy concept to 
understand, however, 'Benn and Peters, for example, say "it is not easy to see how a wrong 
can be annulled: what is done cannot, in a literal sense, be undone. ,88 This is of course a 
valid criticism but by utilising David Cooper's interpretation of Hegel's theory of 
punishment we will be able to further understand Hegel's argument and thus further 
illuminate the problem.89 
Hegel's theory of punishment is based on this theory of rights. Cooper explains Hegel's 
theory by asserting that 'legal rights are performatees.' So that 'the right to do x is logically 
dependent upon some rule or convention by reference to which such a right may be 
ascribed.'90 This right may exist in various ways, for example, statutes, precedents etc. This 
is not, however, the whole story. The validity of an individual's rights can only really be 
assessed by the response that occurs when that individual is prevented from exercising that 
right. Has there at least been an attempt made to punish and/or censure the person/people 
who are responsible for preventing such an exercise of the individual's rights? Cooper refers 
to Kelsen's claims, that 'attempting to apprehend and punish men is a form of procedure 
necessary to establish that rights of a certain kind exist in any paradigmatic manner. If a 
man is not liable to punishment for an action that is strong reason for supposing he 
86 Bohman, 'Punishment as a Political Obligation', p. 552. See Hegel, Philosophy alRight, (translated by T.M. 
Knox), (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1942), §99(A), p. 69. 
87 Cooper, David E., 'Hegel's Theory of Punishment', in Hegel's Political Philosophy: Problems and 
Perspectives, Pelczynski, Z.A. (ed.), (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1971), p. 151. 
88 Ibid., P 160. 
89 Cooper has been used as an interpretive source for Hegel's theory because 'Cooper's treatment of 
punishment. .. is especially valuable because it discusses the question of the "general justifying aim" of the 
institution of punishment.' Stillman, Peter G., 'Hegel's Idea of Punishment', Journal of the History of 
Philosophy, Vol. 14, No.2, 1976, p. 169. 
90 Cooper., 'Hegel's Theory of Punishment', p. 160. 
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committed no crime, that he infringed no rights.'91 Cooper warns us that this is not the 
usual means-ends argument familiar to utilitarians, but instead is the logical conclusion one 
would have to draw. Thus, we can draw the conclusion that 'unless people are generally 
apprehended and punished for preventing others doing x, there is reason to suppose that the 
latter do not have the right to do x - certainly not a "felicitous" right'. 92 
Cooper claims that the justification of punishment by Hegel then becomes clear. My rights 
are dependent on there being punishment for those that infringe my rights, not as a 
means/ends argument or as a deterrent, but because without punishment, it is illogical to 
claim that I have rights at all. 'If it is important that men have legal rights, it is important 
that there is punishment - for without the latter, there could not logically, be the former. ,93 
In fact, 'rights are performatees which logically depend for their felicitous existence upon 
the punishment of those who infringe them.,94 
Punishment is also important because Hegel claims that punishment has the ability to annul 
crimes.95 This is a difficult concept, in fact Cooper claims that Hegel uses the term 
annulment in two ways, one familiar and one not. The first is the familiar way that we 
would equate with the balancing nature of justice, that is, when an infringement occurs, 
restitution is forthcoming, and that re-balances the situation, in fact it annuls the wrong that 
has occurred. Thus in this sense 'a crime is an "injury to a possession or to something which 
exists externally" and the compensation in a metaphorical sense annuls the wrong' .96 
Although appealing to a sense of fair play, this idea of re-balancing is by no means an 
91 Cooper., 'Hegel's Theory of Punishment', p. 162. 
92 Ibid., pp. 162-163. 
93 Ibid.,163. 
94 Ibid .. 
95 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, (translated by T.M. Knox), § 99(A), p.69 
96 Cooper., 'Hegel's Theory of Punishment', p. 163 
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uncontroversial view,97 but it is not this first notion of annulment that is of primary interest 
to us. It is the second usage that is illuminating. 
Cooper rightly points out that for Hegel a crime is "an injury which has befallen the implicit 
will", the criminal is 'implicitly denying that his victim has certain rights .... Rights, that is, 
belong to persons as free agents - in virtue of their "wills". ,98 His argument is subtle. It is 
that although the criminal intended to do an injury to the "implicit will" of the victim, i.e. 
the criminal intended to demonstrate that the victim had no rights, this denial of rights is in 
fact impossible. It is impossible because the victim did have these rights 'and so there was 
never such a thing as the demonstration that the victim did not have them. ,99 We can 
immediately see what sort of objections would be made to this claim, that most criminals 
are not consciously thinking about the rights of the person against whom they are 
committing a crime, that his intentions are indeed otherwise, e.g. theft, murder, or rape. 
Cooper argues that this in no way detracts from Hegel's claim. The fact that the criminal is 
not thinking about the rights of the person is irrelevant. The fact that he is attempting to 
infringe them is all that is significant. What in fact occurred was that the criminal behaved 
as if the victim did not have the right, that is, the criminal acted as if the right of the victim 
had been negated. In these terms 'to speak of annulling the crime is to speak of whatever it 
is that establishes that the victim did have those rights which were implicitly denied by the 
criminal.,loo That is the 'negation of the negation'. The means to this end is punishment. 
97 GUnther, Klaus, , The Criminal Law of "Guilt" as Subject of a Politics of Remembrance in Democracies', in 
Lethe's Law: Justice, Law and Ethics in Reconciliation p. 5. GUnther whilst discussing 'the problem of 
punishment' dismisses the 'mystical constructions of a re-balancing, from the concrete "an eye for an eye", to 
the abstract "negation of negation" of injustice .... Harm does not "re-balance" anything, nor does it replace a 
loss, or re-establish violated law.' But this view expressed by GUnther seriously misunderstands Hegel's view. 
GUnther conflates the two ways in which Hegel employs the term annulment. 
98 Cooper., 'Hegel's Theory of Punishment' , p. 164, Philosophy of Right,§93, p. 67. 
99 Ibid., p. 164. 
100 Ibid, pp. 163-164. 
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The nullity [of crime] is that crime has set aside right as such. That is to say, right as 
something absolute cannot be set aside, and so committing a crime is in principle a nullity: 
and this nullity is the essence of what a crime effects. A nullity, however, must reveal itself 
to be such: i.e. manifest itself as vulnerable. A crime, as an act, is not something positive, 
not a first thing on which punishment would supervene as a negation. It is something 
negative, so that its punishment is only negation of the negation. Right in its actuality, then, 
annuls what infringes it and therein displays its validity, and proves itself to be a necessary, 
mediated reality. 101 
Hegel establishes that it IS punishment that annuls the cnme In the following way. 
Punishment of the attempted negation of the person's rights 'serves to demonstrate that the 
victim did have rights despite the criminal's implicit denial of them'. Hegel thus claims that 
we must punish the crime, for otherwise the crime would have been held valid. Unless 
punishment follows, society will be seen as condoning the crime. 
If he sees the man who cared nothing for [his rights] go scot-free, he is given to understand 
that society cares nothing for him either. But if the wrongdoer is made to see the error of his 
ways, the man to whom the wrong was done sees his rights vindicated and is assured that 
society cares for him, even if one of its members does not, and will hold his rights in the face 
of assault and injury. 102 
There are of course some serious philosophical objections concerning punishment. Do we 
necessarily want to punish someone who attempts to negate the rights of another, might this 
not seem too harsh? Hegel himself is in no doubt about the value of punishment but he 
understands why to inflict punishment can appear to be a superficial response. If 
101 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, trans. T.M. Knox (Oxford, 1942), §97. Addition, p. 246, in Cooper, 
pp. 165-166. 
102 Glover, Jonathan, Responsibility, (London, Harmondsworth, 1970), p. 104. 
187 
punishment is viewed solely as 'a preventive, a deterrent, a threat, as reformative' 103 then it 
is solely concerned with crime and criminality. Hegel argues that if 'crime and its 
annulment' i.e. punishment are treated just as 'unqualified evils', it would seem totally 
unreasonable 'to will one evil merely because "another evil is there already".104 It is clear, 
however, that punishment is crucial because the crime must be annulled not because it is an 
evil (although of course it is) but because it is an infringement of rights: the rights that the 
wronged person holds by dint of being a recognised free human being. 
Hegel makes it clear that not only must we punish the criminal to reaffirm the rights of those 
who have suffered but that the criminal himlherself has a right to be punished. By punishing 
the criminal we also reaffirm him 'as a person, a subject a rational being with worth and 
dignity' .105 'The injury [the penalty] which falls on the criminal is not merely implicitly just 
- as just, it is eo ipso his implicit will, an embodiment of his freedom, his right; on the 
contrary, it is also a right established within the criminal himself, i.e. in his objectively 
embodied will ... ' 106 This may appear counter-intuitive, but is of course a direct correlation 
of Hegel's claims concerning rights. For Hegel values punishment not for its retributive or 
deterrent properties, although he would not deny these, but because by punishing the 
criminal we acknowledge him also as a bearer of rights. 'By being punished, he - as well as 
~ll other persons- is re-established as a person with rights; only if the criminal has the right 
to his own punishment does he have the right of a person.' 107 
103 Hegel's Philosophy of Right, (Translated by T.M. Knox), (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1942), §99, pp. 
69-70. 
104 Ibid. 
105 Stillman, 'Hegel's Idea of Punishment', p. 176. 
106 Hegel's Philosophy of Right, § 100, p. 70. 
107 Stillman, 'Hegel's Idea of Punishment', p. 174. 
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Hinchman claims that by punishing a criminal we are in essence refusing to allow him to 
'exempt himself from the rules' which 'express something essential about what it means to 
be human'. 108 By flouting these rules or "abstract rights" the criminal is putting himself 
outside of the class of right-bearing subjects, he alienates himself. This may be a matter of 
no concern to the criminal, but it is a matter of grave concern to the rest of us. For if we 
allow 'the criminal to remove himself from the class of right-possessing beings' then we 
call our own status into question. By punishing the criminal we not only reaffirm the status 
of the victim of his crime as a right-possessing being whose rights the criminal attempted to 
negate, but also confirm the criminal's status as a right-possessing being and thus also 
reconcile him to his social world. 
Cooper argues that although in some cases punishment may seem harsh this will very much 
depend on what punishment amounts to. Punishment may not necessarily be imprisonment 
or fines, but might instead be public exposure or revelation. This idea of public exposure 
would seem to add weight to the claims of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, for is 
not this exactly what is happening there? Although it appears to be the same, in fact it is not. 
Despite the fact that the outcomes may look the same, the "mechanism" or process is very 
different. The catalyst for the revelations and public exposure via the TRC is not the state 
qua the state demanding the truth from the perpetrators of crime. The state is not demanding 
that the perpetrators admit that their actions negated the rights that the victims had as 
citizens. Rather, it is the perpetrator's conscience and/or the fear of criminal proceedings 
against them if they do not tell the full story that may well be the reason for their revelation. 
108 Hinchman, Lewis P., 'Hegel's Theory of Crime and Punishment', The Review of Politics, VoI.44, No.4, 
1982, p. 542. 
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That is, the motive for the revelation is selfish. It is not motivated by a desire to address the 
alienation of the victim from the social world. 
If, as Hardimon claims, 'in order to actualise oneself as a bearer of rights one must be 
recognised by others as the bearer of rights,' 109 then what is required is that the state qua the 
state demands the public exposure and punishment of the perpetrators of crime. Thus refusal 
by the state to address the wrongs that the state is designed to uphold, that is to punish 
perpetrators of crimes, negates the rights of both the victims and the perpetrators as 
members of the legal community and also as members of civil society. The outcomes if this 
were pursued by the state could still be the same, that is, the revelation of truth, but there 
would be an acknowledgement, by the perpetrators, the wider community and the state, that 
an attempt had been made by the perpetrators to negate the rights of the victim. 
To briefly reiterate Hegel's complex arguments, we can see the following process:-
1. I have a place in the social world 
2. Having a place in the social world gives me rights 
3. I become alienated from the social world if my rights are negated, 
or if I perpetrate a crime against another 
4. To overcome this alienation the perpetrator who negated my rights must be 
punished, or I have the right to be punished if I perpetrate a crime against 
another 
5. This punishment annuls the crime that was committed when my rights were 
negated, or when I attempted to negate another's right 
6. This negation of the negation reconciles me to the social world. 
109 Hardimon, Hegel's Social Philosophy, p. 100. 
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Finally we now tum to the term "reconciliation," which appears as the final stage in the 
process. As we have already discovered by examining the criticisms of the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission in South Africa, it is a near impossibility to ensure or even 
engender reconciliation between victims and perpetrators if the victims are not willing to 
forgive. 'Moralising approaches may give victims a monopoly over the past or, 
alternatively, reconciliation can become overly dependent upon the moral generosity of 
victims. In other words, it is not self-evident that morally trans formative approaches are 
suitable, or politically workable.' liD What is possible, however, is to reconcile victims with 
their social world. It is the lack of this process that is the real cause of the problems in 
society, the victims have become alienated from the social world in which they find 
themselves located. The Chairperson of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission claimed 
that reconciliation means 'at its core the restoration of relationships, the rebuilding of trust, 
and the overcoming of animosity.' III These attributes of reconciliation are correct as far as 
they go. Hardimon reminds us that reconciliation 'is systematically ambiguous as between 
the process of reconciliation and the state that is its result. The process may be variously 
described as a process of overcoming conflict, division, enmity, alienation, or estrangement; 
the result, as the restoration of harmony, unity, peace, friendship, or love.' 112 However, the 
problem with the state of reconciliation is exacerbated by the term itself, because the 
English term "reconciliation" has within it negative connotations that are unacceptable to 
victims. The idea that is often present in English is one of resignation or submission: for 
example, I am reconciled to the loss of my husband, or he is reconciled to the company 
take-over. To be able to overcome this problem will require an understanding of the more 
complete notion of "reconciliation" provided by Hegel. Hardimon explains the difference 
110 Nagy, 'The Ambiguities of Reconciliation and Responsibility in South Africa', p. 712. 
III Balint, Jennifer, Law's Constitutive Possibilities: Reconstruction and Reconciliation in the Wake of 
Genocide', in Lethe's Law: Justice, Law and Ethics in Reconciliation, p. 144. 
112 Hardimon, Hegel's Social Philosophy, p. 85. 
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between the English term "reconciliation" and the German term "Versohnung" which is a 
more profound concept and is far more complex than its English equivalent. 
Versohnung strongly connotes a process of transformation. When two parties become 
genuinely versohnt, they do not resume their old relationship unchanged ... Parties who have 
attained Versohnung do not have to decide to get along together, their getting along together 
is, instead, the natural result of their being in a new, transformed state. Although the word 
"reconciliation" does not deny that a trans formative process of this sort takes place, it does 
not convey Versohnung's positive suggestion that it does take place. ll3 
The problem with the operation of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission is that 
reconciliation III this case often has within it the English notion of resignation and 
submission. 
If by bringing perpetrators of cnme to justice, that process negates the perpetrators 
attempted negation of the rights of the individual, then we begin to have the restoration of 
the social world as a home for the victim. Not in a way that the victim has to be resigned to 
the fact that these injustices occurred, but by the acknowledgement in the public sphere that 
what happened was an attempt to negate their rights (but that these rights were in fact 
impossible to negate). It is possible to extrapolate this process to political responsibility and 
still recognise its distinctiveness from criminal responsibility. My place in the social world 
as a member of the political community, representative democracy, gives me rights. These 
rights are that the elected political representative will give me an account. It has already 
been established that in order to fulfil the requirements of political responsibility it is 
necessary that the representative should give an account of his actions should he be asked to 
113 Hardimon, Hegel's Social Philosophy, p. 85. 
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do so. More precisely he should be prepared to give that account in public under the full 
glare of the public gaze. More fundamentally, when he acts in the political realm he should 
always be mindful that should he ever be required to do so, he should always be able to 
account for his actions. Thus he ought to have reasons for what he does, and be prepared to 
justify his actions to those he acts for, even if this accounting or justification never actually 
takes place. 114 I become alienated from the social world and feel that I have been treated 
unjustly if my rights are negated, that is, when the elected representative refuses to give me 
such an account. Rather than bringing perpetrators of crimes to justice as are the demands of 
criminal responsibility to negate the negation, the demands of political responsibility only 
require the political actor to give an account of his actions. Only when this account is given 
by the perpetrator is there a negation of the negation, which reconciles me to the social 
world as a member of the political community. 
This limitation on the extent of the political actor's responsibility is extremely important 
because there is a temptation demonstrated by many commentators to slip seamlessly from 
political responsibility to criminal responsibility or vice versa. These are just two of many 
examples. Andrew Schaap, whilst discussing the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in 
South Africa and the amnesty provision for perpetrators of crimes carried out in the 
apartheid era, states that 'of course, amnesty is even more likely to obscure political 
responsibility for past wrongs.' 115 Another example is that of Violaine Roussel who, whilst 
discussing Variant Creutzfeldt-lakob disease, moves from political responsibility to 
criminal responsibility in the same sentence. She claims that, 'the discourses about new 
risks and political responsibility underlined how accidents should be addressed through the 
114 Pitkin, The Concept of Representation, p. 119. 
115 Schaap, Andrew, 'Forgiveness, Reconciliation and Transitional Justice, in Lang, Anthony F. & Williams, 
John (eds.), Hannah Arendt and International Relations, (Basingstoke, Pal grave, 2005), p. 80. 
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criminal responsibility of local political actors.' 116 What both commentators go on to 
discuss is punishment. In Schaap's case he states that 'punishment, at least symbolises a 
collective condemnation of past wrongs', whilst Roussel emphasises the subsequent 
prosecution and punishment of ministers for criminal offences. What these commentators 
really want to advocate is punishment for those who have been involved in political action 
because they feel that they deserve to be punished, but if they are to be punished they have 
to have committed a "crime". This desire to see political actors punished makes 
commentators conflate criminal and political responsibility by suggesting that the 
politician's action should be seen as a crime. What they need to be able to establish, 
however, is a causal link, and as we have already seen agency and cause are not compatible 
with political responsibility. They are not compatible because political responsibility exists 
even when causal or criminal responsibility does not. Political responsibility may involve 
some "punishment" i.e. loss of office, but this does not make it a matter of criminal 
responsibility simply by virtue of that "punishment". Further, the distinctive nature of 
political responsibility can mean that it is not exhausted by, for example, resignation 
because, within that distinctive nature, giving an account can be a more onerous burden than 
a straightforward resignation. Resignation might well amount to, or be considered to be, 
retirement from the public world. John Profumo is again an example. His political 
responsibility in the sense of his resignation and subsequent withdrawal from the public 
world could only have ended after a full and satisfactory account had been given, which 
Profumo never gave. 
116 Roussel, Violaine, 'Changing Definitions of Risk and Responsibility in French Political Scandals', Journal 
of Law and Society, Vol.29 No.3, 2002, p. 462. 
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As we have already established, the conflation between criminal, moral and political 
responsibility demands careful attention, but it is possible to make these distinctions and 
illustrate a viable, if limited, concept of political responsibility. Different concepts can be 
discerned in a consideration of justice. For instance, amongst these complex problems are 
the feelings of injustice generated from historical wrongs within a nation where the 
perpetrators can no longer be indicted or even identified because any conceivable 
perpetrator is long deceased. The fact that the sense of injustice persists compels us to 
consider how can such wrongs be righted when the generation aggrieved is so remote from 
actual events? Those who now accept responsibility, for example Blair and the slave trade, 
cannot conceivably be criminals. It is also possible to see, in the case of South Africa, that 
some individuals (such as the Cradock Four, see footnote 49) are prepared to forego 
retribution but still insist on being given an account, or something analogous to an account. 
This is despite the fact that those for whom they are prepared to forego retribution are, 
nevertheless, criminally responsible. Political responsibility, properly understood, would 
take the form of an account by representatives of the community from which the 
perpetrators were drawn. The account would have to include an explanation of how such 
criminal acts came to be part of the society or government that tolerated or encouraged 
them. We have already alluded to the failure to give such an account and the denial of 
political responsibility in the testimony of de Klerk, for example, who always denied 
political responsibility for the gross human rights violations that had occurred. Similarly, 
other organisations also 'made great efforts to distance themselves from the injustices of 
apartheid.,117 In this instance all that matters is that those representatives could in some 
sense be plausible representatives of that community - even if it is in the tenuous sense in 
117 Nagy, Rosemary, 'The Ambiguities of Reconciliation and Responsibility in South Africa', pp. 715-716. 
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which, for example, Britain represents the state which tolerated and/or encouraged the slave 
trade. 
Representational democracy has within it normative values which include political 
responsibility and giving an account in public should one be required to do so. The failure 
on the part of our political representatives to deliver these requirements produces a sense of 
injustice, because one experiences feelings of affront by being denied ones rights. This is 
not only an affront to the individuals directly concerned, but this negation of our rights also 
damages the political process as a whole. Yet giving an account is not the end of the matter 
for if we accept this premise it immediately requires us to answer another substantive 
question, what is the substance of this account that he has to give? This question is a 
crucially important and the nature and integrity of this account will be discussed in the next 
chapter: truth and political responsibility. 
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Chapter Five 
Truth and Political Responsibility 
"Fiat veritas, et pereat mundus" (Let truth prevail though the world may perish) 1 
It was quickly identified in the review of literature that the consideration of contingency, 
justice and truth was essential when investigating political responsibility. Whilst each 
requires a separate discussion, what also became apparent was that they are nevertheless all 
inextricably linked. The problems concerning truth are similar to those concerning justice in 
that they are vulnerable to the contingency of the world. During the examination of 
contingency, justice/injustice and political responsibility the primacy of giving an account 
was established. The victims of injustice suffer from exclusion and alienation from their 
social world; for this to be overcome it is necessary to give an account, and for this account 
to be given in public. It is this acknowledgement in public that a wrong has been committed 
and an account given that reconciles the aggrieved to their social world and therefore 
overcomes both the sense of alienation and exclusion. When this is applied to the political 
realm, it is by giving such a public account that the politician actively demonstrates that he 
accepts political responsibility for his actions. It is necessary to investigate the nature of this 
account because it is obviously not the sort of account that the British government is 
prepared to give: that 'accountability is discharged by giving information to Parliament, even 
if this information is misleading, and the Minister knows that it is misleading.,2 Although 
this is an account of sorts, it is not an acceptance of political responsibility, therefore, this 
I Arendt, Hannah, Between Past and Future, (New York, Penguin, 1961) p. 228. 
2 Mather, Graham, 'Clarifying Responsibility and Accountability', in Government Accountability: Beyond the 
Scott Report, (London, CIPF A, 1996), p. 21. The view expounded by the British government and which still 
persists is that no liability attaches itself to a minister unless the information is not given in good faith. 
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sort of account will do nothing to overcome the sense of exclusion and alienation caused 
when an injustice has occurred. This is not only unacceptable on moral grounds but it is also 
unacceptable on practical grounds because in terms of political responsibility and truth, truth 
takes the form of a narrative on the basis of which further actions are taken. 
It is evident that on moral grounds the sort of account advocated by the British Government 
is lacking in truthfulness and integrity and on practical grounds unless the account that is 
given is truthful then the narratives that are created are fundamentally false. False narratives 
mean that the future is based on a collective lie, delusion and the politics of selective 
memory. This ultimately creates fragility within the polity that will render it unable to 
withstand any challenges. It can also encourage a climate of mendacity that ensures that 
other historical events are also part of a continuing false narrative that must be employed in 
order to confirm the original deceit and thereby resist challenge. False narratives are a 
corrupting force within the polity, but above all they corrupt the notion of political 
responsibility. False narratives ensure that the initial alienation and sense of injustice are re-
enforced and compounded in the memories of the victims/aggrieved and their successors 
rather than fading with the passage of time. Without the truth, narratives are fundamentally 
false and they do not allow victims to move on. The discourse needed between those who 
perpetrated actions leading to a sense of injustice and alienation, and their victims, requires a 
basis of mutually agreed negotiated truths to form a narrative of integrity. Again, like 
contingency and injustice, truth links the past and the present because the truth deals with the 
past. Giving a truthful account of what has happened in the past means that if the past can be 
remembered in a way that means that new beginnings are possible, the past can be laid to rest 
and the cycle of alienation and exclusion can be halted. Thus, 'a discursive model of truth-
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telling presupposes a political conversation (a dialectic of telling and listening) grounded in 
two central pre-requisites: reciprocity and openness.,3 Without such a discourse new 
beginnings are not possible. As Arendt perceptively notes the truth fills the gap between the 
past and the future. 
The problem with discussions of truth is that like discussions of responsibility they also get 
involved with different types of truth and whether truth is indeed possible. They do this 
rather than concentrate on the damage done by the absence of truth which is not only morally 
corrupting but is especially damaging when it relates to the political process and political 
responsibility. The first task therefore is to establish that the truth does matter and has the 
force claimed for it by commentators such as Arendt. The next task is to examine the 
rejection of other strategies in favour of truth-telling as a remedy when faced with a broken 
political order. Arising from this, discussions centre around the importance of truth-telling 
and claims concerning the qualities of truth and the enduring damage caused by its absence. 
We have then to answer a further and much more complex question about what exactly is 
meant by truth and are there different orders of truth? If there are different orders of truth 
then which order of truth has primacy; and finally how does the nature of the discourse of 
truth serve the purposes of the political and therefore political responsibility? What is central 
is the rejection of strategic action in favour of something like Habermas' understanding of 
truth as a form of communicative action. In terms of political responsibility truth appears in 
the form of a narrative, a truthful account. 
3 Muldoon, Paul, 'Reconciliation and Political Legitimacy: The Old Australia and the New South Africa', 
Australian Journal of Politics and History, Vo1.49, No.2, 2003, p. 194. 
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In discussing truth and political responsibility it is not possible or desirable in this instance to 
undertake an epistemological examination of truth since such discussions abound in 
philosophical literature. As Rorty observes, it is simply the case that all modem philosophy 
has been centred round discussions of truth.4 To such detailed and extensive discussions 
there is nothing that this discussion could add. Rather this discussion is undertaken for the 
same reason that the entire project of examining political responsibility has been, as an 
attempt to understand how truth figures in the nature of the political, and how the lack of 
truth damages the political process. The function of truth in this context is not, therefore, 
about achieving the kind of certainty that obsessed someone like Descartes. The kind of 
epistemological arguments that arise from that scepticism are not central to the nature of 
truth in the context of political responsibility. Nor do we need to address the claims made by 
relativists that truth is always subject to factors that are culturally and historically contingent, 
that we 'had better give up on the idea of true sentences as representations of reality, and 
give up trying to charge the idea of "truth" with what [ we] call "normative" meaning. ,5 
Thus, it is not intended in this instance to subject "truth" to a philosophical debate on its 
nature or indeed its possibility, but rather it is to demonstrate the importance of the search for 
truth when cleavages have been created within the polity. It is, after all, when there is 
division leading to conflict that the question is asked; what is the truth in this situation and 
who is politically responsible? 
The nature and possibility of truth are, of course, contested issues. Rorty, for example, claims 
that whilst he does not say that 'the idea of truth is "invalid" or "untenable," not that it 
"deconstructs itself", but simply that ... there are more useful ideas such as freedom.' In a 
4 Rorty, Richard, 'Truth and Freedom: A Reply to Thomas McCarthy', Critical Inquiry, Vo1.l6, No.3, 1990, 
p.633. 
5 Ibid., p. 634. 
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discussion with Jonathan Freedland, Bernard Williams argues that claims such as these have 
resulted in deconstructionists and postmodernists having stripped away all the previously 
received wisdoms concerning truth. In fact, they assert that what the truth amounts to 
'actually is all versions of different people's biases and propaganda.,6 Despite these doubts 
raised by post-modernists and deconstructionists concerning the possibility of discovering 
the truth there are those of us who want to affirm that the truth can be discovered and that the 
truth does indeed matter. Williams argues that 'the concept of truth just in itself as opposed 
to philosophical theories of truth, just the plain notion of the truth, is probably the most basic 
notion in the meaning realm that we have got. We cannot explain it in terms of anything 
more complicated.,7 What the truth is, if we utilise Arendt's definition, is 'conceptually, we 
may call truth what we cannot change; metaphorically, it is the ground on which we stand 
and the sky that stretches above us.' 8 She bases this claim on the existential notion that it is 
through truth that one is revealed and although this exposes one to risk, nevertheless, 
survival, 'the perseverance into existence', is impossible without the truth. 'Without men 
willing to do what Herodotus was the first to undertake consciously - namely, to say what 
is,,9 truth is impossible. Saying "what is" in this context, 'stabilises the futile and perishable 
and fabricates [constructs] a memory'. IO In other words it creates a past that can be 
remembered in a way that means that new beginnings are possible. Discovering the truth can 
be a challenging and threatening experience for all those concerned and one that many would 
like to reject. Despite the problems associated with discovering the truth, rejection of this 
process although possible is ultimately counter-productive, our difficulty is that no matter 
6 Williams, Bernard, in 'Jonathan Freedland interviews Bernard Williams about truth', The Talk Show, (BBC4, 
18 November 2002), transcript p. 1. 
7 Ibid., p. 4. 
8 Arendt, Between Past and Future, 'Truth and Politics', p.264. 
9 Ibid., p.229. My italics. 
10 Arendt, Between Past and Future, 'The Concepts of History', p. 64. 
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how much we try to repress it, the truth repeatedly comes back to haunt us. In the words of 
Desmond Tutu 'unless we look the beast in the eye we will find that it returns to hold us 
hostage. ' II 
The first task is, therefore, to establish that truth does indeed have the force so graphically 
described by Arendt, and also to establish why it is so important to the political process and 
political responsibility. The centrality of these ideas can be demonstrated with reference to 
the discussion of, and about, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in South 
Africa. The clearest indication of how seriously the new multi-racial South African regime 
took the issue of discovering the truth was demonstrated by their decision to establish the 
TRC at the end of the apartheid era, rather than resort to more traditional strategies. In fact 
"'reconciliation through truth" was the lodestar of the South African vision' .12 There is some 
evidence for the success of this strategy's ability to produce reconciliation. One example 
provided by Gibson claims that his research demonstrates that 'truth in many instances does 
contribute to reconciliation in South Africa, [but that] the process is not always simple or 
direct.' 13 Despite this emphasis by the TRC on truth and reconciliation, nevertheless the 
discovery of the truth was not only to be about reconciliation or understood to be an end in 
its own right. Rather the discovery of the truth had assigned to it the very exacting and 
onerous task to be able to 'mediate between the demise of the old moral order and the birth 
of the new'. 14 It was seen, therefore, not only as a tool to reconcile old enemies and past 
11 Tutu, Desmond, No Future Without Forgiveness, (London, Rider, 1999), p. 31. 
12 Du Bois, Fran<;ois, "Nothing but the Truth": the South African Alternative to Corrective Justice in Transition 
to Democracy,' in Lethe's Law, Justice Law and Ethics in Reconciliation, Christodoulidis, Emilios and Veitch, 
Scott (eds.), (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2001), p. 92. 
13 Gibson, James L. 'Does Truth Lead to Reconciliation?: Testing the Causal Assumptions of South African 
Truth and Reconciliation Process', American Journal of Political Science, VoI.48, No.2, April 2004, p. 202. 
Gibson speculates, however, that this ability to embrace reconciliation might be rooted in the religious beliefs 
of black South Africans, and is therefore partial. 
14 Du Bois, "Nothing but the Truth": the South African Alternative to Corrective Justice in Transition to 
Democracy,' in Lethe's Law, p. 92. 
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division but also as having the ability to create the conditions necessary for the foundations 
for the reconstruction of South Africa. IS Thus, the South Africans understood that there were 
many from amongst the black, white and coloured populations as a whole, but some 
members in particular, who felt alienated and excluded from their social world. The remedy 
instigated by the TRC was to promote reconciliation between victims and perpetrators by 
truth telling about the past. Implicit within this process was the hope that the victims (and 
also the perpetrators) would also be reconciled with their social world and that this would 
facilitate a new social order. 
Despite this optimism about the power of such truth-telling, other commentators are 
sceptical. They claim that revealing the truth no matter how well intentioned can, in fact, be a 
double-edged sword. Crocker for example, claims that the need to reveal the truth has to be 
weighed against other priorities, since the truth can harm people as well as benefit them. 
Indeed too much truth can itself cause harm by fuelling ethnic divisions and hostilities which 
in turn can impede and inhibit democratisation and reconciliation. He claims that there is a 
need to balance the desire for the truth by victims against other goals, and that sometimes 
revealing the truth to victims can incite violence. 16 Such pragmatic considerations are, 
however, questioned by others, such as Habermas who noted in the context of the post-war 
German debate, that 'where the overriding concern is national cohesion, "the crass demand 
for reconciliation" necessitates "the promotion of forgetfulness". Instead of reconciliation 
providing the means by which a perpetrating community can corne to terms with its past, it 
15 The Commission was convened after much deliberation. In fact, Du Bois claims that the terms of the 
Commission were born out of compromise because 'neither the representatives of the past nor those of the 
future' were prepared to accept the others preferred options. "Nothing but the Truth": the South African 
Alternative to Corrective Justice in Transition to Democracy,' in Lethe's Law, pp. 92-93. 
16 Crocker, David, A. 'Reckoning with Past Wrongs: A Normative Framework, Ethics and International 
Affairs, Vol.13, 1999, pp. 50-51. 
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encourages a politics of selective memory' .17 For instance, if these narratives are not based 
on the truth, but are instead based on a selective memory instigated by the need to create 
national cohesion, then 'although ostensibly objective, these historical narratives have served 
to constitute, rather than simply describe, the national identity.' Although they have 
apparently been successful in that they appear to create 'the sense of a unified nation 
grounded in a shared past. The critical feature of all of these histories is, the fact that there is 
frequently little to hold them together except the territory that they narrativise.' 18 
The South Africans chose a Truth and Reconciliation Commission because they understood 
the inevitability of the creation of false narratives should they have chosen one of the three 
alternative pathways that had historically been adopted by political communities when faced 
with a broken political and moral order. Thus, because they had an understanding of the 
primacy of truth-telling the South Africans rejected the historical pathways to corrective 
justice in favour of restorative justice. Both sides in the debate rejected as fundamentally 
flawed the type of undertaking characterised by the Nuremberg trials where alleged 
perpetrators of crimes were brought before courts. They rejected this strategy not only 
because of the inevitability of the charge that it is "victor's justice", but also because they 
recognised that by bringing to justice a limited and representative number of perpetrators the 
rest are seen to have escaped. 19 From the rest of the population there is a metaphorical sigh 
of relief, that those identified and prosecuted "are the guilty ones", they are the ones 
responsible. Thus the majority do not have to answer for their role in past events, the truth 
has not been heard. This outcome allows most of the population to remain aloof and 
17 Muldoon, Paul, Reconciliation and Political Legitimacy: The Old Australia and the New South Africa', 
p.187. 
18 Ibid., p. 185. 
19 There were also pragmatic reasons that centred on the cost and the damaging effects of huge show type trials. 
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insulated not only from any criminal proceedings, but also and even more importantly in 
terms of political responsibility from self-examination of their action or inaction and thus the 
complete avoidance of having to accept any responsibility. This process is referred to 
scathingly by Arendt in 'Truth and Politics'. Here she castigates Adenauer for this claim 
from his war memoirs 'that the barbarism of National Socialism had affected only a 
relatively small percentage of the country. ,20 
The second alternative is to indict everyone who participated; however, this is also a very 
unsatisfactory strategy. It leads inevitably to claims such as those made by Adolf Eichmann 
and reported by Arendt in Eichmann in Jerusalem. Eichmann claimed that if indeed he had 
committed crimes then so had many others because he had simply participated in and carried 
out the orders legislated by the regime. Arendt points out that if this line is adopted then 
potentially almost all Germans are guilty. She dismisses Eichmann's claims because the 
outcome of 'what you [Eichmann] meant to say was that where all or almost all, are guilty, 
nobody is. ,21 If this is the case then it is pointless to try to pursue anyone who committed 
crimes because if all are guilty, no one can be judged or punished,22 which 'means that the 
particular is again lost in the disorder of the general.,23 There is no one to whom either 
criminal or political responsibility can be attributed. A general amnesty is then required for 
the whole popUlation and with this the adoption of a sort of mental amnesia or self-deception. 
The problem with this strategy is that in Hegelian terms not punishing perpetrators doubly 
injures the victims. In the case of criminal responsibility not only have wrongs been 
20 Arendt, Between Past and Future, 'Truth and Politics', p. 252. 
21 Arendt, Hannah, Eichmann in Jerusalem: a Report on the Banality of Evil, (London, Faber & Faber, 1963), 
p.255. 
22 Alweiss, Lilian, 'Collective Guilt and Responsibility', European Journal of Political Theory, Vo1.2, No.3, 
2003, p. 307. 
23 Diner, Dan, 'Hannah Arendt reconsidered: on the banal and the evil in her holocaust narrative', New German 
Critique, No.70, 1997, p.190. 
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committed against victims that caused them injury, but also the failure to indict the 
perpetrators injures them yet again because the state condones the actions of the perpetrators 
by refusing to censor or indict them. This is equally true of political responsibility. By 
equating all Germans with the political decisions made by the Nazis this promotes the idea of 
"collective responsibility", and fails to identify those whose political decisions instigated and 
facilitated a climate in which such criminal acts could be perpetrated. The failure to thus 
identify those who were politically responsible also further injures the victims and indicts the 
whole population including those who did attempt to take political action against the Nazi 
regime. Thus there is no chance that the victims can be reconciled to their social world and 
the truth is totally absent. This facilitates the creation of false narratives which have to be 
continually reinforced and maintained in the future. In fact in Germany when in November 
1988, Phillip Jenniger challenged the narrative that portrayed German citizens as victims 
rather than perpetrators, he had to resign from his office as the President of the Bundestag. In 
a speech on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the Jewish pogrom, 
Reichskristallnacht, he 'tried to break through the status of victimhood, which many 
Germans had long adopted for reasons of self-protection'. Jenniger regretted that the 
'Germans had not hitherto had the courage to come to face up to their past. That we can only 
apologise for our history, but not come to terms with it,' and accept responsibility. 24 
The third alternative rejected by the South Africans is any notion that the past can be buried. 
The 'advocates of due process, [who are] sceptical that victor's justice can be avoided, 
contend that the only ethically justified way to reckon with past political wrongs is to bury 
the past and move on to a better future. ,25 The TRC was convened because it rejected the 
24 Jenniger, Phillip, 'Not Embittered but Reflective', Das Par/ament, 14 June 2002. 
25 Crocker, 'Reckoning with Past Wrongs: A Normative Framework,' p. 56. 
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recourse to victor's justice but also recognised the futility of attempting to bury the past. 
Instead, as Desmond Tutu illustrates graphically, to bury the past also means that the victims 
are forced into the position of having to 'let bygones be bygones'. Tutu claims that this sort 
of mental amnesia is far from being constructive. In fact 'the past, far from disappearing or 
lying down and being quiet, is embarrassingly persistent, and will return and haunt us unless 
it has been dealt with adequately.' 26 
This is true not only in South Africa but also across Europe where failure to reveal the truth 
causes persistent and re-occurring problems. In France the continuing debate about 
collaboration and resistance regularly reappears. 'There is a never-ending conflict between 
the desire to forget and the desire to remember, between the need for repression and the 
unpredictable return of the repressed, between the inexorability of ignorance, and the 
aspiration to truth.,27 The massacre at Oradour-sur-Glane highlights the problem for the 
survivors and families. The decision not to confront the status of the perpetrators of the 
massacre, many of whom were French malgre-nous (those who claimed they had been forced 
to serve in German units), was what one deputy considered to be an act of "omission". It 
looks, however, 'remarkably like political repression ... although eventually the repressed 
material tragically resurfaced in the course of the judicial process.' 28 When those convicted 
of the massacre were pardoned in 1953 the 'constant calls to forgive, to reconcile, even to 
forget the past clashed with an urgent need to deal with the spontaneous return of repressed 
material. .. old wounds were reopened and the dead were hauled into court. Official symbols 
could not make shattered memories whole. ,29 
26 Tutu, No Future Without Forgiveness, p. 31. 
27 Rousso, Henry, The Vichy Syndrome, (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1991), p. 304. 
28 Ibid., p. 56. 
29 Ibid., p. 58 
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The importance of truth-telling is again illustrated by discussions of the aftermath of the war 
in Germany. Habermas asks the question; 'In which way is the Nazi period to be processed 
in public consciousness?,3o The fact that he was asking this question in 1987 and that the 
questions which arise concerning the period 1933-1945 are still 'entwined with sensibilities 
and reactions', illustrates how important truth-telling is. Habermas states that 'the authors of 
the series The Germans in the Second World War .. . detected a need in their older viewers 
which is certainly unmistakable: the desire to release the subjective experience of wartime 
from the frame of reference which in retrospect had to provide everything with meaning.' 31 
Tony Judt summarising the politics of retribution in post-war Europe paints a depressing 
scenario for future development. He claims that ' ... the ways in which the memory of that 
experience was distorted, sublimated, and appropriated, bequeathed to the post-war era an 
identity that was fundamentally false, dependent upon the erection of an unnatural and 
unsustainable frontier between past and present in European public memory. ,32 From these 
commentators alone it can be seen that a truthful narrative concerning the past is considered 
to be essential in order to repair the rupture of the past to give a foundation of reality to the 
rebuilding of the future. The failure to deal with the past is all too potent a catalyst to 
troubles in the future. Attwood cites the example of the way in which the British settlers 
mistreated Aboriginal peoples. This has 'for much of the last 200 years or more been elided 
in the Australian national consciousness, but since the mid-1960s this past has increasingly 
become a troubling presence, casting a shadow, some believe, over Australia's future. ,33 In 
Jersey the failure to deal with issues of collaboration under Nazi occupation can perhaps 
30 Habermas, JUrgen, 'Concerning the Public use of History', New German Critique, Vo1.l5, No.44, 1988, 
p.40. 
31 Ibid., p. 43. 
32 Judt, Tony, 'The Past is Another Country: Myth and Memory in Postwar Europe', in The Politics of 
Retribution in Europe, Deak, Istvan, Gross, Jan T., Judt, Tony (eds.), (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 
2000), p. 293. 
33 Muldoon, 'Reconciliation and Political Legitimacy: The Old Australia and the New South Africa', 
p.188. 
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explain the paradigm of official secrecy and non-transparancy that allowed issues of child 
abuse to be concealed and remain unexamined for 40 years.34 Although the truth is always 
about the past, nevertheless it is the link between past and future: without a truthful account 
and the ascription and acceptance of political responsibility no new beginnings are possible. 
The future is forever tainted by the past. 
It is not possible or intended to conduct a detailed examination of the workings of the Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission or its comprehensive reports. It is the case, however, that 
although the TRC was convened to overcome the severe problems that were the legacy of a 
broken moral and political order, its remit and philosophy illustrates problems that can be 
generalised to other times and places. In order to overcome the dilemma caused by the choice 
between victor's justice and impunity, the TRC had shifted the focus to restorative justice. 
Thus, it was believed that the emphasis had to change 'from a concern with corrective justice 
to reconciliation, from a paradigm in which justice determined what was to count as the 
relevant truth, to one in which justice was to be the product of truth' .35 An examination of 
some of the workings of the TRC confirms that the truth has the power claimed for it by 
Arendt, but also demonstrates that there are three important qualities attributable to truth that 
makes it essential for it to be revealed. The first is that it can assist in the healing process and 
secondly that there is a moral imperative to reveal the truth. Thirdly, and for our purposes the 
most important reason, is that without the establishment of the truth and the identification of 
those who are politically responsible the polity is permanently and enduringly damaged. 
Unless those who have been wronged and who are alienated and excluded from their social 
34 'No collaboration choice says book', BBC News 06/05/2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-
ll/hi/world/europe/jersey/452l451.stm 
35 Du Bois, "Nothing but the Truth": The South African Alternative to Corrective Justice in Transitions to 
Democracy', in Lethe's Law, p. 93. 
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world, are gIven a truthful account by political actors, they remam excluded and 
unreconciled.36 
The first issue is the claim that truth has the power to heal. There are examples that 
demonstrate that the revelation of truth can assist this healing process. The regimes that 
perpetrated violence, murder and oppression relied on secrecy and intimidation to make the 
creation of false narratives possible, therefore the public nature of these revelations of truth is 
essential. When victims are permitted to tell their stories in public and are told the truth by 
the perpetrators they are being treated with 'dignity rather than as-before treated with 
contempt. This respect enables those once humiliated as victims to become empowered as 
citizens. Those once reduced to screams of paralyzing fear now may share a personal· 
narrative. ,37 Van Roermund offers this powerful example from the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission's Interim Report of June 1996, from a statement by the daughter of one of the 
victims of apartheid known as the "Cradock Four". 38 
"We want to forgive, but whom should we forgive?" The revelation of the "who" implies 
the disclosure of names, agents and acts. In the eyes of the survivors of oppression, 
obliterating the past is tantamount to killing the victims twice. For them revealing the 
truth is a form of burying the victims with dignity, and thus burying the past. Burying the 
past, rather than forgetting or obliterating it. Burying is for sure a way of covering. But it 
36 There may of course be some, as Gibson claims, who will be personally reconciled with the perpetrators. 
37 Crocker, 'Reckoning with Past Wrongs: A Normative Framework,' p. 52. 
38 The group known as the "Cradock Four" were a group of UDF activists who were abducted and murdered by 
the security forces. Their bodies were then mutilated and burnt and dumped unceremoniously at Bluewater Bay 
outside of Port Elizabeth. In 1993 the re-opened inquest found that the security forces were responsible for their 
deaths, although no individual was named as responsible. The members of the security forces who had 
committed this atrocity subsequently applied for amnesty for their crimes. Roermund, Bert van, 'Rubbing Off 
and Rubbing On: The Grammar of Reconciliation', in Lethe's Law, p. 178. 
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is a way of covering that uncovers the meaning of what has happened and that one wants 
to remember or wants to forget. 39 
We must be clear, however, that this is taking place between victim and perpetrator. So 
despite Crocker's claims about the 'empowerment as a citizen' this truth-telling does not 
involve the state or political actors or political responsibility. 
Secondly, the truth about the past is important in itself. This is illustrated by the quotation 
which introduces this chapter in which Arendt, deliberately misquoting Ferdinand the First, 
claims that 'the sacrifice of truth for the survival of the world would be more futile than the 
sacrifice of any other principle or virtue. ,40 One way to make this point is to say that 
'victims and their descendants have a moral right to know the truth .... without reasonably 
complete truth, none of the other goals [including reconciliation] ... are likely to be 
realised ... Former enemies are unlikely to be reconciled if what counts as lies for one side are 
verities for the other. ,41 It is axiomatic that the search for the truth recognises that moral and 
ethical dimensions must already underpin the work of a body such as the TRC. This is 
essential because 'policies and strategies that are designed and implemented solely under 
pressure of immediate circumstances and without proper attention to the relevant ethical 
questions are likely to be ad hoc, ineffective, inconsistent and unstable. Moral questions have 
a habit of not going away. ,42 
Crocker for example suggests that there is an implicit normative framework inherent within 
the attempts to connect the frameworks for transitional justice. Although the revelation of the 
39 Roermund, 'Rubbing Off and Rubbing On: The Grammar of Reconciliation', pp. 177-178. My emboldening. 
40 Arendt, Between Past and Future, 'Truth and Politics' p. 229. 
41 Crocker, 'Reckoning with Past Wrongs: A Normative Framework,' p. 50. 
42 Ibid., p. 63. 
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truth has its own moral imperative, it does not necessarily serve the goal of giving a public 
account which is necessary to establish a process leading to political responsibility and 
reconciliation. Of far greater importance is the exposition of the truth through 
communicative action as part of the process of re-establishing the integrity of the polity. 
Thirdly, without the establishment of the truth the polity is permanently and enduringly 
damaged because victims remain alienated and excluded from their social world. Narratives 
concerning the past enable us to move forward. Desmond Tutu remembers that 'there was in 
fact hardly any controversy about whether we should deal effectively with our past if we are 
going to be making the transition to a new dispensation. No the debate was not on whether 
but on how we might deal with the only too real past. ,43 
There was also little dissent concernmg the need to re-Iegitimise the state, and that 
'reinvesting legitimacy in the state has become inseparable from managing the legacies of 
the past. ,44 It is through discourses that seek to confront the past that it is possible for the 
state to be re-Iegitimised and to move forward. Without the truth, however, the narratives 
that are created are false which is very damaging not only to victims and/or their families but 
also to the polity itself. As soon as any testing events occur, then the past will come back to 
haunt US.45 Only the truth, a truthful account, fills the gap between the past and the future 
and allows for new beginnings. The processes involved in confronting the past have, 
however, often resulted in outcomes that fall short of the required expectations of re-
43 Muldoon Paul, 'Reconciliation and Political Legitimacy: The Old Australia and the New South Africa', 
p. 186, Ft.20, from Tutu, Desmond, No Future Without Forgiveness, (London, Rider, 1999), p. 24. 
44 Ibid. 
45 One only has to see the rapidity with which charges against a father for imprisonment and sexual abuse of his 
daughter in Austria was linked by commentators to the "unmastered" Nazi past. Martha Carney interview, 
World at One, SSC Radio 4,06/05/2008. 
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legitimisation. The problem, as perceived by Muldoon, echoing Habermas, has been that 
although narratives about the past are intended to move us forward, because, all too often, the 
state believed that it was sponsoring a discourse of reconciliation, the state 'has tended to 
encourage a politics of selective memory. ,46 This fails to re-Iegitimise the state on two 
counts. Firstly it fails because it does not sufficiently acknowledge and punish those who 
have perpetrated crimes, that is those who are criminally responsible. Secondly it fails to give 
an account of how such criminal acts came to be part of society and why the government 
instigated and/or tolerated them, and so fails to identify those who are politically responsible. 
Thus telling the truth is not, as Muldoon points out, about telling the truth 'for the sake of the 
past' but about reconciling the victims to their social world.47 This can only be 
accomplished, as we have already established, by an account being given in public by 
representatives of the community from which the perpetrators were drawn; this account must 
be truthful. 
If we accept that the truth plays a vital role in the health of a polity, our next question is, 
what is truth-telling? The answer to this question is by no means as straightforward as it 
might appear; truth-telling is a complex issue. As Muldoon correctly points out, even the 
most cursory examination of the literature reveals that there are a 'variety of different 
conceptions of truth-telling' which are simultaneously at work.48 For example, from the 
Australian and South African experience alone there has emerged claims concerning 
different modes of truth-telling. 'Firstly, an historical/juridical mode, where truth is 
constituted through certain academic or forensic standards; secondly, a confessional mode, 
where truth is constituted through a Christian "wrestle of conscience"; and finally a 
46 Muldoon, 'Reconciliation and Political Legitimacy: The Old Australia and the New South Africa, p.182. 
47 Ibid., p. 188. 
48 Ibid. 
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discursive mode, where truth is constituted through public discussion and debate. ,49 If we 
accept the working hypothesis that not only does truth matter but that it is essential for the 
health of a polity then the next question is, given that there are different orders of truth, 
which order of truth has primacy? The problem that we encounter with some types of truth-
telling, however, is exactly the same problem that we have encountered so often in 
discussions of political responsibility: that is the problem caused by the conflation of 'private 
and public moralities [which] thereby misconstrues the nature of the political community.'50 
The notion of what counts as truth is of course a contested one, as the many volumes of 
literature testify, and leads to the difficulties in establishing the primacy of anyone order of 
truth. Conflicts arise between those for example who champion, rational and 'factual or 
forensic truth and personal or narrative truth and social or "dialogue" truth and healing and 
restorative truth'. This difficulty and confusion is more than sufficient to allow the evasion of 
responsibility, political or otherwise, by those who wish to escape from the consequences of 
their actions. 51 These difficulties lead those who undertake the pursuit of truth to describe 
and champion different types. Alex Boraine, for example, a member of the TRC, is 
unequivocal when he claims that 'a society should investigate, establish, and publicly 
disseminate the truth about the crimes that have been committed, through "forensic truth" or 
"hard facts".'52 Similarly, when considering orders of truth, Judge Albie Sachs, a member of 
the South African Constitutional Court, identifies two types of truth he considers to be the 
most important. The first is factual or forensic truth: truth which can be verified and is 
documented. The second is 'social truth, the truth of experience that is established through 
49 Muldoon, 'Reconciliation and Political Legitimacy: The Old Australia and the New South Africa, p.188. 
50 Ibid., p. 193. 
51 Du Bois, "Nothing but the Truth": The South African Alternative to Corrective Justice in Transitions to 
Democracy', in Lethe's Law, p. 97. 
52 Crocker, 'Reckoning with Past Wrongs: A Normative Framework', p. 49. 
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interaction, discussion and debate.' Furthermore these' different orders of truth, ... [do] not 
necessarily mutually exclude one another. ,53 Arendt similarly claims that the nature of truth 
has taken on two divergent strands, but she identifies these as rational truth and factual truth. 
Arendt, also like Sachs, does not believe these different orders of truth to be mutually 
exclusive. It is these two distinctive strands of truth that are emphasised by Arendt, rational 
truth and factual truth, which will be the focus of this discussion. It can be demonstrated that 
the implication of Arendt's detailed discussion of the primacy of factual truth is that a further 
and more profound notion of truth emerges, a type of truth similar to Sachs 'social truth'. 
Arendt attributes this understanding of truth to Karl Jaspers when she claims that for him 
'truth and communication are conceived to be the same.' 54 This order of truth which Sachs 
calls 'social truth' and which could be called communicative or negotiated truth, is reliant on 
factual truth, and emerges only through speech when people communicate and act together. 
The importance of this insight will be discussed later in relationship to the qualities necessary 
for communicative or negotiated truth. 
In order to begin to understand the nature of truth and how political responsibility and truth 
are linked there is no better place to start than the thought experiment created by Arendt in 
'Truth and Politics' .55 To illuminate this problem Arendt invites us to accompany her on a 
thought experiment, which although challenging, nevertheless, manages to carve a secure 
niche for truth, albeit a very limited kind of truth. When this notion of truth is linked to the 
political, it allows both for the ascription of, and also demands the acceptance of political 
responsibility. Arendt, however, embarks on her thought experiment by examining the nature 
of truth, and how this accounts for the apparent conflict between truth and politics. This 
53 Tutu, No Future Without Forgiveness, p. 33. 
54 Arendt, Hannah, Men in Dark Times, (San Diego, Harcourt Brace, 1955), p. 87. 
55 Arendt, Between Past and Future, 'Truth and Politics', pp. 227-264. 
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starts from the seemingly rather unpromising assertion by Arendt that 'No one has ever 
doubted that truth and politics are on rather bad terms with each other, and no one, as far as I 
know, has ever counted truthfulness among the political virtues. Lies have always been 
regarded as necessary and justifiable tools not only of the politician's or the demagogue's but 
also of the statesman's trade.' Arendt follows this uncompromising assertion by asking 
uncomfortable questions about what this could 'mean for the nature and the dignity of the 
political realm, on the one side, and for the nature and the dignity of truth and truthfulness, 
on the other?' 56 
Arendt describes how the conflict between truth and politics has arisen from two different 
and seemingly incompatible definitions of "truth". She observes that "truth", since Leibniz, 
has been used in two different ways, 'truths of reasoning and truths of fact.' Truths of 
reasoning include such things as mathematical, scientific and philosophical truths. This 
'initial dichotomy of factual and logical truth,57 adopted by Arendt is of course problematic 
and has attracted much criticism. Nelson, for example, claims that both her conceptions of 
the truth, the rational and the factual, are 'incompatible with politics. ,58 This is because 
Nelson does not take into consideration what exactly Arendt means by the contents of 
'political life'. Politics for Arendt takes place between equal individuals. It is only when 
people come together to communicate in the public realm that truth is possible, politics takes 
place in the light by men revealing themselves. Arendt is also clear that it is neither possible 
nor desirable to lead a completely political life, and draws clear distinctions between the 
56 Arendt, Between Past and Future, 'Truth and Politics', p. 227. 
57 Nelson, John S., 'Politics and Truth: Arendt's Problematic', American Journal of Political Science, Vo1.22, 
No.2 May 1978, p. 281. Although Nelson recognises that Arendt is 'trying desperately to think against the 
tradition while using its own conceptual tools,' he fails to appreciate what Arendt's real motive is. She is 
challenging us to ask 'adequate, meaningful questions' in a modern world circumscribed by the deformation of 
factual truth and divorced from the political. A world so circumscribed that she despairs of our ability to even 
ask such questions' let alone of giving answers'. 
58 Ibid., p. 278. 
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private and the public. It is clear from this, therefore, that in Arendtian terms, truth and 
politics only clash if one thinks of the political realm as merely the 'battlefield of partial, 
conflicting interests,' and that in fact 'factual truth clashes with the political only on [the] 
lowest level of human affairs.' 59 We can safely ignore these criticisms because her critics 
fail to recognise that Arendt accepts this definition for convenience rather than for its 
'intrinsic legitimacy.' Like us, Arendt is attempting to understand 'what injury political 
power is capable of inflicting upon truth'. As we are investigating this for political rather 
than for philosophical reasons, we can 'afford to disregard the question of what truth is,.6o 
We can also disregard claims that to discover the truth we must be able to take a 'God's eye 
point of view' and that our claims 'reflect a nostalgia for the logocentrist's unveiling- reality 
model of inquiry. ,61 Like Arendt, we can 'be content to take the word in the sense in which 
men commonly understand it. ,62 
Although the Truth and Reconciliation Commission is clear about the centrality of truth to its 
deliberations, what is problematic in its situation is the deformation of truth that emerges as a 
problem in any examination of conflict situations. The deformation of truth is also a major 
concern when attempting to argue for the veracity of political responsibility and as such 
needs a more thorough examination because of its implication for the perceived conflict 
between truth and politics. Returning to Arendt and her thought experiment, it is clear that 
although she is concerned with orders of truth she is much more concerned with the 
deformation of truth and the deformation of factual truth in particular. In order to understand 
the processes involved in the deformation of truth, it is enlightening to follow Arendt's 
59 Arendt, Between Past and Future, 'Truth and Politics', p.263. 
60 Ibid., p. 231. 
61 Rorty, 'Truth and Freedom: A reply to Thomas McCarthy', p. 643. 
62 Arendt, Between Past and Future, 'Truth and Politics', p. 231. 
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thought trains when she traces the history of the deformation of factual truth back to Plato. It 
was Plato who sublimated factual truth to rational truth and she asserts that from Plato 
onwards, rational truth has claimed primacy. Plato was attempting to overcome the 
contingency of the world by discovering unchanging everlasting truths. He was 
fundamentally opposed to the validity of opinion (doxa), and contrasted it unfavourably with 
knowledge (episteme). His thought experiments, as exemplified par excellence in the 
'Allegory of the Cave', furnishes us with the defining example of the superior being who 
leaves the world of appearances for the 'sky of everlasting ideas'. 63 Here the truth-seeker is 
selflessly engaged in rational thought to reveal to those in the inferior worldly existence, 
rational, absolute truths. It is the truth-seeker's misfortune that on his return to the cave 
where he reveals himself to the ordinary beings who inhabit it, and tries to communicate to 
them his rational truths, these rational truths are debased by the inhabitants, into mere 
opinion. Thus, 'philosophical truth, when it enters the market place, changes its nature and 
becomes opinion. ,64 Our truth-seeker suffers because he returned to the inferior world of 
appearance where his "truths" are debased into opinion, that is, they have become nothing 
more than 'it seems to me' .65 Thus, rational truths suffer from being deformed into mere 
opinion. 
Through the allegory of the cave it is possible to see how easily rational truth can be 
deformed into opinion. Arendt alerts us to the fact that although this can indeed be the fate of 
rational truth it is much more likely to be the fate of factual truth. 'It is, of course, factual 
truth that we are most concerned with here, since facts and events - the invariable outcome 
63 Arendt, Between Past and Future, 'Truth and Politics', p. 237. 
64 Ibid., p. 238. 
65 Ibid. 
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of men living and acting together - constitute the very texture of the political realm.' 66 This 
deformation of factual truth has profound implications. The outcome that so perturbs Arendt 
is that whereas the opposite of rational truth is 'either error or ignorance as in science, or 
illusion and opinion as in philosophy,,67 factual truth differs from rational truth because the 
opposite of factual truth is 'neither error nor illusion nor opinion but the deliberate falsehood, 
or lie.,68 Thus, it is not the 'deformation' of rational truths that really disturbs Arendt, 
because 'the need of reason is not inspired by the quest for truth but by the quest for 
meaning, and truth and meaning are not the same'. Rather, what so disturbs her is the 
'deformation' of factual truth also into mere opinion. Factual truth is characterised by being 
witnessed, by being reported, being spoken about, it is reliant on people and communication, 
therefore in Arendt's terms factual truth is by nature, political. It only 'acquires political 
implications by being put in an interpretative context. ,69 
Arendt highlights this problem when she explains how it becomes possible for factual truths 
to be reduced to mere opinion. This she asserts is the result of the conflicting claims of 
differing world stories that are inherent within ideologies. This results in factual truth being 
debased by the needs of different factions and groups. The outcome of this is the inability of 
men to communicate freely and publicly with each other, and also following Kant, that it also 
'deprives [man] at the same time of his freedom to think.,70 She claims that this 
'deformation' is so insidious because it is the chief tool of oppression in totalitarian states. 
This deformation of truth is such an important theme because the manipulation of truth is 
used in order to exert control and maintain power. Arendt of course details this process 
66 Arendt, Between Past and Future, 'Truth and Politics', p.231. 
67 Arendt, Hannah, The Life a/the Mind: One Thinking, (San Diego, Harcourt Brace, 1971), p. 15. 
68 Arendt, Between Past and Future, 'Truth and Politics', p. 249. 
69 Ibid. My italics. 
70 Ibid., p. 234. 
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thoroughly in On Totalitarianism. It is not this problem, however, that is Arendt's concern 
here. It is the modem method of deforming factual truth that has for Arendt a much more 
sinister and devastating outcome. 
Arendt freely acknowledges that there have always been times when lies have been used by 
the state, for example in times of great danger. Nevertheless, in these instances, these lies 
were always recognised by their perpetrators for what they were, deliberate misinformation. 
These lies were not supposed to be believed by everyone but only by the enemy. She claims 
that perversely, factual truths were actually safeguarded by the very process that politicians 
and statesmen were manufacturing lies. 'They [the politicians and statesmen] were not likely 
to fall victim to their own falsehoods; they could deceive others without deceiving 
themselves.,7l Arendt identifies a modem trend that treats 'cold blooded lying' very harshly, 
'whereas the often highly developed art of self-deception is usually regarded with great 
tolerance and permissiveness.' 72 This claim is vividly illustrated by two very different 
responses by the House of Commons to deceit and lies. Firstly, the response made by the 
House to John Profumo who was discovered to have told a 'cold blooded lie' to the House in 
order to protect himself from accusations of impropriety. Once it was discovered that 
Profumo had lied to the House of Commons he was compelled to resign. Although he and his 
wife devoted the rest of their lives to charity work, he would never be forgiven. This 
contrasts with Blair and his Cabinet who waged war on Iraq largely on the pretext of 
information in the falsely fabricated "dodgy dossier". Although Blair subsequently resigned 
his seat in Parliament, it was not over this issue and after this incident he was still able to 
lead the Labour Party to its third successive victory. The deformation of factual truth is so 
71 Arendt, Between Past and Future, 'Truth and Politics', p. 253. 
72 Ibid., p. 254. 
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devastating because it involves the perpetrators of the falsehoods believing their own lies and 
deceits. This amounts to self-deception and is similar to 'affected ignorance' as described by 
Aquinas, 'choosing not to know what one can and should know,'73 and for Arendt is the most 
serious development, namely that, 'even whole nations, may take their bearings from a web 
of deceptions to which their leaders wished to subject their opponents.' 74 Arendt uses de 
Gaulle as a prime example of a leader who was able to re-build a nation and a power base on 
an 'evident non-fact that France belongs among the victors of the last war,.75 Similarly, 
there is the creation of the convenient fiction that the Austrians were the victims of Nazi 
occupiers, promoted by American advocates of the post-war Marshall plan. 
Following the Eichmann controversy,76 Arendt had become certain that the only safeguard 
for factual truth was from those who were dedicated to the 'disinterested pursuit of truth.' 77 
Those who are outside of the political arena notably the judiciary and institutes of higher 
learning are those identified by Arendt. Only in these areas have 'truth and truthfulness 
always constituted the highest criterion of speech and endeavour.' For the judiciary this 
could be perhaps characterised by judicial review. The role attributed to the historical 
sciences and the humanities is that they are supposed 'to find out, stand guard over, and 
interpret factual truth and human documents'. 78 Arendt characterised the truth-teller by her 
isolation, her dislocation from the political milieu. This very isolation and dislocation, can 
73 Moody -Adams, Michele M., 'Culture, Responsibility, and Affected Ignorance', Ethics, Vol.! 04, 1994, 
p.296. 
74 Arendt, Between Past and Future, 'Truth and Politics', p. 255. 
75 Ibid., p. 252. 
76 This controversy arose after the publication of Eichmann in Jerusalem following the Eichmann trial. It 
concerned many misinterpretations concerning Arendt's intentions and Arendt's challenge to the raison d'etre 
for the trial and for the what she considered to be the lies presented at the trial about Jewish involvement in the 
Holocaust and especially the conduct of Jewish leaders. 
77 Young-Bruehl, Elizabeth, Hannah Arendt, For Love of the World, (New Haven, Yale University Press, 
1982), p. 397. 
78 Arendt, Between Past and Future, 'Truth and Politics', p. 261. The current position in academia is now more 
troublesome, and Arendt would undoubtedly have been unhappy with the increasing emphasis on the role of 
universities to provide technical innovation and to undertake research that only has end-users in mind. 
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however, lead to the truth-teller being categorised by the state as the "enemy within". The 
truth-teller's importance becomes clear in times of great danger to the polity, when truth 
telling becomes a kind of action. The truths that Arendt has in mind are those that are 
uncontested 'beyond agreement, dispute opinion or consent.,79 She gives the example of the 
Germans invading Belgium in August 1914. She states that 'Considerably more than the 
whims of historians would be needed to eliminate from the record the fact that on the night 
of August 4, 1914, German troops crossed the frontier of Belgium; it would require no less 
than a power monopoly over the entire civilised world. ,80 Perhaps more recent examples of 
non-disputable facts could be that Israel invaded Jordan and Syria in June 1967, or that it was 
dissident republicans the Real IRA who planted the bomb at Omagh. 
The problem with the deformation and manipulation of truth is that this manipulated truth 
has to be continually changed and upgraded to match changing circumstances. This 
deformation of facts is all the more dangerous because 'the truths of "Reasoning are 
necessary and their opposite is impossible" while "those of Fact are contingent and their 
opposite is possible".81 Unlike Plato, Arendt claims that facts and opinions are not inimical 
to each other and that factual truths unlike rational truths always relate to other people. 
'Factual truth concerns events and circumstances in which many are involved; it is 
established by witnesses and depends upon testimony; it exists only to the extent that it is 
spoken about, even if it occurs in the domain of privacy.' Facts inform opinions, and 
opinions, inspired by different interests and passions, can differ widely and still be legitimate 
as long as they respect factual truth: 'freedom of opinion is a farce unless factual information 
is guaranteed and the facts themselves are not in dispute. In other words, factual truth 
79 Arendt, Between Past and Future, 'Truth and Politics', p. 240. 
80 Ibid., p. 239. 
81 Arendt, The Life a/the Mind: One Thinking, p. 59. 
222 
informs political thought just as rational truth informs philosophical speculation. ,82 The 
problem with the continual public utterances of lies concerning the factual world is that this 
induces a certain kind of cynicism in the population. 'The result of a consistent and total 
substitution of lies for factual truth is not that the lies will now be accepted as truth, and the 
truth be defamed as lies, but that the sense by which we take our bearings in the real world 
.. .is being destroyed. ,83 
How this deformation of truth relates directly to the political realm is illustrated by the 
observations of Sir Richard Scott, at the end of his enquiry into the' Arms for Iraq' affair. Sir 
Richard is concerned about the effect that this deformation of truth has on the political 
system. He notes that the House of Commons were not given the true facts or information by 
Ministers concerning the fundamental change in policy that they, the Ministers, had adopted 
concerning the supply of arms to Iraq. Although he admitted that Ministers did not engage 
often in out and out falsehoods, still they were less than frank about the true nature of 
Britain's dealings with Iraq. Sir Richard thinks, like Arendt, that this has profound 
implications. 
The denial of this information [factual truths] to the public denies the public the ability to 
make informed judgement on the government's record. A failure by ministers to meet the 
obligations of ministerial accountability by providing information about the activities of 
their department engenders cynicism about government and undermines, in my opinion 
the democratic process.84 
82 Arendt, Between Past and Future, 'Truth and Politics', p. 238. 
83 Ibid., p. 257. 
84 Scott, Sir Richard, 'Ministerial Accountability', Public Law, Autumn 1996, p. 425. 
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Scott also believed that the 'failure by ministers to discharge the obligations of accountability 
will damage the democratic character of our political institutions. ,85 Being lied to, or at least 
not being told the factual truth, subverts and therefore subsequently undermines the decision-
making process. This results in inauthentic decision-making which in tum damages the 
political process. Following on from Scott, it is evident that this sort of communication is 
precisely the type of communication described by Habermas as "distorted communication". 
His description of "distorted communication" is that it is often unintelligible, also often 
manifestly factually incorrect, it is also often morally inappropriate or it is simply untruthful 
in the sense of not being authentic. This can be contrasted with authentic communication that 
Habermas claims should contain the qualities of comprehensibility, truth, intention and 
legitimacy.86 This is the reason for our agitation about people who lie to the House of 
Commons, precisely because it undermines the basis of communicative action. The ability to 
elicit factual truth that could subsequently facilitate authentic decision-making arising from 
that truth is therefore essential, but how can this become a reality? 
The cymcism of the electorate is completely understandable when one considers this 
example highlighted by Scott. The mendacity inherent within speech/communication from 
members of the government resulted in a distorted decision-making process which in tum 
resulted in inauthentic action; that is action based not on the truth but on deception. This fits 
the pattern of strategic action described by Habermas and results in the teleologically driven 
action of which both Arendt and Habermas are so critical. 87 Strategic action is contrasted 
85 Scott, 'Ministerial Accountability', p. 425 
86 Haberrnas, Jlirgen, "A Reply to My Critics," in Habermas: Critical Debates, edited by John B. Thompson 
and David Held (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1982), pp. 288-289. 
87 There is no doubt that Haberrnas does not support, and is in fact critical of, Arendt's complete rejection of 
strategic action. There are also commentators, for example, Johnson who claim that Habermas in his 
'description of strategic action distorts it as a concept'. Johnson claims that Habermas' assessment is that 
'strategic action is assessed solely in terms of efficiency or effectiveness. Johnson, James, 'Habermas on 
Strategic and Communicative Action', Political Theory, Vol. 19, No.2, May, 1991, p. 189 
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unfavourably with communicative action. 88 The theory of communicative competence is an 
attempt to restructure the normative basis of a speech system of 
"universal and necessary" validity claims ... [where] ... understanding is the immanent telos 
or function of speech ... Habermas regards "strategic" forms of communication (such as 
lying, misleading, deceiving, manipulating, etc) as derivative; since they involve the 
suspension of certain validity claims (especially truthfulness), they are parasitic on speech 
oriented to genuine understanding. 89 
In the case highlighted by Scott, therefore, the communication from government 
ministers was oriented not at understanding, but at misleading and deceiving, in order 
that the government could achieve its own strategic goals or ends which concealed a 
covert strategy of arms sales. 
It is necessary to understand the contrast between strategic and communicative 
action in order to appreciate the major role that Habermas assigns to communicative 
action. Although both theories of strategic and communicative action assume that 
human action is potentially rational in its attempts to 
realise specific intentions ... to actors [engaged in strategic action] other people are just 
external, objective facts of reality, ... only with the distinctive quality that they carry out 
actions too. [Whereas], the communicative concept of rationality ... operates with 
dialogical actors who co-ordinate their plans through argumentation aimed at reaching 
mutual agreement. 90 
88 Habermas does however, 'himself insist that strategic action and communicative action are equally 
fundamental forms of social action'. Johnson, p. 191. 
89 McCarthy, Thomas, The Critical Theory of Jiirgen Habermas, (London, Hutchinson & Co., 1978), p.2S7. 
90 Eriksen, Eric Oddvar & Weigard, Jarie, 'Conceptualizing Politics: Strategic or Communicative Action?', 
Scandinavian Political Studies, Vo1.20, No.3, 1997, p.221. 
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Thus, 
Strategic and communicative action constitute two different concepts of rational action 
and two different approaches to the study of politics. The former denotes how individuals 
calculate other people into their plans to reach subjective goals, that is to maximize a 
function; the latter imply that individuals have to reach a mutual understanding in order 
to get things done. Hence, ... [the question arises:] is an observed pattern of political 
behaviour due to strategic actors estimating the best way to further their self-interest, or 
is it due to the reasonable argument between socially situated participants in a political 
discourse? 91 
Thus, strategic action is categorised by Kihlstrom and Israel as when 'one isolated person 
relates to different dimensions in the world (mostly the objective) just to reach hislher own 
calculated success. He does not need to involve the others interest in this. This self-interested 
social action is first of all oriented on consequences instead of reaching understanding and 
can appear as an open strategy or a concealed one.,92 
Whilst it is the case that strategic action must be oriented to success, and whilst it is possible 
that strategic actors are 'atomistic or egoistic' it need not necessarily be the case that 
strategic actors are concerned solely with their own narrow motives or self-interest. 93 What 
is the case, however, is that they are orientated to compromise and not consensus. 
91 Eriksen, & Weigard, 'Conceptualizing Politics: Strategic or Communicative Action?', pp. 221-222. 
92 Kihlstrom, Anita and Israel, Joakim, 'Communicative or strategic action - an examination of fundamental 
issues in the theory of communicative action', International Journal o/Social Welfare, Yol.I 1,2002, p. 212. 
93 Johnson, 'Habermas on Strategic and Communicative Action', p. 19 I. 
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The qualities of strategic action that Kihlstrom and Israel identify and which are of interest to 
us are: 
strategic action co-ordinates interaction by force or influence; the effort to reach 
consensus is unilateral manipulation; the actors manipulate the issue because it benefits 
their final solution; the nature of the argument is legitimised only to the extent that 
benefit unilateral final solutions; competence to reach a goal is unilaterally defined by 
one of the actor's open or hidden goals; one partner blocks the other's experience and 
does not allow it to be dialogically integrated as a competence act; consensus is only 
coincidentally connected to the situation; if consensus occurs it is co-incidental in 
relation to one actor's strategy.94 
Strategic action does not necessarily entail deception but even where it involves telling the 
truth, at least as far as the strategic actor understands it, it does so coincidentally. The 
strategic actor might be responsible to others for the success or failure of his strategy but he 
cannot be politically responsible in the sense in which political responsibility is being 
developed here. For reasons which will be given below the perspective of strategic action has 
to be abandoned for political responsibility to be a possibility. This strategy hardly appears 
conducive to ameliorating cleavages in society by overcoming alienation and exclusion, nor 
is it a strategy that purports to re-Iegitimise the state. We can see, however, how this would 
benefit those who are resisting truth-telling by allowing them to dominate and manipulate the 
communicative process. 
94 Kihlstrom, and Israel, 'Communicative or strategic action - an examination of fundamental issues in the 
theory of communicative action', p. 212. 
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The alternative solution to exclusive strategic action IS communicative action. This is a 
difficult and contested concept, but it is worth rehearsing because the outcome of 
communicative action is consensus rather than compromise and converts politics from 
entrenchment into a transformative undertaking. The most comprehensive and articulated 
proponent of communicative action is Habermas who, echoing Aristotle, stresses that man is 
a zoon politikon or as paraphrased by Habermas 'an animal that exists in a polity, a public 
space'. He asserts that the nature of human beings is that we learn from one another and our 
socialisation and development as people is only possible 'in the public space of a culturally 
stimulating milieu' .95 It is entering this public space and the social interactions that exist 
within it that enable the transformation of the human organism that is a human being, into a 
person. It is this "lifeworld" that creates us as people, that is, it makes us who we are, but 
simultaneously we, through are actions and communications, create the "lifeworld".96 
Habermas identifies 'one particular social space, namely the political public sphere of a 
democratic community' as playing an 'especially important role in the integration of 
citizens,.97 
This political public space contrasts sharply and is in no way similar to lives lived in public 
that we see increasingly in today's media society and which is about self-presentation. Public 
discourse, which is categorised as 
reaching agreement on a particular subject or clarifying reasonable dissent takes priority 
over the self-presentation of the author. Here, the public is not a domain made up of 
viewers or listeners, but instead a space for the contributions of speakers and addressees, 
95 Habermas, 'Public space and political public sphere- the biographical roots of two motifs in my thought', 
Commemorative lecture, (Kyoto, Nov II 2004), p. 3. 
96 This is "double contingency". 
97 Habermas, 'Public space and political public sphere', p. 9. Habermas complains that the technocratic forms 
of political practice has deprived the public sphere of its unique qualities. 
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who confront one another with questions and answers ... The line between public and 
private spheres does not become blurred; the two complement each other instead. 98 
It is hardly surprising therefore, that Habermas VIews communication as the core of any 
action and that the way that one communicates with others and the nature of that 
communication should also be of vital importance.99 Thus, being human is bound up with 
the use of language. The human species is able to maintain itself by the social co-ordinated 
activities of its members, and these co-ordinated activities are possible only by the use of 
language and communication, this communication is aimed at achieving a shared 
agreement. 100 "'Understanding a language" and "being able to speak" refers, then, to skills 
that one has acquired, to the activities that one has learned to carry out in common with 
others.' 101 Habermas claims that it is only through language that social actors can co-
ordinate their actions in a way that may orient them towards mutual understanding. 
If we examine Habermas's theory of communicative action l02 we may be able to understand 
what the account we have a right to be given should consist of. The most successful way of 
understanding the properties of communicative action is to contrast them with those of 
strategic action whose purpose is to exert 'an influence upon others instead of understanding 
with them' .103 The qualities of communicative action of interest to us are: that actors strive 
98 Habermas, 'Public space and political public sphere', p. I. 'Rather than everyone else's gaze being focused 
on the actor, there is an exchange of reasons and opinions. In discourses that focus on a shared subject, 
participants turn their backs on their private lives. They do not need to talk about themselves.' 
99 Mc Carthy, The Critical Theory of Jiirgen Habermas, p. 272. It is then essential to Habermas' project that he 
gives a coherent account of this communication, in fact McCarthy claims that Habermas' project is no less than 
' ... the possibility of providing an account of communication that is both theoretical and normative, .. ' 
100 Brand, Arie, The Force of Reason, (Sydney, Allen & Unwin, 1990), p. II. Habermas is critical of other 
philosophers who have attempted to analyse language only as a 'medium of representation, not of 
communication' . 
lOl McCarthy, The Critical Theory of Jiirgen Habermas, p. 163. 
102 Habermas, Jiirgen., The Theory of Communicative Action, YoU, (London, 1984), p. 286. 'Agents involved 
are co-ordinated not through egocentric calculation of success but through acts of reaching understanding'. 
103 Ibid., p. 286. 
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to understand one another's perspectives; efforts to reach consensus are mutual; actors make 
their arguments based on intersubjective evaluation of the issue; actors can dismiss or accept 
arguments without such conflict causing a breakdown in the dialogue; consensus is 
connected to the specific situation to which the problem is related; the partner's interest can 
be realised through dialogue; asymmetry is legitimised by the partner during the dialogue. 104 
What this illustrates is that politicians invariably adopt strategic action as a way of allowing 
one actor (themselves) to prevail through influencing the other via the arbitrary exercise of 
power or manipulation. This sort of action 'is first of all oriented on consequences instead of 
reaching understanding and can appear as an open strategy or a concealed one' .105 This 
concealed strategy means that 'at least one of the parties behaves with an orientation to 
success, but leaves others to believe that all the presuppositions of communicative action are 
satisfied.,106 Our discussions concerning the sometimes draconian outcomes that can befall a 
politician attempting to give such an account, make it clear why they seek to adopt a strategic 
strategy oriented to consequences rather than a communicative one oriented to 
understanding: 'to the degree that interactions cannot be co-ordinated through achieving 
understanding, the only alternative that remains is force exercised by one against others (in a 
more or less refined, more or less latent manner). The typological distinction between 
communicative and strategic action says nothing else than this.' 107 
There are four different dimensions to communicative action: comprehensibility, truth, 
intentions and legitimacy. Thus to be able to engage in communicative action that meets the 
104 Kihlstrom and Israel, 'Communicative or strategic Action- an examination of fundamental issues in the 
theory of communicative action', p. 212. 
105 Ibid., p. 210. 
106 Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. 1 , p. 332. Quoted in Kihlstrom and Israel, 
'Communicative or strategic Action', p. 211. 
107 Habermas, Itirgen, 'A Reply to My Critics', p. 269. 
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criteria of comprehensibility, the speaker has to select a comprehensible expression in order 
that the speaker and hearer can understand one another, that is the actors strive to understand 
one another's perspective. To meet the criteria of truth the speaker has to have the intention 
of communicating a true propositional content in order that the hearer can share the 
knowledge of the speaker, that is a narrative of factual truth. The speaker has to want to 
express his intentions truthfully in order that the hearer can believe in the speaker's utterance, 
that is that the hearer can trust him. To ensure that the communication is legitimate the 
speaker has to select an utterance that is right in the light of existing norms and values. This 
ensures the hearer can accept the utterance, so that both speaker and hearer can agree with 
one another in the utterance concerning a recognised normative background. IDS 
The act of utterance, situates the sentence in relation to external reality ("the" world of 
objects and events about which one can make true or false statements), inner reality (the 
speaker's "own" world of intentional experiences that can be expressed truthfully or 
untruthfully) and the normative reality of society ("our" social life-world of shared 
values and norms, roles and rules that an act can "fit" or "misfit" and that themselves are 
either "right" - legitimate, justifiable - or "wrong") .... Thus the pragmatic infrastructure 
of speech situations consists of general rules for arranging the elements of speech 
situations within a co-ordinate system formed by "the" world, one's "own" world, and 
"our" shared life-world. 109 
This is an impressive theoretical model, which if it were possible in practice, delineates an 
intelligible, factually correct, appropriate and truthful account that fulfils the criteria for the 
ascription and acceptance of political responsibility. This theory of communicative action is, 
108 Habermas, 'A Reply to My Critics', paraphrased, pp. 288-289. 
109 McCarthy, The Critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas, pp. 279-280. First function (truth claim implicit in 
speech) is the ability to make a 'distinction between a public world (Sein: being, that which really is) and a 
private world (Schein: illusion, that which merely seems to be).' Second function, (claim to truthfulness or 
veracity). Third function, (claim to rightness or appropriateness). 
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however, more than just a model. The case for its significance, for ideas of truth in the 
context of political responsibility, is very clear. It is significant because at its broadest it 
focuses on situations where consensus has broken down or has been challenged. These are 
precisely the kinds of circumstances where questions of political responsibility arise, as we 
have already demonstrated through the workings of the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission in the post-apartheid South Africa or in the discussion of civil disobedience. 
These circumstances of broken consensus and subsequent challenge most often result from 
the consequences of strategic action. The problem with acquiring power by means of 
strategic action is that is 'implies an asymmetrical relation between the citizens where those 
in office have the right to impose their will on subjects, by force if necessary.' 110 In contrast 
the significance of communicative action lies in its multidimensional character. This allows 
us to see the different ways in which the account given by a putatively responsible political 
actor might, or might not, be accepted as persuasive. Hence, this mayor may not facilitate a 
new consensus that allows for both the redemption of the actor and the reintegration of the 
addressee(s) into their social world. 
It does this because it incorporates the need for the kind of factual truth that Arendt refers to 
concerning events and circumstances established by witnesses and dependent on testimony. 
This kind of truth is notably missing from the narratives and accounts given in explanation at 
Oradour-sur-Glane or in the Spanish Civil war, the Cave Creek disaster and those reported 
by Scott over the arms to Iraq affair. These are at best incomplete, selective or partial 
narratives and stand in contrast to narratives of factual truths, truth that is uncontested 
110 Eriksen, Eric Oddvar & Weigard, Jarie, 'Conceptualizing Politics: Strategic or Communicative Action?', 
Scandinavian Political Studies, VoI.20, No.3, 1997, p. 236. 
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'beyond agreement, dispute, OpInIOn or consent'. Not only does this facilitate the 
identification of politically responsible actors, it is such factual uncontested truth about past 
events that provides the link between these past events and future possibilities. 
Habermas also incorporates the requirement for moral appropriateness which in this context 
means that being a member of the polity entitles one to a truthful factual account. Any failure 
to render this truthful account thereby fails to recognise the moral status of those who might 
have suffered as the result of political action, i.e. those who experience a sense of injustice. It 
has already been established that the failure to identify politically responsible agents 
generates this sense of injustice. This is manifested through violated expectations, such as 
those at Cave Creek, which generate feelings of affront and alienation resulting in exclusion 
from the polity. The cynicism that this engenders undermines its legitimacy and is deeply 
damaging to the political process as a whole. 
Habermas has in mind and clearly delineates lying, misleading, deception or manipulation on 
the part of strategic actors as being incompatible with the need for authenticity. I II This is 
undoubtedly true and Arendt obviously agrees that they are incompatible. To overcome this 
Habermas, therefore, incorporates the need for authenticity based on truthfulness and 
oriented to genuine understanding. Habermas' ideas concerning authenticity, however, need 
to be supplemented and augmented by those ideas of forgiving and promising promulgated 
by Arendt. For, politicians immersed in the political sub-system pursue their own strategic 
goals constrained within their own self-referential system. Goal-driven strategic action 
permits politicians to fulfil their own exclusive agendas subject to the contingency of the 
III Habermas, "A Reply to My Critics," in Habermas: Critical Debates, edited by John B. Thompson and 
David Held, pp.288-289. 
233 
world. Asking them to give a truthful factual account for their actions in public is rightly 
perceived by politicians as containing risks; risks that include censure and/or their removal 
from office or power. Thus, as has already been discussed the desired level of authenticity by 
political actors is unlikely without the possibility of forgiving and promising. The inherent 
dichotomy of this is that as soon as the possibility of forgiving and promising is required then 
the kind of authenticity involved in political responsibility is not only much more demanding 
but involves greater risks both for the political actor and the community. For example, lies 
told in giving an account will typically involve lies about what has happened in the past and 
such lies clearly obstruct political responsibility. Such lies can, however, be challenged or 
exposed by, for example, reference to documents that disclose another narrative. However, 
lies told in acts of forgiving and promising are not subject to such exposure, or at least not in 
such a manner. Their presence would, however, undermine the possibility of new beginnings 
by forming a false and/or incomplete narrative as a basis of new actions. Further, because 
promising and forgiving contain reference to the future, they involve greater reliance upon 
the authenticity of those promising (that they will do x in the future) and forgiving (that they 
do, and will continue to, forgive rather than seek retribution). 
Finally, Habermas' theory of communicative action as it relates to political responsibility is 
in direct contrast to Weber's claims concerning political responsibility which rely on the 
conscience of his tragic hero. Unlike the tragic hero for whom there can be no escape from 
his political responsibility, Habermas makes no pretence that the outcome of communicative 
action is guaranteed, i.e. that communicative action will succeed. The problem with political 
responsibility contra Weber is, however, that in reality it is so onerous for the political actor 
that it will always invite evasion. Although this has some implications for the politician the 
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major implication is the effect on the political community for which he acts. As there is no 
place for an account to the community there can be no place for truth or to redress injustice. 
The crucial difference between strategic and communicative action is that political 
responsibility is seen to have dire consequences for the political actor and this consideration 
takes precedence in strategic action. In contrast, in communicative action the considerations 
concerning the consequences of the evasion of political responsibility for the community 
take precedence. The process by which we attempt to reach consensus can be as important as 
the consensus itself. There will always be serious, vitally important issues, for example 
global warming, where the considerations of conflicting views may never lead to consensus, 
but where the stating of these apparently conflicting considerations can form a basis for the 
negotiation of practical amelioration of perceived problems. Thus, whilst' a conversation like 
this may not lead to consensus at all, but is nevertheless the only way to deal with these sorts 
of conflicts, providing the members want to go on living peacefully together and not resort to 
bare coercion, force, violence (or pure negligence).' 112 Thus, Habermas' model although 
offering no guarantees for success is sited firmly within the community that it effects. 
A truthful factual account will help to overcome the alienation and exclusion felt by those 
who have suffered from wrongs, and it will, therefore, re-Iegitimise the polity. It will ensure 
that the foundation of the future of the polity is not based on a false narrative or profound 
cynicism. To be politically responsible requires giving an account but before we can expect 
political actors to be prepared to take the risk of giving this sort of truthful account in public 
we must ensure that forgiveness is possible. We have already acknowledged that this strategy 
of giving a truthful account involves risks for all those involved in communicative action. 
The risks are clear for the political actor, the speaker, for us the addressees the risk is that we 
112 Eriksen & Weigard 'Conceptualizing Politics: Strategic or Communicative Action?' pp. 237-238. 
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might be pushed in the direction of forgiving some actions that we would not be inclined to 
forgive. This is a risk that we must take. 'If forgiveness is to be worth its name Derrida 
insists, it must be unconditional: we must forgive what cannot be forgiven.' 113 We must do 
this because forgiving and promising offers the possibility that the political process can move 
forward despite the impediments of a contingent world. A truthful account is, therefore, the 
link between past and future. Forgiving can restore political actors because the power that 
forgiveness has is the ability to stop the transgressor from forever being seen in the light of 
her transgression. For although the truth is always about the past, a truthful account of past 
transgressions that underpins the requirements for the ascription and acceptance of political 
responsibility has a restorative effect which will allow the possibility of new beginnings. The 
risk to society is that we have to enter into a shared future through the facility of promising 
with only the politician's assurances that he will not transgress in the same way in the future. 
113 Derrida, Jacques, On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness, (London and New York, Routledge, 2001), pp. 34-
35. Quoted by Schaap, Andrew, Forgiveness, Reconciliation, and Transitional Justice', in Lang, Anthony F., & 
Williams, John, (eds.), Hannah Arendt and International Relations, (New York, Palgrave, 2005), p. 75. 
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Conclusion 
As Marx so clearly expresses it 'Men make their own history but they do not make it just as 
they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under 
circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past.' I The implications 
of this are that we would necessarily need to scale down our expectations of what political 
responsibility can deliver. Nevertheless, lest this project appears so fraught with difficulties 
that it can be ignored, the consequences of not being able to assign political responsibility 
and not being given an account are that the feelings of injustice that this generates can 
ultimately undermine the political process as a whole. This investigation was an attempt to 
establish whether political responsibility was a coherent concept, and secondly to evaluate 
its usefulness in the lexicon of political terms. 
In drawing the boundaries of a possible concept of political responsibility the following 
salient features have emerged. Political responsibility is a narrow concept that can only be 
attributed to politicians, so only those actively involved in the political process as decision-
makers can be politically responsible. Representative democracy has the elements of 
responsibility and consequently "giving an account" of action inherent within it. To avoid 
the "tragic hero" scenario (Weber) there must be incorporated within the concept of political 
responsibility, forgiving and promising. Forgiving and promising offer the potential for new 
beginnings but these new beginnings are only possible by the revelation of the truth. 
I Karl Marx & Friedrich Engels, 'The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte', in Marx, K. and Engels, F., 
Selected Works, Vol. I., (Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1962), p. 247. Quoted in Lukes, 
Stephen, Power; A Radical View, (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p. 26. 
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Saying that someone is responsible is a way of apportioning blame for outcomes which has 
failed at least to meet expectations and may have caused, distress, pain and suffering. 
Saying that someone is politically responsible, therefore, one would assume seeks to 
apportion blame for actions undertaken in the political realm which have not only failed to 
meet expectations but have often caused consequences which have reverberated throughout 
the community. We have seen, however, that these charges of political responsibility can 
range from a war of ethnic cleansing as in the case of Milosovic, to the death of a child 
whilst being supervised by a local authority (Climbie), to the making of a propaganda film 
for a repugnant regime (Reifenstahl). It is often not apparent that the context forms any part 
of a political realm and it appears that political responsibility is pressed into service in 
realms of both the private and commercial worlds. Further, the range of issues in which 
blame is labelled as political responsibility, are so extensive and disparate, being without 
any apparent consistency of severity, content, or consequence that it is difficult to discern 
whether it is an idea that forms a concept or merely a rhetorical response, a "Sunday 
concept". 
The reVIew of scholarly work confirmed this wide and disparate application and 
interpretation of what is meant by political responsibility. Moreover, it revealed that unlike 
"responsibility" the term political responsibility had never received any serious and 
systematic consideration. This is not because its importance is not acknowledged. It is 
perhaps because on examination the complexity of the term political responsibility is such 
that it renders two polar opposite responses. The first is that expressed by Jonas, for 
example, that political responsibility is all encompassing: 'the statesman has political 
responsibility for the total life of the community,2. This is a conceptual problem by Jonas 
2 Jonas, The imperative of Responsibility, pp. 10 1-102. 
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which results in political responsibility being perceived as being extremely and 
unreasonably onerous. The second position perceives political responsibility as being very 
narrow. This is manifest by ministers who nominally accept political responsibility but who 
refuse to give an account of their actions they have often done so in the knowledge that 
without their full account they reduce political responsibility to mere rhetoric. They have 
also invariably evaded the draconian institutional consequences of telling the truth because 
their acceptance of political responsibility was merely a nod to convention. The significance 
is that the outcome of both of these positions is the evasion of political responsibility by 
political actors. Mechanisms which encourage the acceptance of political responsibility 
where a truthful factual account can be given without impossible or destructive risks for the 
political actors will help to overcome the alienation and exclusion felt by those who have 
suffered from wrongs and will therefore re-Iegitimise the polity. Non-evasion of political 
responsibility will allow new beginnings and will ensure that these have a foundation which 
is not based on a false narrative or profound cynicism. 
This review underlined this confusion about where such application is to be located and to 
whom such application can be made. It did however reveal some issues for further 
consideration. The most obvious difficulty was the way in which commentators failed to 
differentiate between political responsibility and other types of responsibility, showing a 
propensity to conflate and confuse political responsibility with criminal, legal or moral 
responsibility. This failure was a direct result of not examining what the term "political" in 
political responsibility represented and the implications of this. The next major difficulty 
was contingency. The contingent nature of the world and the ramifications of its complexity 
raised serious questions regarding agency, cause and capacity, which questioned the 
possibility of the ascription and/or acceptance of political responsibility. 
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Despite these impediments there is a fundamental reason to pursue the idea of political 
responsibility because what the literature review also revealed was that the first casualties of 
the absence of political responsibility are justice and truth. The serious corollary of this is at 
worst the political system can break down or at the very least it becomes an object of 
cynicism and apathy amongst the members of the polity it is supposed to represent. This 
damage to the political system if not remedied can have long lasting consequences, where 
the feelings of injustice lead to alienation of those members of the polity who are affected. 
This study has sought to disentangle the conflation between different types of responsibility 
and firmly locate the idea of political responsibility by an exploration of the significance of 
the political. The result of this has been that political responsibility has been established as a 
real concept and further exploration of contingency, justice and truth has facilitated the 
emergence of a set of normative values. The first normative value to be established forming 
a concept of political responsibility was that political responsibility can only be attributed to 
political actors who have voluntarily left (or have been forced to leave), the private world 
and are operating in the public realm: political responsibility can only be ascribed to those 
who are political actors in the public political realm. 
From the examination of representative democracy during the discussion of contingency, a 
further normative value was established. The concept of representation as it refers to 
representational democracy contains the element of accountability, "of giving an account". 
This second normative value, is that to be politically responsible the political actor 'should 
be prepared to give that account in public under the full glare of the public gaze. More 
fundamentally, when he acts in the political realm he should always be mindful that should 
he ever be required to do so, he should always be able to account for his actions. Thus he 
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ought to have reasons for what he does, and be prepared to justify his actions to those he acts 
for, even if this accounting or justification never actually takes place. ,3 The third normative 
value to be established directly relates to the second. The account of action that must be 
given by the political actor refers solely to decisions of "high policy"; this overcomes any 
obfuscation concerning the split· between the political and administrative systems to 
safeguard and re-Iegitimise the polity. 
Giving an account is however, always about the past. Unless this account is truthful then the 
narratives that are created are fundamentally false. False narratives mean that the future is 
inevitably based on a collective lie, delusion and a politics of selective memory. This will 
create fragility within the polity that will render it unable to withstand any challenges. The 
truth is the link between the past and the future. The discourse of truth will be something 
like Habermas' understanding of truth as a form of communicative action. In terms of 
political responsibility, the fourth normative value is, therefore, that the account given by the 
political actor appears in the form of a narrative, a truthful factual account. 
At present the greatest impediment to giving a truthful factual account for political actors in 
most western democracies is that they inevitably risk severe sanctions. On this basis one can 
understand the propensity of politicians to deny their political responsibility. The decisions 
they have made involving political action have involved them in the risks of action taken in 
the contingent world where the full consequences incurred as a result of that action may not 
have been apparent. We the addressees, however, are also subject to risk. In order to 
mitigate against the risks inherent in communicative action within a contingent world and 
allow the political system to be re-Iegitimised and new beginnings undertaken further 
3 Pitkin, The Concept of Representation, p. 119. 
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safeguards need to be incorporated into a concept of political responsibility. These are 
forgiving and promising. There can be no question that giving the factual truthful account 
that is required by political actors will automatically attract forgiveness. The account cannot 
be given on the condition that forgiveness will follow and also cannot imply the remission 
of sanctions or punishment. 
These discussions of political responsibility, as well as being able to offer the potential for 
progress, also include pitfalls. We the addressees face the risks and necessary compromises 
that may for instance push us in the direction of forgiving some things that we would not be 
inclined to forgive. These compromises may, for instance, require us to accept the accounts 
of political actors that we find morally repugnant and where our outrage would have lead us 
to draconian retribution. Given the evidence we have found of the damaging effect of failure 
to ascribe and/or accept political responsibility, the primary aim of this exercise is to restore 
confidence in, and re-Iegitimise, the political system. If this involves acknowledgement of 
his transgression by the political actor in his acceptance of the addressees' forgiveness, and 
his promise to act differently in the future from his past actions, then the imperfections and 
doubts within the process may be tolerated for the health of the polity. 
It is as well to stress and reiterate that our investigations have discovered that rather than a 
"Sunday concept," political responsibility has within it some substantive and very valuable 
properties, but that the concept also has some severe limitations. It is not the catch-all 
concept which people would like it to be to enable the automatic condemnation and 
punishment of political actors, nor is it akin to giving a moral framework for government. 
The value within it is that it may allow political actors to make mistakes, and by accounting 
for these set up new beginnings with real plausible promises in the Arendtian sense, for 
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better government. That the lessons learnt through the examination of past mistakes allows 
for the possibility that the political process can move forward despite the impediments of a 
contingent world. 
To those who would suggest that there is no mechanism or precedent for such a process, we 
would ask them to consider how the systems for dealing with criminal and legal 
responsibility have been established. There are many precedents in judicial enquiries, Royal 
Commissions and select committees that suggest that a rational forum for communicative 
action within the political system but representing political actors and addressees within the 
polity could be easily formulated. For those who would argue that we are in a period of 
parliamentary decline which would make scrutiny of the executive increasingly problematic, 
they should refer to the analysis by Matthew Flinders of reform that have been instigated by 
the government within the House of Commons from 2001 to 2005. Flinders claims that 
'scrutiny reforms implemented during 2001-05 should not be dismissed... A number of 
significant "cracks and wedges" have been achieved and these may expand over time 
through a gradual process of extension, accretion and spillover.,4 
Limiting political responsibility to political actors within the public sphere could be 
construed as a contrivance to protect individuals in the private sphere from the ascription of 
political responsibility. Jaspers is the philosopher most critical of this process. Although we 
would want to agree with Jaspers that those involved in taking political action also share 
responsibility, this is not political responsibility but moral responsibility. Without this 
4 Flinders, Matthew, 'Analysing Reform: The House of Commons, 2001-5', Political Studies, Vo1.55, No.1, 
2007, p. 174. 
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separation we can see, as Arendt claimed, that it is impossible to distinguish those who are 
really guilty from those who are not, and the individual is lost in the collective. 
This view of political responsibility, however, raises some further serious objections. The 
first and most obvious is that of the relationship that the politicians that we wish to hold 
politically responsible have to power. As C. Wright Mills states: 
As the means of information and of power are centralised some men come to occupy 
positions in ... society from which they can look down upon ... the everyday worlds of 
ordinary men and women .... They are in command of the major hierarchies and 
organisations of modem society ... They run the machinery of state and claim its 
prerogatives ... They occupy the strategic command posts of the social structure in which 
are now centred the effective means of the power and the wealth and the celebrity which 
h . 5 t eyenJoy. 
The argument is that the domination by elite groups is so complete that it is impossible to 
hold them to account, that their power allows them to further their own and/or their group or 
parties interests at the expense of the interests of the electorate in general. This is of course 
perfectly true, but ultimately is self-defeating, as they will eventually undermine the 
legitimacy with which they hold their power. Lukes also claims that the concept of power 
that he has developed also contains an inherent element of responsibility: 'it is "realistic, 
morally fair and politically imperative to make demands upon the men of power and to hold 
them responsible for specific courses of action .... those who have the power to advance or 
harm others interests but fail to realise or attend to this"'. 6 Lukes maintains that 'this 
5 Lukes, Power A Radical View, p. 2. 
6 Mills, C. Wright, The Causes of World War Three, (London, Seeker & Warburg, 1959), 100. Quoted in 
Lukes, pp. 66-67 & 77. 
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incidentally shows that the question of responsibility is not only moral but also and mainly 
political. ,7 
The second objection is that of domination and false consciousness. This follows Marx's 
conception and challenges the ability of those subordinate groups who are subj ects of power 
relationships having the ability to challenge the normative values underlying the social 
order. 
The thick version [of false consciousness] claims that a dominant ideology works its 
magic by persuading subordinate groups to believe actively in the values that explain and 
justify their own subordination ... .The thin theory of false consciousness, on the other 
hand maintains only that the dominant ideology achieves compliance by convincing 
subordinate groups that the social order in which they live in natural and inevitable. The 
thick theory claims consent; the thin theory settles for resignation.8 
If this is indeed the case then any claim that these subordinate groups would either 
understand that they needed to or would be able to hold elite groups to account are mistaken. 
An example of this process was seen in the run-up to the Iraq war when the government 
claimed that it had intelligence and knowledge far superior to anything that the informed 
man in the street could envisage. Although this even convinced Cabinet Ministers 
nevertheless this turned out to be a complete fiction which two million street protesters had 
already acknowledged. 
This exerCise to establish the concept of political responsibility has identified other 
directions for possible further research involving the normative values that have been 
7 Lukes, Power A Radical View, p. 67. 
8 Ibid. p. 126. 
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identified for the concept of political responsibility. These areas include; political 
responsibility and amnesty, political responsibility and collaboration, political responsibility 
and apology and reparations, and political responsibility and restorative justice. 
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